It will be seen from the above that there was little in Arabia to attract the
attention of the great powers of late antiquity, and at first it was only Arabia’s
role athwart the route to the east that lent it any importance to them. This
factor alone was sufficient to make Arabia a focus of imperial manoeuvring
and power politics, but trade operated in conjunction with other factors as
well. The spread of Christianity and to a lesser extent Judaism in Arabia
reflects the interest of external powers from an early date. In fact, it was
the great triad of politics, trade and religion that determined the course of
events there from late antiquity onwards, with trade providing an imperial
momentum later transferred to the other two factors.
All around the peripheries of Arabia the impact of imperium was being
felt. Behind the Roman presence advancing in the north came Roman
roads, way-stations and forts, reflecting an increasing interest in control
of what lay beyond. Far more vigorous, however, were the inroads by the
Sasanians: they had a more immediate stake in Arabia, with their capital
at Ctesiphon, the rich agricultural alluvium of Iraq, and the Persian Gulf
trade to consider. Settlements were founded up and down the Gulf, and
Oman was annexed by Shapur I (240–70). In the fourth century, Arab raids
provoked a punitive expedition that reached as far as the Hijaz. Discovery
of silver and copper in theNajd led to the foundation of a Sasanian outpost
at Shamam.67
Several factors exacerbated the rivalry between the two imperial powers.
The establishment under Constantine of a Christian empire based at
Constantinople made competition with Persia more immediate and provided
yet another arena for intrigue and dispute. But more important by far
was the evolution of the rival polities themselves. From largely decentralised
and culturally diverse empires, tolerant of a broad range of contradictory
ideologies and traditions, both developed into world powers; they used
political, economic and military strength to pursue imperial aims that were
justified by elitist ideologies, spurred by aspirations to universal dominion,
and increasingly dictated from the capital. The Byzantine and Sasanian
empires competed for control of western Asia and adopted more global
strategies in efforts to promote their own interests and undermine those of
their rival.68 Thus, while the rise of Christianity led to the collapse of the
market for the incense consumed so massively and ostentatiously by pagan
Rome,69 the demise of this formerly crucial aspect of the eastern trade was
more than replaced by new rivalries of unprecedented intensity.
The new level of conflict generated by escalating competition between
the two great powers manifested itself in several ways where Arabia and the
Arabs were concerned. Firstly a pronounced religious element was introduced
into the struggle, primarily in the southern part of the peninsula
and surrounding lands. Monophysite missionary activity70 led to the conversion
of Ethiopia to Christianity in the fourth century and the spread of
the faith in Yemen and elsewhere in south Arabia. The Christian presence
noted frequently in the Koran was probably the result of commercial contacts
with Syria. The Sasanians, on the other hand, supported the spread of
the rival confession of the Nestorians and also encouraged the Himyarites,
a predominantly Jewish regime which ruled most of south Arabia and had
influence elsewhere. Religious rivalries played an instrumental role in an
Ethiopian invasion of Yemen in about 518 and shortly thereafter in a Himyarite
civil war between Christian and Jewish factions. This struggle led to
a persecution of Christians in south Arabia under the last Himyarite ruler
Dhu Nuwas, culminating in the 520s with the massacre of the Christians
of Najran. Ethiopia responded with a second invasion, killing Dhu Nuwas
and once again installing a puppet regime in Yemen. The power of the
Ethiopian governor, however, was soon usurped by a certain Abraha, who
established himself as the paramount authority in the south; the Meccans
viewed his expedition of 552 as directed against themselves, but it was in
fact a move against tribal forces to the east.
Secondly, external forces gradually encircled and penetrated the peninsula.
The Sasanians established trading posts beyond the Straits ofHormuz
as far as Aden and in the sixth century occupied Yemen. Persian authority
extended as far as Yathrib, where taxes collected by the Jewish tribes of
Qurayza and al-Nadir were sent on in part to a Persian ‘governor of the
desert’ (marzub¯an al-b¯adiya).71 Byzantium, on the other hand, still had
trade through Clysma and Ayla to protect,72 and sought a sea route to the
east that would not be subject to Persian taxes and interference. It thus
tried to extend its influence down the Red Sea and battled against pirates
and adventurers to maintain control of ports and customs stations; epigraphical
evidence places Byzantine forces nearly a thousand kilometres
south of Damascus in the mid-sixth century.73 It also used its new Christian
ally, Ethiopia, to pursue its economic interests and intervene militarily
in the affairs of the south, encouraging the Himyarites to attack Persian
interests.74
Thirdly, both powers used tribal allies in Arabia to further their own
interests, protect their Arabian frontier zones, and confront the tribal forces
of the other side. Such a tactic was not new. Rome and Persia had routinely
used tribal auxiliaries in various capacities,75 and in the late fifth and early
sixth centuries the Himyarites in Yemen coopted the great north Arabian
tribal confederation of Kinda into acting in their interest and controlling
caravan traffic along the routes from Yemen to Syria and Iraq. Kinda
eventually extended its control across central Arabia, as well as part of the
Hijaz and areas along the Persian Gulf coast, and in the early sixth century
it was attacking both Byzantine and Sasanian targets along the desert
fringes of Syria and Iraq. Seeking to avoid further incursions and to gain
a strong tribal ally against forces acting for the Sasanians, the Byzantines
reached an understanding with the confederation and on several occasions
sent embassies to promote good relations. Kinda thus became an ally of
Byzantium; turning against the Sasanians, it gained considerable authority
in the hinterlands of south-western Iraq and even occupied al-Hira for a
time.76 However, its primary sponsors remained the Himyarites in Yemen,
and as this regime declined, so did the fortunes of Kinda.
The Sasanians’ main tribal ally was the Lakhmids, a tribe that had established
itself in north-eastern Arabia by the fourth century and founded
a stable base at al-Hira. There had been contacts and relations between
the two sides in the past, but the combination of deteriorating relations
with Byzantium and the spectre of powerful Kinda forces allied to Byzantium
and positioned within easy striking distance of Ctesiphon and the
agricultural plains of Iraq led the Sasanians to support and encourage the
Lakhmids with renewed vigour. The latter had long been subordinate to
Kinda, and double marriages between them had been arranged at least
twice in the past. Nevertheless, by about 504 the new Lakhmid chieftain,
al-Mundhir III (504–54), was able to rid himself of Kinda suzerainty and
launch operations against the confederation with a well-organised army.77
Fighting over the next two decades ended with the utter disintegration of
Kinda and the extension of Lakhmid authority over their rival’s former
clients among the Arab tribes. By the 540s the Lakhmids held sway over
many of the tribes of central Arabia and over towns as far west as Mecca.78
Byzantium was thus forced to turn to other Arab clients for the protection
of its position and interests. Its choice fell on the Ghassanids, a south
Arabian tribe closely related to Kinda, that had migrated to northern Arabia
and Syria in the fifth century and established itself as the pre-eminent
power on the desert fringe there. The Ghassanids were a more nomadic
group than the Lakhmids; although they were often associated with the
camping-ground called al-Jabiya 65 kilometres south-west of Damascus,
they had no real fixed centre comparable to that of the Lakhmids at al-
Hira. Their influence was not as broad-ranging as that of the Lakhmids, and
although they had trading connections with Iraq throughNisibis andDara,
their control over the relevant routes was tenuous.Nevertheless, Byzantium
granted the Ghassanid sheikh the title of phylarch and showered him with
honours, privileges and money. In return, it was expected that the chieftain
would keep his own tribe under control and protect imperial interests from
other tribes as well.79
The Ghassanids and Lakhmids, confronting one another across the Syrian
desert, were thus drawn into the series of great Byzantine–Persian wars
that began in 502 and ended with a decisive Byzantine victory in 628 (see
above, pp. 119–20, 124–7, 135–6). Significant fighting between them began
in the 520s and continued sporadically for sixty years, with dire consequences
for the agricultural infrastructure of both Syria and Iraq. Several
observers describe the destruction in Syria,80 and whatever survived the passage
of raiding parties and military expeditions was exposed to the brigands
and outlaws hovering around such forces.81
This military conflict tends to overshadow other developments in which
the two sides were variously involved. The Ghassanids were responsible
for the establishment of several small towns in the hinterlands south of
Damascus and perhaps also for some of the so-called ‘desert palaces’ of the
Syrian steppe.82 Sponsors of monophysite Christianity, they also erected
numerous churches and monasteries. In Iraq, al-Hira grew from a camp
(which is what the name means in Arabic) into a lively Arab town, noted
for its churches and monasteries, impressive residential compounds and
taverns. Persian Gulf shipping could sail up the Euphrates as far as al-Hira,
and Lakhmid income included proceeds not only from raids but also from
agricultural rents and produce, trade, and taxes from tribes they controlled.
There also seems to have been a nascent literary tradition emerging there.83
Both sides, especially the Lakhmids, were also major patrons of Arab oral
culture, and some of the most important poets of pre-Islamic times gained
generous support from Ghassanid or Lakhmid sheikhs.84
The history of the Arab client regimes is important, but they were not
central in the imperial planning of either Byzantium or Persia, in which they
figured mainly as threats that had to be countered.85 Little is knownfromthe
Lakhmid and Persian side, but Byzantine emperors, political strategists and
historians such as Procopius certainly held the Ghassanids in low esteem.
The Byzantines had little faith in the abilities, motives or intentions of their
Arab allies. The treaty of 561, for example, expresses dissatisfaction with
Saracen adherence to treaty terms in the past, comes close to calling them
smugglers and traitors, and warns of harsh punishment for lawbreakers.86
When Ghassanid phylarchs refused to adhere to Chalcedonian orthodoxy,
they were exiled. Byzantium made overtures to the Lakhmids when it was
expedient, and the lack of trust and commitment worked both ways: the
capture of Dara by Khusro I probably involved some negotiations with the
Ghassanid phylarch al-Mundhir (569–82).87
Neither side survived the manoeuvrings of their patrons or the broader
conflict which engulfed the Middle East in the sixth century. In 581 al-
Mundhir was arrested by Emperor Tiberius I (578–82) and exiled to Sicily
in a religious dispute, and in 584 his son and successor al-Nu‘man joined
him. The Ghassanid phylarchate rapidly fell apart, fragmented by Emperor
Maurice (582–602) into a host of smaller entities and riven with dissension
and conflict over the deposition of two leaders within four years. Forces
from the tribe are mentioned in accounts of the Arab conquest of Syria, but
not in a leading role.88 The Lakhmids survived a while longer, but during
the reign of Shah Khusro II (591–628) they were displaced in favour of a
similarly decentralised system. The Sasanians also promoted the position
of the Banu Hanifa, who roamed in the desert on their southern flank.89
Later, when a force of Persian troops and Arab auxiliaries sought to quell a
desert revolt in about 610, their army was beaten at Dhu Qar; this was the
first time the tribes had been able to defeat the Sasanians in battle.90 It also
illustrates how the demise of the Arab client regimes marked not the shift
from one system of frontier defence to another, but rather the opening of a
great power vacuum extending from the desert fringes of Syria and Iraq all
the way to central Arabia. Inhabitants of the peninsula remembered that
they had once been ‘trapped on top of a rock between the two lions, Persia
and Byzantium’.91 But as the next decade was to reveal, those days were
gone forever and the Persian setback at Dhu Qar was but a hint of things
to come.
World History
