In 850, Caliph al-Mutawakkil (847–61) sent Abu Sa‘id Muhammad bin
Yusuf to Armenia to collect the so-called ‘royal taxes’. Although these were
apparently paid, relations between representatives of Abu Sa‘id and the
principal Artsruni and Bagratuni princes deteriorated rapidly and all parties
took up arms.66 In 852, Bugha al-Kabir embarked on a series of ruthless
campaigns to quash Armenian resistance. The principal noble families were
targeted and many leading members were either killed or captured and
despatched to the Abbasid capital, Samarra. A few, however, escaped. In
853 or 854, Gurgen Artsruni sought refuge with Gregory Bagratuni, prince
of Sper.67 Gregory had recently captured an unidentified Byzantine fortress
called Aramaneak. When the Byzantine ‘general of the east’ – an Armenian
rendering of strat¯egos t¯on Anatolik¯on – attempted to recover Aramaneak,
both princes opposed him. He was so impressed by Gurgen’s courage that
he informedMichael III (842–67), who invited Gurgen to Constantinople.
Gurgen declined but he did persuade Gregory to return the fortress and
also fought against Bugha’s troops when they attacked ‘the Greek forces
in their fortresses’. This is the first recorded contact between an Artsruni
prince and Byzantium for many generations. Significantly it took place in
Sper while Armenia was in turmoil.
Nor was this the limit of Byzantine ambitions. In 858, after Gurgen had
returned to Vaspurakan, he was confronted byGregory Artsruni at the head
of Abkhazian and Iberian troops.68 Having failed to attractGurgen, it seems
that Byzantium had switched its attention to a second displaced Artsruni
prince and backed his bid to seize Vaspurakan. Although Gregory was
unsuccessful, the imperial administration evidently had a strategic vision
which extended far beyond those districts adjacent to imperial territory.
Therefore when Photios became patriarch of Constantinople in 858 and
re-established contact with the Armenian church, he did so in the context
of renewed Byzantine engagement across Armenia. The sequence and
chronology of the letters exchanged between Photios (858–67, 877–86) and
several Armenian correspondents, including CatholicosZacharias (855–76),
remains contentious, as does the authenticity of one of Photios’ letters to
Zacharias.69 Collectively the correspondence attests Photios’ determination
to heal the long-standing confessional breach. The council of Shirakawan,
convened in 862 by Zacharias, represents the first fruits of Photios’ initiative.
70 Canons 13 and 14 respectively condemn two groups: firstly, convinced
monophysites who masquerade as Chalcedonians, for personal gain; and
secondly, those who have apparently accepted Chalcedon, but still cannot
help themselves from adopting the traditional Armenian charge – that the
council’s ruling on the unity of Christ’s person was, in fact, Nestorian.
As Jean-Pierre Mah´e puts it, ‘le cas pr´evu ´etait la conversion de monophysites
au dyophysisme et non l’inverse.’71 The aftermath of this council
is unknown but just before his deposition in 867, Photios observed in an
encyclical letter that ‘today, the covenant of the Armenians worships purely
and in orthodox fashion the Christian faith.’72
By the time Photios was reappointed patriarch on 26 October 877, conditions
had altered dramatically. His ‘spiritual brother’ Zacharias had died
and the prince of princes, Ashot Bagratuni, was now entrenched as the preeminent
client of the caliph and wary of Byzantine initiatives. Although
Photios made considerable efforts to engage with Ashot, sending conciliatory
letters addressed to ‘your most eminent piety’, despatching a relic of the
True Cross and even reporting that relics of the three most revered Armenian
saints had been found in Constantinople, he was unable to recover
lost ground.73 The final letters chart the breakdown in discussions with
Ashot and his spiritual advisers. Both sides reverted to their traditional
positions, defining and rebutting in meticulous detail the doctrinal errors
of the other. Although these letters are not dated, the heavy defeats suffered
by the Byzantine forces atMelitene in 882 and Tarsus in 883 provide a likely
terminus ante quem (see above, p. 297). Around 925, Patriarch Nicholas I
Mystikos (901–7, 912–925) reflected that Photios had pursued ecclesiastical
reconciliation with Armenia without success, implying no correspondence
on this subject between the churches in the intervening forty years.74
Frustratingly there is no evidence for contacts with the feuding members
of the Artsruni house in Vaspurakan after 858. A little more is known about
relations with the extended Bagratuni family. Photios acknowledged Ashot
Bagratuni’s concern for his recent travails and joy at his restoration in 877,
suggesting contact before he had regained the patriarchate.Moreover Ashot
learned about the discovery of the Armenian relics during an embassy from
Basil I (867–86) in 878. In spite of these initiatives, it was not Ashot, prince
of princes, who was appointed kouropalat¯es but his cousin Ashot, prince of
Taron, at an unspecified date before 878.75 In a final letter, Photios described
the Taronites who inhabited Fourth Armenia as orthodox.76 It may well
be the case that Ashot was rewarded for his orthodoxy. Alternatively the
relative proximity of Taron to imperial territory may have influenced the
appointment. Either way, Byzantium developed ties simultaneously with
several Bagratuni princes.
Three decades of ambitious military and ecclesiastical initiatives beyond
the eastern frontier, lasting from 854 to 883, were followed by an era of
consolidation. Little-known figures, controlling districts much closer to
imperial territory, were induced to acknowledge imperial sovereignty. After
the accession of Leo VI (886–912), Manuel, lord of Degik, was given a
written guarantee of immunity, taken to Constantinople and appointed
pr¯otospatharios.77 At the same time, other Armenians were appointed to
separate commands along the frontier, usually organised around individual
fortresses, and encouraged to expand into adjacent districts. Thus
Melias (or Mleh in Armenian) was first appointed turmarch of Euphrateia
and Trypia.78 In 908, he captured the kastron of Lykandos and became
its kleisouriarch. He then advanced to Tzamandos and constructed a
kastron. Later he annexed Symposion. In 915 he was appointed strat¯egos
of the newly-created theme of Lykandos. Melias’ lordship thereby gained
an administrative and legal identity within theByzantine state. The network
of themes created piecemeal along the eastern frontier reflected the local
achievements of men such as Melias. Inevitably there were losers as well as
winners. For every Melias, there were figures like Ismael ‘the Armenian’,
kleisouriarch of Symposion, who was killed by raiders from Melitene.
It would be wrong, however, to assume that this time of consolidation on
the frontier coincided with any break in relations with Armenian princes
beyond the frontier. Again, several isolated references indicate continued
contact with key Bagratuni princes. After Ashot, prince of princes, had been
crowned king on 26 August 884 by Catholicos George II (877–97) using a
crown brought from the caliph, Basil I acknowledged him as his ‘beloved
son’.79 Leo VI addressed Ashot I’s son Smbat I Bagratuni (‘the Martyr’)
(c. 890–913) in the same way after he succeeded his father in about 890,
sending him ‘fine weapons and ornaments and clothing embroidered with
gold and cups and chalices and golden belts studded with gems’.80 In 892
Smbat captured the city of Dvin and sent its commanders to the emperor in
chains, although it seems that this campaign was his own initiative rather
than a joint operation.81 When the prince of Taron, Krikorikios (‘little
Gregory’), captured his two cousins in battle in the mid-890s, Smbat wrote
to Leo VI, interceding for their release.82 Evidently he believed that the
emperor could influence the actions of Krikorikios and in this he was
proved right.
This incident is reported in chapter forty-three of Constantine VII Porphyrogenitus’
De administrando imperio, whose importance has long been
recognised.83 It describes how several members of the princely family of
Taron across two generations were drawn into the political and cultural
orbit of Byzantium; the titles, marriages and properties variously granted
to them; and the consequences of such engagement for the very existence
of the principality. The chapter ends with the patrikios Tornikios offering
to cede his territories to the emperor, Romanos I Lekapenos (920–44).
Although Tornikios died before completing this transfer of sovereignty,
he left a will – a Byzantine rather than an Armenian custom – devising
the same. His cousins complained to Romanos, who agreed to exchange
his inheritance for Oulnoutin, a strategically placed kastron in the west
of Taron. This chapter reveals much else besides, not least the collection
and retention of information gained during diplomatic exchanges; a legal
dispute between different members of an Armenian family over title to
their property in Constantinople, encouraged if not inspired by the imperial
authorities; and complaints to Romanos from three other Armenian
princes over payments made to Krikorikios. It is worth remembering, however,
that this chapter affords a partial view of diplomatic relations with one
particular princely house and the territorial rights conceded to Romanos.
The following three chapters trace imperial claims to the Qaysid emirate
of Manzikert, to specific districts and kastra around Theodosioupolis and
to the kastron of Ardanuji in Klarjet‘i; they do not supply an exhaustive
account of relations with every Armenian princely house.
A better impression of the range of Armenian contacts is supplied by the
protocols for imperial correspondence preserved in the Book of ceremonies.84
The list, which has been dated to between 918 and 922, identifies not only
the prince of princes of Greater Armenia and the prince of Vaspurakan,
‘who now is honoured as prince of princes’, but also seven other Armenian
princes. Yet arguably even this list does not do justice to the range
of potential correspondents. It identifies only the leading representative of
each princely house, but, as we have seen in respect of Taron above, several
members of the same house could be in direct relationship with the
emperor.
In addition to the activities of Armenian commanders on the frontier,
and diplomatic links, Byzantium could also intervene directly using its
military forces. A Byzantine force attacked Theodosioupolis as early as 895,
whilst in 915 Ashot II Bagratuni (‘the Iron’) (914–c.928), son of King Smbat
I ‘the Martyr’, returned from exile in Constantinople at the head of a
Byzantine army, intent on re-establishing himself in the districts previously
held by his father.85 In the event, neither campaign was followed up but
such apparently isolated actions need to be placed in the context of heavy
Byzantine defeats in the Balkans, at Bulgarophygon in 896 and Anchialos
in 917. Only after peace had been achieved in 927 were Byzantine forces
redirected to the east.86 Thereafter key fortresses under Arab control were
systematically targeted.Melitene capitulated in 934 and Theodosioupolis in
949, both after years of persistent pressure and blockade. At the same time,
every effort was made to ensure that neighbouring Armenian or Iberian
princes were not antagonised. Conceivably this strategy was devised after
two early reverses. In 922 when a Byzantine army attacked Dvin, it was
opposed by the same Ashot II ‘the Iron’ who had benefited from imperial
support seven years before.87 Only in exceptional circumstances did an
Armenian prince fight against imperial troops. Arguably his own interests
had been prejudiced by this advance. Secondly, an attempt was made in
923 to seize control of Ardanuji, located beyond the frontier in Klarjet‘i,
by infiltrating troops under the guise of a visiting diplomatic mission.88
Although this kastron had been offered to Romanos I Lekapenos by its
prince, the threat by neighbouring Iberian princes to make common cause
with local Arabs precipitated a rapid withdrawal.
Frustratingly it is at this very moment, with Byzantium poised to utilise
all three approaches – administrative, diplomatic and military – that our
source-material peters out. There is sufficient evidence, however, to confirm
that the eclipse in Bagratuni power – epitomised by Smbat I’s murder in
913 and perpetuated by the long confrontation between Ashot II ‘the Iron’
and Smbat’s nephew, also called Ashot – forced Byzantium to reappraise its
position and recognise Gagik Artsruni as the pre-eminent figure.89 Shortly
after the death of Catholicos John V in 925, Gagik I Artsruni (908–c.943)
wrote to Nicholas I Mystikos, seeking to secure the succession for his
preferred candidate through a ceremony in Constantinople.Nicholas’ reply,
addressed to Gagik ‘prince of princes’, was uncompromising in its defence
of orthodox belief, maintaining that Gagik’s candidate would need to be
instructed in sound doctrine and ecclesiastical government.90 At the same
time Nicholas noted the ‘confession of friendship’ by which Gagik was
‘attached to our Christ-loving emperor and to our most holy church of
God’; his own orthodoxy was not at issue. This relationship had practical
implications. According to Ibn al-Athir, in 931 the lord of Vaspurakan, Ibn
al-Dayrani (the Arabic version of [Gagik] son of Derenik) proposed and
participated in a joint campaign with Byzantine forces against the Qaysid
amirs.91
During the Artsruni ascendancy, Byzantium retained ties with other
noble houses. The leading Bagratuni after 929, Abas, held the title of magistros,
reflecting both the continuing demise of his family’s fortunes and a
closer link to Byzantium than many commentators have credited.92 A letter
written in about 933 by Theodore Daphnopates to the bishop of Siwnik‘,
reprimanding him for teaching monophysite doctrine, reveals the spread
of Byzantine interest eastwards.93 Yet it is clear that Byzantium did not
enjoy a monopoly of influence across Armenia. Mindful of recent Sajid
intervention and devastation, Armenian princes remained wary of Muslim
powers to the east and south, however ephemeral these proved to be.
Thus when Saif al-Dawla, the future Hamdanid amir of Aleppo, marched
north through the Bitlis pass to Lake Van in 940, several Armenian princes
responded to his summons and submitted, including one of Gagik’s sons
and Ashot, son of Krikorikios, prince of Taron.94 Although the sources
contradict one another over the course of his campaign and the identity
of the Artsruni client, they confirm that Armenian princes were prepared
to recognise the sovereignty of an enemy of Byzantium if they believed
this would serve their own interests. Ibn Hawqal offers a second example,
listing those Armenian princes who paid tribute to the Sallarid ruler of
Azerbaijan, Marzuban, in 955 and the considerable amounts due.95 It is
unclear whether such sums were actually remitted or whether this liability
lapsed after Marzuban’s death in 957, but the principle, however shortlived,
seems established. By contrast, there is no evidence that Byzantium
imposed any financial burdens upon its Armenian clients.
In the event, Saif al-Dawla did not develop a bloc of Armenian support.
His victories over Byzantine forces provoked a series of counter-offensives.
The successes enjoyed by Nikephoros Phokas after 955 drew Byzantium
southwards, into Cilicia and northern Syria, away from active military
engagement in Armenia (see below, p. 517). As observed above, campaigns
across Armenia had been directed against those emirates and their bases
which historically had posed the greatest threat. This strategy concluded
with the capture of Theodosioupolis in 949. Although the military focus
shifted south, it seems that the nexus of relationships with Armenian princes
and clerics continued to be maintained and developed. Admittedly there is
very little evidence of Byzantine involvement in Armenia between 935 and
976, but it is during this period that significant confessional tensions emerged
within the Armenian church. Catholicos Anania I (943–67) reasserted
his authority over the dissident see of Siwnik‘ at the council of Kapan in 958,
but was succeeded by Vahan I of Siwnik‘ who ‘wished to develop friendship
and agreement with Chalcedonians’.96 Vahan I was deposed in 968 by the
council of Ani and sought refuge with the king of Vaspurakan, Apusahl
Hamazasp (953/8–72). Byzantine influence in these events may be inferred.
A colophon records the visit of a priest named Pantaleon to Constantinople
in January 966 at the command of Apusahl Hamazasp, ‘king of kings of
the house of Armenia’.97 The colophon adds that this occurred in the time
of Nikephoros, ‘emperor of the Greeks, valiant and virtuous, victorious in
battles against the heathens’. Pantaleon returned safely ‘through the power
of the Holy Cross and the prayers of the Holy Apostles and the grace
of both our kings, Nikephoros and Hamazasp’. Not only was Apusahl in
direct contact with Constantinople; in the eyes of the author, Nikephoros
II Phokas (963–9) enjoyed joint sovereignty with the Artsruni king.
Nor is this the only evidence of continued Byzantine engagement. Whilst
the four chapters devoted to Armenian and Iberian affairs in the De administrando
imperio largely recount past episodes rather than present circumstances,
their very inclusion is significant. In 966 or 967, after the death
of its prince, Ashot, Taron came under Byzantine control. Two years later,
Bardas Phokas, nephew of Nikephoros and doux of Chaldia and Koloneia,
advanced to Manzikert and destroyed its walls.98 Thus within fifteen years
of the compilation of this work, Taron had been incorporated into the
empire and the potential threat posed by Manzikert neutralised.
In 974, John ITzimiskes (969–76) travelled to Armenia.According to our
only source, the twelfth-century Armenian historian Matthew of Edessa,
King Ashot III Bagratuni (‘theMerciful’) (953–77) assembled all the leaders
of the countries of the east, including Sennacherim, lord of Vaspurakan,
and their forces.99 Having opened lines of communication with Ashot, the
emperor advanced to Mush in Taron and camped outside the fortress of
Aytsik‘.His forces came under overnight attack, although the circumstances
and outcome are obscure. At some point thereafter, Tzimiskes was handed a
letter, apparently from Catholicos Vahan I. This detail is hard to interpret,
given Vahan’s deposition six years before. The two leaders then made a
treaty whereby Ashot III ‘theMerciful’ supplied 10,000 troops in return for
notable gifts. Several elements in this account – specifically the leadership
role accorded to Ashot, the skirmishes at Aytsik‘ and Vahan’s letter – may
reflect a Bagratuni spin or a conflation of different episodes. Scholars have
generally interpreted Ashot’s attendance upon the emperor at the head of a
large army as a defensive precaution. Yet his conduct also befits a loyal client,
responding to an imperial summons and supplying military assistance at
a designated location. Tzimiskes’ subsequent letter to Ashot ‘shahanshah
[originally a Persian royal title, ‘king of kings’] of Great Armenia and my
spiritual son’, describing his victorious campaign of 975 into Syria and
Lebanon, then becomes apposite.100
The degree to which Armenian princes had been drawn into the orbit
of Byzantium can be seen through their involvement in the rebellions
which erupted against Basil II (976–1025) and Constantine VIII (1025–
8) after 976. Bardas Skleros had the support of Gregory and Bagarat,
sons of Ashot, prince of Taron, and Zap‘ranik, prince of Mokk‘, whilst
Bardas Phokas exploited his relationship with the Iberian prince David
of Tao – forged while he was doux of neighbouring Chaldia – to win
him to Basil II’s cause.101 In addition to the title of kouropalat¯es, David
received substantial territorial concessions, including the districts of Karin
and Apahunik‘, recently prised from Arab control. The personal ties with
Bardas Phokas which caused David to fight for Basil II later prompted him
to join Phokas when he rebelled against Basil in 987. All three survived
these confrontations. Gregory Taronites, doux of Thessaloniki and magistros,
fought against Samuel of Bulgaria (987/988–1014) after 991 and was
killed in 995.102 Zap‘ranik manglabit¯es was charged in 983 by Basil II and
Constantine with transporting a relic of the True Cross from Constantinople
to the monastery of Aparank‘.103 David kouropalat¯es retained possession
of all the lands granted to him previously although these now reverted to
the emperor after his death.104 It is striking, however, that neither Gregory
nor Zap‘ranik remained in their ancestral districts and that David continued
to exercise authority only in the knowledge of inevitable imperial
intervention.
Contemporary relations between the churches reveal a similar pattern
of increased engagement. As Byzantium pushed eastwards, and significant
numbers of Armenians came, or were transferred, within its borders,
the respective hierarchies increasingly overlapped. An exchange between
Metropolitan Theodore of Melitene and Samuel of Kamrjadzor, responding
at the behest of Catholicos Khach‘ik I (973–92), confirms that confessional
tensions were developing at a local level.105 Another exchange,
between Khach‘ik I and the metropolitan of Sebasteia, occurred in 989.106
Complaints of oppression and torture in Sebasteia were combined with
observations that the Armenian bishops of Sebasteia and Larissa, and other
priests, had removed themselves from the Armenian church and accepted
Chalcedon. Yet neither of these sees had previously been described or
treated as Armenian. By contrast eleven new suffragan bishops under the
metropolitan of Trebizond had been created by the 970s, including those
of Mananalis, Oulnoutin and Basean, confirming a simultaneous extension
eastwards by the imperial church.107 This fluidity was recognised by
contemporaries. Sargis was appointed catholicos of Armenia in 992 at a
council convened by King Gagik I Bagratuni (‘the Great’) (989–c. 1017) at
which there were bishops ‘from this country of Armenia and from the side
of the Greeks’.108
Little is known about the contemporary actions or attitudes of leading
members of the Bagratuni and Artsruni houses. Significantly, however,
the deposit of the relic of the True Cross at Aparank‘ during Easter
983 was attended by the three Artsruni brothers then ruling Vaspurakan,
Ashot-Sahak, Gurgen-Khach‘ik and Sennacherim-John. Their presence
at this isolated, mountainous site so early in the year for the arrival of
an imperial donation implies respect for – and close relations with –
Byzantium. Gregory of Narek asserted in his description of the ceremony
that
the divine will is clear: it is that the empire of the Romans, spread out like the
sky across the vast surface of the whole world, will gather in its ample bosom
innumerable multitudes, as a single flock in a single place, a single synod and a
single church, the one bride in the bridal chamber, the one beloved in the single
dwelling place . . . the one spouse under the one tent of the Covenant.109
His support for Basil II seems unequivocal.
David kouropalat¯es of Tao died on Easter Sunday, 31 March 1000. Two
sources allege that he was poisoned when receiving the eucharist, although
one adds that he survived this attempt and was smothered instead.110
Arguably this reflects a confessional spin, since David ‘died’ in a spiritual
sense when taking wine mixed with water in the eucharist. Basil II
was quick to take advantage.111 He marched north from Tarsus, meeting
and rewarding several prominent princes, including Sennacherim-John of
Vaspurakan. He then moved east to the plain of Vagharshapat, but Gagik I
‘theGreat’ failed to attend, ‘reckoning it a diminution’, and Basil thereupon
returned via Ult‘is in Tao and Theodosioupolis to Constantinople. Gagik
may have viewed David’s death as an opportunity to revive Bagratuni hegemony,
an ambition that submission to Basil II would have compromised, if
not thwarted; other princes had been compelled to lead or contribute large
numbers of troops for operations against Bulgaria. Alternatively he may
have been influenced by ecclesiastical opinion; both Catholicos Khach‘ik
and his successor Sargis I (992–1018) were steadfast in their opposition to
the imperial church. Whatever the cause, Basil II was prepared to consolidate
his gains and bide his time. After more than a century of regular
dealings with Armenian princely houses, Byzantium was keenly aware that
times of political flux after the death of the leading prince offered the best
opportunity for direct intervention, as the rival claimants looked for outside
support. Basil could afford to wait.
When George I (1014–27) succeeded his father Bagrat III as king of
Georgia in 1014, Basil II asserted his claim to certain districts previously
ceded to David of Tao and then Bagrat.112 George rejected this claim and
resisted an attempt to occupy them. Basil waited until Bulgaria had been
pacified. In 1021 he travelled east, expecting to receive George’s submission;
but George did not attend. Further negotiations failed and both sides took
up arms. Although there is no evidence that any Armenian princes joined
George in defying Basil II, he had arbitrated between John-Smbat III and
Ashot IV Bagratuni (‘the Brave’) following the death of their father, Gagik
I ‘the Great’, probably in 1017, and had intervened in their subsequent
confrontation.113 Arguably John-Smbat now saw an opportunity to gain
imperial backing. In January 1022, Catholicos Peter I (1019–58) attended
upon Basil II at his winter quarters in Trebizond, bringing with him a will
from John-Smbat III appointing him as his heir.114 This underpinned the
Byzantine claim to Ani after his death in 1041.
John-Smbat and Ashot were therefore pulled back into the imperial orbit
indirectly through the conduct of King George I of Georgia. Sennacherim-
John Artsruni, however, exchanged his ancestral lands of Vaspurakan for
territories in Cappadocia, including the cities of Sebasteia and Larissa, after
being attacked by Turkish forces from Azerbaijan. Although conventionally
dated to 1016 or early 1017, it may have occurred as late as 1021. After the
collapse of a rebellion byNikephoros Phokas andNikephoros Xiphias in late
summer 1022, it is significant that Basil II campaigned beyond Vaspurakan,
attacking the city of Her.115
Although both Sennacherim-John Artsruni and John-Smbat III had
come to terms with Basil II by January 1022, this did not deter Nikephoros
Phokas from soliciting support from other family members. It is unclear,
however, how far they responded to his appeal.116 In the event, Phokas was
assassinated on 15 August 1022, possibly by the son of Sennacherim-John
Artsruni. Basil then moved quickly, inflicting a sharp defeat upon George
I on 11 September 1022 and coming to terms with him shortly afterwards.
Evidently Abkhazian, Georgian and Armenian princes were still tempted
to participate in a rebellion fomented in the east by a member of the Phokas
family. Basil II was aware of the threat. His persistent involvement with
Armenia, and the extension of the empire’s frontiers to incorporate first
Vaspurakan and ultimately Ani, should be seen in the context of, and as a
response to, these rebellions.
During the tenth century, a large number of small ‘Armenian’ themes
were created, consisting essentially of a fortress and its surrounding district.
117 By contrast, the themes of Taron (966 or 967), Vaspurakan (c.1021)
and Iberia (1022) were organised around existing Armenian principalities
ceded to the empire. Tellingly, these were not broken up. Whilst the sigillographic
evidence reveals considerable fluidity in the combination of
high military commands across these themes during the eleventh century,
there is presently little evidence for sustained administrative down-reach
within them.118 No more than a skeleton administrative structure can be
traced, suggesting that existing social and political structures continued
to be employed.119 This ‘slim-line’ Byzantine presence would prove to be
inadequate when faced by sustained Turkish assault after 1045.120
Basil II’s campaign of 1022 did not mark an end to military operations.
In 1023 or 1024 the fortified town of Archesh on Lake Van was captured
by Nikephoros Komnenos whilst nearby Perkri was taken in 1035.121 These
were both granted separate thematic status but this is unsurprising, seeing
that they had never formed part of Vaspurakan and had been captured from
the ‘Persians’.122 Separate themes ofManzikert (after 1000) and Artzike had
also been created.123 This string of small themes fulfilled a long-cherished
strategic aim, expressed in the De administrando imperio, that if these kastra
were in imperial control, ‘a Persian army cannot come out against
Romania’.124 They also deterred Ashot IV ‘the Brave’ fromexpanding southwards
into former Artsruni territory.
The literary sources reveal almost nothing about the reigns of John-Smbat
III Bagratuni and Ashot IV ‘the Brave’ between 1022 and 1041. Contemporary
inscriptions and colophons, however, confirm ongoing relations with
Byzantium, and the numismatic evidence is persuasive. From the reign of
Nikephoros II Phokas, Armenia switched from a silver-based coinage to a
gold- and copper-based coinage, using exclusively Byzantine issues. During
the excavations at Ani, several thousand Byzantine copper coins were
found, both loose and in hoards.125 In 1979, some 3,539 of Constantine
VIII’s nomismata, equivalent to almost 50 pounds of gold, were unearthed
at Nouchevan, near Dvin.126 The epigraphic evidence is no less valuable
in the historical reconstruction. An inscription at Khtskawnk‘, dated 1033,
refers to ‘the reign of Smbat shahanshah, son of Gagik shahanshah, who
had adopted the beloved boy Sargis, during the time of the three kings of
the Romans, when he received the triple honour anthypatos, patrikios, vest¯es
and doux of the east’.127 Aristakes records that John-Smbat’s son, Erkat‘,
died young.128 This inscription confirms that he had designated Sargis as
his successor, and that Sargis had received imperial sanction.
By the time of his death, however, John-Smbat III had apparently
changed his mind. A colophon dates the completion of a Gospel book
to 1041, ‘when Yov[h]an[n]¯es [that is, John-Smbat III] king of Armenia
was translated to Christ and gave his kingdom to his nephew Gagik’.129
The complex sequence of events between 1041 and 1045, concluding with
the Byzantine occupation of Ani, therefore originated in a familiar context,
a time of political transition.130 Instead of developing ties with both
Sargis and Gagik, however, Byzantine policy after 1022 seems to have anticipated
only the succession of Sargis. Gagik’s unexpected accession thwarted
these plans and with Constantine IXMonomachos (1042–55) embroiled in
George Maniakes’ rebellion (see below, pp. 599–600), Gagik II Bagratuni
enjoyed two years’ respite.131 In 1044, however, he was induced to visit Constantinople
where he was detained and offeredMelitene in return for Ani.132
Initially he refused but when the forty keys of Ani were produced, proving
treachery on the part of Catholicos Peter, he abdicated and received lands
in Cappadocia. Although the leaders of Ani then resolved to entrust their
city either to Gagik’s brother-in-law, David Dunats‘i or to Bagrat IV, king
ofGeorgia (1027–72), the approach of another Byzantine army precipitated
the final surrender of the city.
World History
