Byzantine military effectiveness against the Arabs was mixed. The imperial
government found no sure means of checking or reversing their early
territorial gains, and there is no evidence to suggest that any major administrative
measures to redress the problem were taken specifically between
659 and 662.39 The very ease with which Mu‘awiya’s forces penetrated
Anatolia in the mid-650s indicates that, in the first fifteen years following
the early Islamic conquests, the government in Constantinople failed to
mount effective resistance against the Muslims on the Anatolian plateau.
Of events in 653/4, Sebeos writes: ‘When he [Mu‘awiya] penetrated the
whole land, all the inhabitants submitted to him, those on the coast and in
the mountains and in the plains.’40 Mu‘awiya’s armies were able to range
far and wide, devastating Anatolia, and they could hardly have achieved
this level of military activity had an effective Byzantine defence system been
fully in place then.
By the end of the seventh century, both states found it necessary to tighten
control over the frontier zone, leaving no scope for the local populations
to decide on their orientation for themselves. The Muslims even gave up
the policy of allowing Cyprus to remain independent during the reign of
Caliph ‘Abd al-Malik (685–705), although they soon reversed this particular
decision,41 and it was difficult for any region close to Syria to maintain
neutrality between the two powers. The two central governments could
either introduce garrisons, as the Muslims reportedly did for a while in
Cyprus, or they could evacuate the entire local population from a border
zone and destroy what was left of the cities, as was the fate of Arabissos.
None of these acts created hermetically sealed borders, but they did help
enhance the manipulative powers of the empire and caliphate, and neither
polity wanted independent buffer states to emerge between Byzantium and
Umayyad Syria.
Despite reports of Byzantine mobilisation during Mu‘awiya’s caliphate,
it is highly unlikely that the Byzantines could have managed major military
expeditions reaching into Syria. They could and did threaten Germanikeia
and Melitene, and they used the Mardaites as valuable allies or surrogates,
even as far afield as Lebanon. But they lacked the means and the resolve to
attempt the reconquest of Antioch or other major strongholds in northern
Syria, such as Chalkis, let alone any points further south. It is unclear how
quickly the Byzantines’ familiarity with conditions in Syria faded after their
withdrawal from there in the later 630s.
A tradition has it that when CaliphMu‘awiya was informed of a string of
calamities – one of his governors had run off, various prisoners had escaped
and the Byzantines were raising a fresh army – the commander ‘Amr bin
al-‘As advised him not to worry: ‘This is not much [trouble] for you. As
for the Byzantines, satisfy them with a few concessions with which you can
restrain [dissuade] them . . . AndMu‘awiya followed his advice.’42 This may
be a hostile tradition, intended to malign the allegedly easy-going ways of
the Umayyads, but it may also reflect a general sense among the Muslims
that Byzantine threats did not need to be taken too seriously; that it was
possible to reach negotiated settlements with them, without resorting to
arms.
The abortive rebellion of Saborios, strat¯egos of the theme of the Armeniakoi,
illustrates the benefits to both empire and caliphate of direct diplomacy
between Constantinople and Damascus, and Mu‘awiya’s response
neatly sums up Muslim strategy in the face of Byzantine internal strife.
The well-publicised failure in 667/8 of Saborios’ rebellion – for all his
negotiations with Mu‘awiya43 – underlined the terrible fate awaiting those
Byzantines who attempted private or personal diplomacy with Damascus.
According to the chronicler Theophanes:
the general of the Armeniakoi, Saborios – who was of the Persian race – rebelled
against the emperor Constans. Saborios sent his general Sergios to Mu‘awiya,
promising to subject Romania to Mu‘awiya if he would ally with Saborios against
the emperor. When the emperor’s son, Constantine IV, learned of this, he sent
Andrew the koubikoularios to Mu‘awiya with gifts so that he would not cooperate
with the rebel.
Mu‘awiya reportedly declared: ‘You are both enemies, I will help him who
gives the most,’ to which Andrew replied: ‘You should not doubt, caliph,
that it is better for you to get a little from the emperor than a greater
deal from a rebel.’ Although the revolt enabled the Muslims to capture
Amorion, the administrative centre of the Anatolikoi theme, and to raid as
far as the Bosporus, the Byzantines soon seized the city back, annihilating
the Muslim garrison that had been installed there.44
Saborios’ revolt marked a high point in Umayyad diplomatic attempts
to win control of the Byzantine empire through negotiations with the local
Byzantine commanders. The Muslims hoped to peel away segments of
the empire by convincing local Byzantine (or Byzantino-Armenian) border
commanders to break away, perhaps to found neutral buffer states or even
to switch allegiance outright, allowing theMuslims to occupy these border
areas and raise tribute from them. The miserable fate of Saborios and his
supporters reinforced imperial authority, strengthening the belief that revolt
against Constantinople or direct negotiations with theMuslims would only
result in death and destruction.45
Despite a few early, encouraging examples of local Byzantine towns in
Syria and Egypt surrendering to theMuslims, this did not become a trend.46
WhileMu‘awiya hoped to exploit tensions between Greeks and Armenians
on the Byzantine side of the frontier, Constantinople employed a range
of policies and techniques to enforce the emperor’s authority there. These
included appointing skilful and ruthless eunuchs to punish and put to death
anyone who attempted to become separatists, or who toyed with coming
to terms with the Muslims on their own.
Constantinople’s efforts paid off: the core areas of Byzantine Anatolia
lacked commanders who would find it in their best interests to switch sides
between Constantinople andDamascus.Mu‘awiya and his successors failed
to find a single strat¯egos or senior officer within the all-important theme of
the Anatolikoi who would be willing to betray his command to theMuslims.
The best-known example ofMuslim attempts to subvert a Byzantine border
commander are the negotiations in 717 between the commander-in-chief of
the great expedition against Constantinople, Maslama bin ‘Abd al-Malik,
his field commander, Suleiman bin Mu‘ad, and Leo ‘the Isaurian’, the wily
strat¯egos of the Anatolikoi. Leo reportedly parleyed with Suleiman for several
days near Amorion. But for all his show of readiness to offer tribute and
even reportedly to discuss with Muslim emissaries ways of handing the
empire over once he had ensconced himself in Constantinople, Leo never
intended to submit to the Umayyads: his was a long-drawn-out ruse, as
Suleiman and Maslama learned to their bitter regret. These negotiations
helped Leo to gain the throne, but they brought only embarrassment and
defeat to the Muslims.47
The utmost care was taken by the emperor in selecting commanders
of the theme of the Anatolikoi. This was the most powerful field command,
and despite occasional rebellions, the strat¯egoi of the Anatolikoi never
betrayed their commands to the Muslims. Had they done so, the overland
road to Constantinople would have lain open to the enemy. Although
Umayyad Damascus and its court continued to hope for such an opportunity,
it eventually became apparent that the problem of Syria’s northern
borders would not be resolved by Byzantine commanders’ switching sides.
The empire proved resilient, as it restored a degree of control over its borders
and peripheral regions. There was also an inherent contradiction between
the desire of some Muslims to amass booty for themselves from Anatolian
raiding and Damascus’ need to reach a modus vivendi with the local
inhabitants and leaders in the border regions.
Greek and Roman military maxims shaped how the Byzantines saw
the warfare against Muslim Syria, and it is unclear how successfully they
digested their own, much more recent experience of military catastrophe
there. Until about 711 the reigning Heraclian dynasty may well have made
it awkward for anyone to offer a written historical analysis of events. Such
inhibitions would have eased from 711, but by then Byzantine Syria had
more or less passed from living memory, except among a small number
of renegades and refugees. Despite recent warfare, the borders were now
gaining durable, albeit still uncertain, parameters.
As with the caliphate, the empire suffered from acute internal rivalries,
discouraging the emperors and their advisers fromgiving adequate resources
or total confidence to the best military commanders. There was a deepseated
fear in Constantinople that well-resourced generals might be able
to exploit newly won military victories to overthrow the government. As
long as the empire’s Armenians were less than reliable in their loyalties,
any long-term offensive against Umayyad Syria was impractical, no matter
how much money Byzantium might extort from Damascus under fitnainduced
truces. Only the Armenians could provide enough hardy military
manpower for the Byzantines, yet the imperial government’s relationship
with the Armenians living in Caucasian regions underMuslim control was
ambivalent and many-stranded (see above, ch. 8).
Finally, it is worth noting that seventh- and earlier eighth-century Byzantines
andMuslims lived in a mental environment of eschatological, indeed
apocalyptic expectations, although they were not explicitly linked with
the approach of any specific millennium. Those fears and hopes remained
strong throughout the seventh century and were to be found in many
regions, both east and west. They affected and nurtured a number of
religious manifestations and movements within Greek, Armenian, Syriac
monophysite and Muslim communities. Apocalyptic expectations soared
in the middle of the seventh century, perhaps peaking in the reign of Leo III
(717–41), as the centenary of the appearance of Islam approached.
World History
