STEVEN T. KATZ
I INTRODUCTION
The religious anthropology of the Sages of the rabbinic era, that is, their conception(s) of man, sin, and redemption, is one of the absolute foundations of Judaism both as a theological Weltanschauung and as a lived religious practice. In the present chapter an attempt will be made to offer a reasonable summary and exploration of these views.1
II THE CONCEPT OF MAN
A HUMAN BEINGS AS SERVANTS
The Rabbis began their reflections on the human condition with what they took to be the primal fact of human existence: human beings, like all else in the universe, were created by God and therefore are subordinate to Him. Thus, in explaining the reason for the Psalms selected to be read on specific days, Rabbi Akiva tells us:
On the first day they sang Psalm 24.1, ‘‘The earth is the Lord’s, and the fulness thereof,’’ because He had created and assigned it and was the Ruler in His Universe; on the second day they sang Psalm 48. 2, ‘‘Great is the Lord, and highly to be praised,’’ because He had then divided His works and was King over them; on the sixth day they sang Psalm 93.1, ‘‘The Lord reigneth; He is clothed in majesty,’’ because He had then finished His works and became King over them.
(BT Rosh H. 31a)
God’s creative, omnipotent and sustaining power over against humankind’s dependency and finitude necessarily, and rightly, places men and women in
A few of the texts cited in this chapter received their final edited form after the end of the rabbinic era. For example, the Tanhuma, the Avot de Rabbi Nathan, and some of the midrashic collections such as Midrash Psalms and Midrash Exodus Rabbah, all most likely achieved their final form in the early medieval era. These texts, however, certainly contain material from the rabbinic era and are, by common usage, utilized in the decipherment of theological notions related to the rabbinic era.
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A position of subordination. As the Mekhilta reports Moses to have declared: ‘‘[I will serve] Him by whose word the world came into being’’ (Mekh. Amalek, Exod. i8. 3 [ed. Lauterbach, 168 line 96]). God, not man, is the absolute Master and Maker of things, and all human beings are defined by this asymmetrical metaphysical circumstance.
Jews, the Jewish People, in addition, occupy a position of still further indebtedness. As a consequence of God’s covenant with the Patriarchs, and Israel’s redemption from Egypt as a result of this covenant (Exod. 23—2.5), the Torah openly and unambiguously declares that ‘‘unto Me the children of Israel are servants; they are My servants whom I brought forth out of the land of Egypt: I am the Lord your God’’ (Lev. 25.55). Furthermore, according to the Sages, by accepting the Torah at Sinai, Israel and individual Israelites accepted the ‘‘yoke of the kingship of God’’ (See Sifra Lev. i8.2.85d; Mekh. 20.3.67a; and Sifre Deut. 32.29.323).
Why were the Ten Commandments not said at the beginning of the Torah? They give a parable. To what may this be compared? To the following: A king who entered a province said to the people: May I be your king? But the people said to him: Have you done anything good for us that you should rule over us? What did he do then? He built the city wall for them, he brought in the water supply for them, and he fought their battles. Then when he said to them: May I be your king? They said to him: Yes, yes. Likewise, God. He brought the Israelites out of Egypt, divided the sea for them, sent down the manna for them, brought up the well for them, brought the quails for them. He fought for them the battle with Amalek. Then He said to them: I am to be your king. And they said to Him: Yes, yes.
(Mekh., Bakiodesh, Exod. 20.2 [ed. Lauterbach, 229 lines iff.).1412
Thus, in rabbinic sources Jews are repeatedly referred to as God’s servants (see, e. g., BT Bava K. 7b; PT Kidd. i.59d.3i; BT Kidd. 22b; et al.).1413
Though men and women, even as servants, always possess a free will — freedom of the will being an elemental feature of the rabbinic universe — their freedom should be exercised consistently with their ontological status as God’s creatures. They are of course free to ignore the divine will and the implications of the nature of their creaturely existence, but this is not a use of human freedom that the Rabbis see as appropriate, and is certainly not ideal. Rather, non-Jews, through the seven laws of Noah,1414 and
Israel, through the commandments of the Torah, are meant to bind their will to God’s will such that a parallelism of interest and action comes to exist. ‘‘Make His wishes yours,’’ the Sages encourage, ‘‘so that He will make your wishes His’’ (M. Avot 2.4). Ultimately, human freedom should be exercised in relation to an awareness that life is a gift for which men and women must take responsibility as a trustee rather than as an absolute, autonomous, owner. So, for example, consistent with this understanding of the human condition, the halachah proscribes suicide, for in an ultimate sense we do not own our own bodies. To repeat: human beings are free but, according to the Sages, this freedom — and its application — are limited by the sorts of beings we are and by the inescapable nature of our metaphysical dependence on the One who created us.
B HUMAN BEINGS AS MAJESTIC
Complementarily, rabbinic Judaism also takes the account of man given in Genesis (1.21—8) with the utmost seriousness: ‘‘So God created man in His own image [b’Zelim Elohim], in the image of God created He him, male and female He created them. And God blessed them and God said unto them, be fruitful and multiply, and fill the earth and subdue it, and have dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the fowl of the heaven, and over the beasts, and over all the earth.’’ Accordingly, human beings are not only creatures brought into existence by the Almighty from ‘‘a putrefying drop’’ (M. Avot 3.1), but are also endowed, like their Creator, with intelligence, emotional sensitivity, freedom of will and action, and constructive and dynamic power.
Human beings, sharing in God’s likeness, occupy a high and majestic rung in the created order. Indeed, God has given humankind extensive, though not unlimited, mastery over the terrestrial world that it shares with other beings (Gen. 1.26—8) and has made humans His copartners (shuttafim) in history (see BT Sanh 37a), assigning them the elevated task of completing the work of creation.5 In consequence, Rabbi Simeon taught: ‘‘This is the book of the generations of man: in the day that God created man, in the likeness of God made He him — in this sentence is contained the essence of the Torah’’ (PT Ned. 41c; cf. also Sifra Lev. 19.18). Likewise, R. Akiva felt himself free to observe: ‘‘Dear [to God] is man, in that he
37.26—7. See Tos. Av. Zar. 8.4 and BT Sanh. 56b. They set out seven basic rules that
All humankind is intended to observe. For more on this tradition see D. Novak, The
Image of the Non-Jew in Judaism: An Historical Constructive Study of the Noahide Laws
(New York, 1983).
5 According to the Sages this process begins with Adam’s naming of the animals in Gen.
2.19-20.
Was created in the [divine] image; still more dear in that it is known to him that he was created in the image, as it is said, (Gen. 5.1) ‘in the image of God He made man’ ’’ (M. Avot 3.14).
Out of this awareness of humankind’s likeness to the Creator — as moral personality, as free agent, as rational being, as loving Other — come necessary obligations and opportunities for service, and the possibility of creating that human goodness that such service engenders. That is, being ‘‘like’’ God requires that human actors imitate His justice, His humility, His ways of mercy, His patience, His concern with suffering, and His love for others. Though men and women are ‘‘formed from the dust of the ground’’ (Gen. 2.7), this worthless dust, according to the Sages, has been shaped through God’s own workmanship into an imago Dei of high value.
Even choosing not to be ‘‘like God’’ reflects humankind’s likeness to the Creator. As autonomous beings, men and women are free to disregard the divine imperatives, are free to act either for good or for evil. Each person decides, in a real and material sense, what he or she will become.
As the famous teaching in M. Avot puts it: “Everything is foreseen, yet freedom of choice is given; and the world is judged by grace, yet all is according to the amount of the work’’ (3.19). Such freedom — even to oppose and to choose to do evil — is a necessary corollary of sharing in God’s image, of being moral creatures possessed with an original and real dignity.6
C ZECHUT: THE POSSIBILITY OF HUMAN MERIT
The positive biblical-rabbinic evaluation of human beings, of what human agents are capable of, engendered the rabbinic doctrine of zechut (merit), that is, the notion that men and women can do things worthy of God’s respect and for which God will reward them. The special capacities of human beings, who share by right in the enormity and dignity of God’s work, permit the possibility of their acquiring ‘‘merit’’ in God’s sight.
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An interesting indication of the deep rabbinic commitment to human autonomy comes, ironically, from the Sadducean—Pharisean controversy over the legal responsibility of a slave owner for the activity of his slave. The Sadducees held that a slave holder was legally liable for the actions of his slave, and this certainly appears a logical and juridically correct view. But the Pharisees opposed it on the grounds that slaves were human beings and therefore responsible for their actions. The Mishnah gives the opinion: ‘‘No, you may rightly make a master responsible for the damage done by his ox or his mule since these animals have no mind. But how can you make the master responsible for damage done by the manservant or the maidservant who have minds of their own?’’ (M. Yad. 4.6).
The doctrine of‘‘merit’’ is a doctrine of reward. Individuals, as well as the Jewish people as a whole,1415 earn their reward and punishment as a consequence of their actions (or inactions). As the Tosefta teaches: ‘‘Happy is he who performs a commandment for he inclines (himself) towards the scale of merits, if he transgressed one thing, woe unto him, for he inclines towards the scale of guilt’’ (Tos. Kidd. 1.24 [ed. Zuckermandel, 336}). The Rabbis, of course, knew that a simplistic reading of such a dogma of reward and punishment was “unbelievable” and that it was falsified by human experience. They therefore introduced other ideas and doctrines to account for the actualities of the human (and Jewish) situation, but in an absolute sense they always maintained the belief that in the totality of existence, including the governance of ‘‘the world to come,’’ there was a balance between one’s actions and one’s ultimate destiny. God, in some ultimate and just way, did respond to and reward the righteous and did punish the evildoer.
Consistent with this understanding, the Sages call the ‘‘righteous man’’ ‘‘men of works’’ (BT Sot. 49a; BT Suk. 51a, 53a; BT Taan. 24a), and throughout rabbinic literature the Sages use ‘‘deeds’’ interchangeably with ‘‘merit’’ (see Exod. R. 44.7; Mekh. 48a; and Eccles. R. ii. i). So important was ‘‘merit’’ that Rabbi H. anina ben Akashia tells us that God gave Israel the Torah and Commandments specifically so that Israel could gain ‘‘merit’’ (M. Makk. 3.16; and see also Tanh. 8.4.76; and Num. R. 15.2). As Rabbi Meir taught: ‘‘The study of Torah brings a man to merits and removes him from sin’’ (M. Avot 6.i; and see also M. Ned. 31a). Similarly, commenting on Numbers 8.2, the Sages teach: ‘‘God says to Moses: ‘Tell Israel, it is not for my need of light that I command you to kindle a light before me but in order that you may have merits’’’ (Tanh. 8.4.76; cf. Midrash Tanh. [ed. Townsend, 72}; repeated by Rabbi Acha in Lev. R. 3i.7).
It is also relevant to note that the Sages did not narrowly define or circumscribe the realm of ‘‘merit.’’ In their universe, the Gentile nations and Gentile individuals are also capable of achieving zechut, and in fact do so. This understanding, for example, supplies the rabbinic rationale for the worldly power that various Gentile nations acquired. Thus Genesis Rabbah 66.7 ascribes the power of Rome to the merit of Esau gained for respecting his mother Rebecca.
Even the continued existence of the cosmos is not unrelated to human effort. In the Midrash Hagadol Genesis 3a, Rabbi Ishmael asks: ‘‘For whose merit does the world exist?’’ And he answers: ‘‘For the merit of the righteous’’ (see also Mekh. 8a, Mekh. 27a, Mekh. 34a; Tanh. 8ib; BT Pes. 5a;
BT Bava M. 86b; Gen. R. 55.12; BT liuH. 88b). Likewise, as regards the history of Israel, Rabbi Akiva credits the division of the Red Sea by Moses to the merit of Jacob (Mekh. 29b; and Exod. R. 21.8), and argues, reflecting a common view of the Sages,1416 that God spoke to Moses and redeemed the Jewish people from slavery as a consequence of the merit of the People of Israel (Mekh. 2a). As to the question of what specific merit this Jewish People had, the Sages gave different answers.
Some suggested that they had only the inherited ‘‘merit of the Patriarchs,” invoking the doctrine of zechut avot, the ‘‘merit of the Fathers.’’ Rabbi Akiva, however, taught that the Exodus was due to the ‘‘merit’’ of the pious women of Israel in Egypt who, despite their enslavement, had maintained their faith and, in consequence, continued to have Jewish children even in the face of Pharaoh’s cruel decrees (BT Sot. iib; Lev. R. 1.16). Complementarily, others argued, in a very interesting midrash, that: ‘‘in order to allow Israel to acquire [merit] before God so that God would have reason to redeem them, God provided them with two Commandments that would provide ‘merit’: (i) the Paschal sacrifice; and (2) circumcision” (see Mekh. 5a; this midrash is, in effect, invoking the principle: ‘‘without work there is no reward’’; Exod. R. 19.6; Song R. 1.35; 1.57; 3.14; 5.3; 7.5). Rabbi Eliezer goes even further and teaches: ‘‘God said for the merit of the blood of circumcision and of the Paschal offerings have I delivered you from Egypt, and for these merits am I going to deliver you at the end of the fourth kingdom’’ (Pirke de R. El. 29.210).
It must be emphasized that this doctrine of‘‘merit,’’ though a doctrine of reward and punishment, is not to be understood simply as a doctrine of necessary cause and effect. And this because the Sages did not want to deny or limit God’s freedom any more than they wanted to limit man’s. They certainly did not want to make it impossible to believe that God acts independently of human actions. Thus they paired the doctrine of ‘‘merit’’ with the repercussive theological notion of God acting ‘‘for His Name’s sake,’’ that is, God acting for reasons other than as a response to human behavior, and for His own reasons. (This possibility also allowed room for the inscrutable and inexplicable in human experience, that is, it made room in the universe for those acts and events that seem to mock rational explanation and that appear to contradict claims regarding the just ordering of the universe. See, for example, BT MoedK 28a). So, for instance, every day during the Amidah (the standing prayer), the Jew prays: ‘‘and He brings the Redeemer unto their children’s children for His name’s sake in love’’ (see also Mekh. 29b; Gen. R. 60.2). Again, and still more broadly, the Sages taught:
‘‘I wil be gracious to whom I will be gracious’’ (Exod. 23.19). In that hour God showed Moses all the treasuries of the rewards which are prepared for the righteous. Moses said, ‘‘For whom is this treasury?’’ And God said, ‘‘For him who fulfils the commandments.” ‘‘And for whom is that treasury?’’ ‘‘For him who brings up orphans.’’ And so God told him about each treasury. Finally, Moses spied a big treasury and said, ‘‘For whom is that?’’ And God said, ‘‘To him who has nothing I give from this treasury’’; as it is said, ‘‘I will be gracious to whom I will be gracious and I will show mercy on whom I will show mercy’’ (Exod. 23.19). (Pes. de-R. K. 99a)
For reasons of His choosing, not the least important of which is His unwavering concern for humankind and His unbounded love for Israel, the Divine acts, according to His own calculus, in human history. So we read in the Tanhuma that God says: ‘‘Even though a person is not worth answering, I shall show him loving-kindness since all my ways are loving-kindness’’ (Tanh. Vayera 4.1, on Gen. i8.iff.; trans. cited from J. Townsend, Midr. Tanh., 87).
Here we encounter another of the central dialectical tensions that define rabbinic Judaism: men and women must act in order for history to unfold, and yet God, too, must act because human initiatives by themselves are insufficient. But, and this is the essential error to be avoided, there is no disjunction, no either/or, between God’s activity — which we call grace — and the imperative of human action. It is not a matter of God’s grace or human action but rather of God’s grace and human action.
The Sages were neither moral philosophers nor metaphysicians as we today understand these designations, but in the doctrine of ‘‘merit’’ they were trying to reconcile a variety of grand metaphysical and ethical issues. On the one hand, the Sages knew, and taught, that God could act without human effort, striving, or merit, ‘‘for His Name’s sake.’’ God’s freedom of action was, of necessity, absolute and inviolable. However, at one and the same time, they argued that God would not proceed without reference to human behavior, because to do so would not be just, and ‘‘God is just.’’ Thus the Sages here draw together three central theological concerns: their conception of God’s nature, with all of its ethical and metaphysical attributes; their commitment to the significance of human deeds; and their unwavering belief in God’s just governance of our world.
III THE NOTIONS OF SIN AND SINNING
We are now in a position to understand the rabbinic estimation of the concept of ‘‘sin’’ and, in section v that follows, the rabbinic doctrine of
“repentance.” The Sages’ views on these cardinal issues follow naturally and necessarily from their teachings on man’s free will and his majestic potential. Accordingly, they held that sin can arise only from a concrete situation in which human beings are able to make their own existential decisions. The volitional, that is, free, voluntary, activity of the sinner is the defining condition of sin. Sin is an act, not a state of being. It is something human beings do, not something they are. As such, sin, in its broadest sense, is understood in rabbinic tradition as the arrogant over-extending of the human will in contradistinction to the divine will, either in the form of omission (the willed refusal to fulfill one’s obligations), or commision (a willed act of defiance against the Almighty). For this reason the traditional understanding of sin conceives it, whether in the moral or religious sphere,9 as rebellion against God, as exemplified in the sin of Adam and Eve. Thus the gravest sins are appropriately called by the Rabbis meradim, ‘‘acts of rebellion’’ (cf. BT Yoma 36b; Sifra, Aharei Mot i.8od and 4.82a).
A brief analysis of the many biblical terms for ‘‘sinning’’ and their different uses reinforces this interpretation. In the Torah there are twenty words (depending how one counts) for ‘‘sin,’’ the most common being fpet, pesha, and avon. The word het alone appears 459 times in the Bible and generally carries the connotation of‘‘missing’’ or ‘‘failing,’’ that is, failing to do one’s duty or keep one’s obligations in a relationship. The term pesha occurs 136 times in the Torah. Its most usual sense is of a ‘‘breach’’ in a contract or covenant. Avon appears 17 times and generally means ‘‘crookedness,’’ that is, wronging someone intentionally. In all three cases the basic sense relates to freely keeping or failing to keep covenant-Torah obligations. Whether in Adam and Eve or in their descendants, sin is sin precisely because it violates obligations entailed by the ideal of relationship between God and Israel, or God and humankind. In particular, it needs to be emphasized that the key fact involved in all of these conceptions of sin is that they are all rooted in the abuse of human freedom.10
The tragic consequence of sin is that it separates a human being from God. Sin corrupts and attenuates the human-divine relation. ‘‘But your iniquities have separated you and your God’’ (Isa. 59.2). (See here also Hag. 2.12; Ezek. 20.30; 23.37; 36.17). Reflecting on this condition of separation from the Divine caused by sin, the Rabbis concluded that all sin is, in a fundamental and overriding sense, the equivalent of idolatry because
For the Sages, both morality and religious observance were rooted in the same transcendental source: God’s will.
I note that many biblical sources locate sin in the heart, i. e., they present it as a willful decision by man to act against God. See, e. g., Isa. 6.10; 29.13; 63.10; Jer. 7.24; 11.8; 11.9-10; 16.12; 17.9; 18.12; 23.17.
Sinful acts, in their disregard for the divine will, suggest a denial of the Creator. Thus the heretic is defined as a kofer be-ikkar, a person who ‘‘cuts (or denies) the root (principle),’’ meaning that he denies the existence of God and/or God’s concern with humankind.1417
Sin — being a sinner — is a state that is caused by an action. Each person is responsible for himself and herself and is judged on the basis of his or her own actions. The biblical record emphasizes again and again the individual and volitional aspect of sin. Adam is punished for his sin (Gen. 63.i7ff.), and Cain for his sin (Gen. 4.11—12), and so the pattern unfolds. We also see the same pattern in reverse when Noah is rewarded for his righteousness (Gen. 6.ii; 6.22; 7.1), though everyone else of his generation is ‘‘evil continually” (Gen. 6.5; and see also on this issue Exod. 32.30; 18.20; Num. 32.23; Deut. 9.16). Each person’s fate1418 is in his or her own hands. Human beings are what they do. In this connection it should be noted, as the Rabbis already recognized, that it is imperative to take cognizance of the fact that nowhere in the Hebrew Bible is sin attributed to (a) sexuality, (b) creatureliness, or (c) the flesh per se. Sin is not a given but a consequence. Moreover, and consistent with this understanding of the cause and character of sin, this ‘‘stain’’ or “defilement” is not seen to corrupt the essential nature of men and women. Rather, like a spot on the menstrual garment, or filth on the body, it can be cleansed away,1419 because it does not belong to the essence of the thing, in this case the being of the human person. Individuals are judged pure or impure, good or evil, according to what they do, not what they are.
This understanding of sin and its consequences had two important corollaries for the Sages that should be mentioned here. First, the Rabbis firmly believed in the principle of middah keneged middah, ‘‘measure for measure.’’ Applying this to the fate of Israel collectively the Sifre instructs us:
One verse of Scripture says, . . the Lord lift up his countenance upon you,’’ and another verse of Scripture says, who will not lift up a face [and show favoritism]’’(Deut. 10.17).
How can both of these verses of Scripture be carried out?
When the Israelites carry out the will of the Omnipresent, then, "... the Lord lift up his countenance upon you.’’
But when the Israelites do not carry out the will of the Omnipresent, then, ‘‘... who will not lift up a face [and show favoritism]’’ (Deut. 10.17). [So Israel’s deeds make the difference.]
(Sifre Num. 42.2; ET J. Neusner, Sifre to Numbers, Numbers 6.22—7, I 195)
As to what determines the fate of the individual, the Mishnah in Sotah explains the matter very simply: ‘‘What measure a man metes it shall be measured unto him.’’ (See also Sifre Num. 106; BT Sanh. iooa; Mekh., Beshallach 6; and Tos. Ber. 40a). Of course, the issue of reward and punishment, of middah keneged middah, is enormously complex, even deeply puzzling, not least because in our everyday experience we regularly see that ‘‘the righteous suffer and the wicked prosper.’’ To reconcile or overcome this grave theological dilemma, the Sages, who knew that experience appeared to contradict faith (see on this issue, e. g., BT Ber. 7a; M. Avot 4.15), usually argued that God does ultimately balance actions and rewards, but only in the hereafter. Thus M. Avot instructs the faithful: ‘‘Do not let your evil nature promise you that the grave will be your refuge: for despite yourself you were fashioned... and despite yourself you shall give account and reckoning before the King of kings, the Holy One, blessed is he... know that the grant of reward unto the righteous will be in the time to come’’ (2.16). (See also, e. g., BT Kidd. 39bff.; Exod. R., Pekude 52.3; Lev. R., Emor 28.1; and Eccles. R. 1.3). Now, however problematic this otherworldly ‘‘defense’’ of the doctrine that there is a tight relationship between deeds and rewards, it needs to be understood that the rabbinic appeal to it is indicative of the Rabbis’ commitment to the doctrine that God, as the perfect and righteous judge, punishes sin and rewards goodness. (See on this, e. g., Sifrei Deut. 307).
Second, rabbinic Judaism rejected the notion of ‘‘original sin.’’ The Sages were emphatic on this point. Thus they taught: ‘‘As the spirit was given to you pure, so return it pure’’ (BT Shabb. 152B). And again, ‘‘God says to man, ‘Behold, I am pure, and my dwelling-place is pure, and my ministers are pure, and the soul which I have given you is pure’’’ (Lev. R., Mezora, 18. i; and see BT Ber. 10a). In effect, each man and each woman is a new Adam and a new Eve. Each person sins or does not sin by himself or herself and for himself or herself.
Evidence that the Rabbis spurned the doctrine of ‘‘original sin’’ is provided by the rabbinic claim that there had been a series of ‘‘sinless’’ individuals over the ages, the first of these being Abraham, whom most Sages considered to have been ‘‘perfect’’ and ‘‘righteous.’’1420 There is a striking midrash on Adam’s sin and Abraham’s subsequent righteousness that is particularly apposite in this context. In Genesis Rabba 14.6 (and see also 15.5) the Sages commented: ‘‘Why was Abraham not created before Adam? God said: ‘Perchance he (Adam) will sin, and there will be none to make amends (if Abraham existed before Adam). Behold I will create Adam first, and in case he sins, then let Abraham come and do good instead of Adam.’ ’’ Nor was Abraham alone in ‘‘being without sin.’’ The rabbinic sources refer in a number of places to several ‘‘perfect’’ righteous men — the exact number and names of whom vary somewhat from source to source. Among the usual candidates are the Patriarchs, Elijah, and Enoch (see Mekh. 16.10.48a; BT Ar. 17a; BT Sanh. ioia). In particular, a general consensus existed regarding Elijah, concerning whom the midrash teaches: ‘‘Should anyone ask you whether Adam really would have lived for ever if he had not eaten from the forbidden tree, tell him that, as Elijah who did not sin lives for ever, so it would have been with Adam before him’’ (Lev. R. 27.4; see also Pes. de-R. K., piska 9.4). In addition, the names of other candidates for this distinction are found in a baraita in BT Shabbat 55b (and BT Bava B. 17a). Here the names of Jacob’s son Benjamin, Moses’ father Amram, David’s father Jesse, and David’s son Chileav are cited as having lived and died without sin. According to the majority view of the Sages, all of these individuals died because God had decreed this as the fate of all mortal beings, not because they had sinned and therefore forfeited their lives. As Tanfeuma, Vayeshev 4 reports: ‘‘the angel of death was already created on the first day [of creation],’’ that is, prior to and independent of the creation of Adam and Adam’s sin. Likewise, the following dialogue is presented in Sifre Deut. 339:
‘‘The Ministering Angels said to the Holy One, blessed be He: Sovereign of the universe, why did Adam die? He replied: Because he did not fulfill My commandment. They said to Him: But Moses did fulfill your commandments! He answered them: It is My decree, the same for all men, as Scripture states, ‘This is the law: when a man dieth’ (Num. 19.14).’’
IV THE GOOD AND EVIL INCLINATIONS
In connection with this analysis ofsin and sinning it is relevant to consider briefly the notions of the yezer ha-ra (the evil inclination) and the yezer ha-tov (the good inclination)1421 as these concepts were developed in rabbinic thought. For the Sages, recourse to these ideas was primarily an attempt to explain the origin of evil in human beings and the presence of evil in a world that God had pronounced ‘‘good.’’1422
In rabbinic literature there is, in the main, a clear association of the ‘‘evil inclination” with human passions and appetites. The consensus among the Rabbis locates the source of evil in the inability of human beings to control their sensuous natures.1423 At the same time, however, they did not view the sensuous nature of men and women as evil in itself.1424 Indeed, the Sages go so far as to comment on Genesis 1.31 — ‘‘And God saw everything that He made and behold it was very good’’ — that the words ‘‘very good’’ refer to the yezer ha-ra, the evil inclination. By doing so they wanted to call attention to the fact that the yezer ha-ra plays an absolutely essential role in human life.
‘‘It was very good’’ (Gen. 1.31). R. Naliman b. Samuel said: That is the evil inclination. But is the evil inclination very good? Yes, for if it were not for the evil inclination, man would not build a house, or take a wife, or beget a child, or engage in business, as it says, ‘‘All labor and skillful work comes of a man’s rivalry with his neighbor.’’ (Gen. R., Bereshit 9.7)
Again, in the Sifre, the command, ‘‘Thou shalt love the Lord thy God, with all thy heart,’’ is interpreted, ‘‘with both thine impulses, the good impulse and the evil impulse’’ (Sifre Deut. 32, on Deut. 6.5; and see also M. Ber. 9.5 and Tos. Ber. 7.7).
The yezer ha-ra is the source of that ambition, aggression, and egotism that the world, as human habitat, requires. In BT Yoma 69b, the Sages give evidence regarding this truth. They report a curious incident in which the men of the Great Assembly (most commonly identified as living in the fifth century bce, connected to Ezra) are said to have sought to kill the yezer ha-ra. Accordingly, they captured it and put it in prison prior to its execution, only to discover to their dismay that no egg was laid in the land for three days. Thus they came to understand that the yezer ha-ra, for all its explosive power and potential danger, is necessary for the maintenance and continuity of human existence. In itself the yezer ha-ra, as the source of passion, particularly sexual passion, can be the source of good. It becomes evil only when such passion breaks free of the mediating control of reason and conscience — phenomena intimately connected by the Rabbis with Torah and mitzvot. (See here ARNb 16.36; Eccles. R. 4.13—14; and Midr. Ps. to Ps. 9.2.)
The Sages, despite their realistic appreciation of the power of desire and the seductions of the flesh, nevertheless held that the ‘‘evil inclination’’ can be kept in check (see BT Sanh. 107b; BT Sotah 47a). With the requisite moral effort — and particularly when acting in consonance with the demands of the Torah — human beings can master and redirect their passions: ‘‘Raba said: Though God created the yezer ha-ra, He created the Law as an antidote against it’’ (BT Bava B. i6a; and see also BT Kidd. 30b; BT Av. Zar. 17a). Through self-control, human beings can come to subordinate, subjugate and redirect the ‘‘evil inclination.’’19 Thus in BT Sanhedrin we find the Rabbis putting the following words into the mouth of King David: ‘‘I could have controlled my evil desire if I had but earnestly willed it’’ (107a). And again, in Mishnah Avot we read: ‘‘Ben Zoma said ‘Who is mighty? He who subdues his yezer [inclination], as it is said, ‘He that is slow to anger is better than the mighty, and he that ruleth over his spirit than he that taketh a city’ (Prov. i6.32)’’ (M. Avot 4.i).20
19 In BT Er. i3b there is the famous debate between the School of Hillel and the School of Shammai over the question whether it would have ‘‘been better for man not to have been created.’’ According to this source the discussion went on for two and a half years, at the end of which the Sages voted that it would have been better for man not to have been created. This teaching, however, is highly idiosyncratic, indeed exceptional; and, as Ephraim Urbach has correctly judged, ‘‘there is not the slightest indication of its influence on Tannaitic doctrine’’ (The Sages, trans. I. Abrahams [Cambridge, MA, 1987], 252). For further details readers should review Urbach’s entire argument, 252—4.
20 For a full understanding of rabbinic thought it is also to be noted that, just as zechut had consequences not only for the individual but also collectively for the People of Israel so, too, sin affects the whole nation. This is most clearly articulated by the Sages in connection with the destruction of the First and Second Temples and the national exile that followed the defeat of 70.
Said Ulla, ‘‘Jerusalem was ruined only because they were not ashamed on account of one another: ‘Were they ashamed when they committed abomination? No, they were not at all ashamed, therefore they shall fall’’’ (Jer. 6.15).
Said R. Isaac, ‘‘Jerusalem was ruined only because they treated equally the small and the great: ‘And it shall be, like people like priest’ and then, ‘the earth shall be utterly emptied’’’ (Isa. 24.2—3).
Said R. Amram b. R. Simeon bar Abba, ‘‘Jerusalem was ruined only because they did not correct one another: ‘Her princes are become like harts that find no pasture’ (Lam. i.6) — just as the hart’s head is at the side of the other’s tail, so Israel of that generation hid their faces in the earth and didn’t correct one another.’’
Said R. Judah, ‘‘Jerusalem was ruined only because they humiliated disciples of sages therein: ‘But they mocked the messengers of God and despised his words and scoffed at
V TESHUVAH: REPENTANCE
The rabbinic sources teach that sin, being a human volitional act, can be overcome or cancelled out only by another human volitional act called teshuvah (repentance). The term is derived from the Hebrew root shuv, which means ‘‘to turn’’; thus teshuvah is understood to mean re-turning to God. Such an act, when sincere, indicates a true change of character, the willingness of the sinner to keep away from sin in the future, and a desire to enter into a renewed and close relationship with God (see Deut. 4.29—31). In consequence, the freedom at the core of the human personality can be seen to be a two-edged sword: it can rebel and it can repent. God’s exhortation, ‘‘choose the good so that you may live’’ (Deut. 30.19), is forever an open invitation to human beings to exercise their own power. Men and women do not have to look elsewhere, neither above nor below, for the power to turn either to or from God. Rabbinic Judaism believes in human possibility: an individual can return to a right relation with God through teshuvah.
The Sages valued teshuvah so highly, and conceived its place in the cosmic order as so essential, that they claimed that it was one of the seven things created even before the world.21 God wanted to assure that a means of reconciliation between Himself and humankind was built into the very fabric of reality. For this reason, the Sages identify teshuvah as having been present in the very earliest moments in human history. So, for example, the Rabbis, commenting on the verse, ‘‘And Cain went out from the presence of the Lord’’ (Gen. 4.16), assert that at his trial Cain did teshuvah and was forgiven (Lev. R. 10.5). The Midrash then goes on to have Cain say to Adam: ‘‘‘I did teshuvah and a compromise was made on my behalf.’ When Adam heard this he gave himself a slap on the face and said, ‘So great is the power of teshuvah and I did not know it.’ And at that time Adam wrote Ps. 92.’’
His prophets, until the wrath of the Lord arose against this people till there was no remedy’’’ (2 Chron. 36.6).
And said Raba, ‘‘Jerusalem was destroyed only once faithful people had disappeared from among them, as it is said, ‘Run you to and fro through the streets of Jerusalem and see now and know and look in the spacious piazzas there, see if you can find a man, if there be any who does justly, who seeks truth, and I will pardon him’’’ (Jer. 5.1). (BT Shabb. 119b—i2oa. I here use J. Neusner’s translation of this passage given in his The Theology of the Oral Torah, 493-4.)
In consequence of these wrongs, according to the Rabbis, Israel is alienated from its covenantal partner, and God banishes the Jewish people from the Land of Israel in order to force them to repent of their ways. At the same time the Divine Presence ‘‘ascended and dwelled in its place — as it is said (Hos. 5.15): ‘I will return again to my place [until they acknowledge their guilt and seek my face]’’’ (BT Rosh H. 3ia—b).
2i The others being Torah, Gan Eden (Paradise), Gehinnon (Hell), the Throne ofGlory, the Temple, and the name of the Messiah (BT Pes. 54A).
Accordingly, Rabbi Ishmael, summarizing the biblical teachings that became the rabbinic doctrine of teshuvah, taught:
(1) If a man has committed a sin against any one of the commandments of the Torah, even if only a positive one, no atonement and forgiveness will be granted to him by God unless he has repented, (2) and even chastisements inflicted by God do not purge away the sin without repentance. (BT Yoma 86a)
For the Rabbis, teshuvah was a foundational element in the created order of things.
The metaphysical notion inherent in the concept of teshuvah should here be clearly identified: teshuvah means that both the past and the future are open to change. Through teshuvah one opens a dialogue with Heaven going forward, and also, in some spiritual sense, ‘‘restores’’ the damage done in the past. In the words of the Rabbis:
See how lovely repentance is! The Holy One said (in Mal. 3.7): return unto me AND I WILL RETURN UNTO YOU. For, if there are some sins on one’s hand and that person returns to the Holy One, he credits him as if he had not sinned. Thus it is stated (in Ezek. 18.22): <not> any of his sins which he committed
< SHALL BE REMEMBERED AGAINST HIM. >
(Tanh., Wayyera 4.16, on Gen. 19.246!., [trans. J. Townsend, 103])
Similarly, according to PT Rosh Ha-Shanah 59c, God promises that those who repent on Rosh Hashanah will become ‘‘new creations,’’ that is, their past misdeeds will be annuled, while the Pesikta Rabbati (ed. Friedman) i68a transmits the same promise to those who repent during the ‘‘ten days of repentance” that begin on Rosh Hashanah and climax on Yom Kippur.
For the Rabbis, at least four elements were involved in the process of teshuvah. First and most basically, an individual had to be aware of his or her sin. Therefore the first step was recognition, with all the personal humila-tion this involved, of one’s misdeeds. All false pride and egotism had to be abandoned while a person truly confronted his or her past actions. Second, having recognized one’s sins, one must engage in a sincere inner ‘‘turning’’ towards God. Third, confession of one’s sin, first suggested in Leviticus 5.5; 16.21 and Numbers 5.6—7, was generally — though not necessarily — expected (see, e. g., Tos. Sanh. 9.5; BT Sot. 7b; PT Yoma). This act of confession was known as viddui. Fourth, where possible, the wrong that had been committed needed to be redressed and an appropriate penalty or fine paid to the individual who was wronged. (See on the biblical legislation concerning the acts of confession and restitution Lev. 5.20—4 and Num. 5.5—8.)
It is also relevant to note that in order to facilitate teshuvah the Rabbis extended the plain sense of the biblical teaching in Leviticus 5.23—4
Regarding the restitution of stolen property. This is seen clearly in M. Gittin 5.5 and again in a baraita in BT Gittin (55a) where the issue is discussed. In both contexts the Sages adopted as halachah the position of the School of Hillel that monetary compensation was permitted as a form of redress in the case of theft, and rejected the view of the School of Shammai that the stolen article itself needed to be returned. And they ruled this way because they believed that this more lenient interpretation would encourage sinners to make restitution and repent.
VI TESHUVAH, SACRIFICE, AND ATONEMENT
Let us now consider the important question of how the Sages understood the relation between the practice of sacrifice, the act of teshuvah, and the making of atonement. According to the Tosefta, ‘‘Sin offering and guilt offering and death and the Day of Atonement, all of them together do not expiate sin without repentance” (Tos. Yoma 5:9). This text reminds us that for the Rabbis sacrifice was not expiatory in the sense of ex opere operato. Instead, the Sages set out strict and detailed regulations governing the practice of sacrifice. They required that a person who brought a sin offering, in order for the offering to be effective, needed not only to supply the sacrifice but also to (1) repent; (2) make a public confession of his or her wrongdoing; and (3) return, if necessary, the items stolen or make amends through monetary payment for harm caused. On this last point, commenting on Leviticus 5.23—4, an ancient baraita (Tos. Pes. 3.1) recorded: ‘‘If he [the guilty party] brought [to the Temple] his guilt offerings and brought not the goods [and the priest slaughtered the ram and received its blood in the vessel], he stirs not the blood of the sacrifice until the sinner has brought the goods robbed; and the priest lets the sacrifice lie till its appearance indicates decay, when it is removed to the place of burning.’’ The Sages, in effect, taught that even where it appears that the ‘‘sin offering’’ plays the essential expiatory role, the expiation produced by the sacrifice is, in fact, efficacious only because it involves the willing act of the sinner, understood as comparable or equivalent to teshuvah, in bringing the sin offering. Therefore a sin offering brought, for example, by someone anonymously for another is not expiatory. The sinner can gain expiation only as a result of his or her own offering, and this because it is in the act of offering that the repentance and hence the expiation lie (cf. M. Yoma 8). To hold that the act of sacrifice necessarily atones even if devoid of the penitential element is, for the Sages, to view biblical sacrifice as a magical category whereby God can be manipulated by formulaic patterns of behavior. (For more on this issue see Deut. 4.25—40; Lev. 26; Amos 4.46; 5:2iff.; Hos. 4.8f. 5.6; 8.11—12; 14.3f.; Isa. i. ii—12; 22.12—13; 28.7—8; Jer.
6.20; 7.2if; and the discussion among the Sages in ARNa4.5; SifreDeut. 43 and 11.15).
In BT Berachot 23a the Rabbis build on this theme, interpreting the verse in Ecclesiastes 15.i which refers to ‘‘the sacrifices of fools’’ as the sacrifice that is offered without repentance. They teach: ‘‘Ifyou sin, bring an offering before Me. ‘And be ready to hearken’ (Eccles. 4.17). Raba said, Be ready to hearken to the words of the wise who, if they sin, bring an offering and repent. ‘It is better than when the fools give’ (Eccles. 4.17)! Do not be like the fools who sin and bring an offering but do not repent.’’
The Sages also held that in the absence of the Temple (after 70 ce), and the elimination of the possibility of offering sacrifices, teshuvah was now the equivalent of, and the relevant substitute for, sacrifices.22 Just as sacrifices had facilitated atonement because the act of offering them in an appropriate manner had reconciled the human and divine will (see Sifre Num. 143), so, too, teshuvah has the power to restore the relationship between the penitent individual and God. ‘‘You might think,’’ the Rabbis admonished their contemporaries,
That the Day of Atonement does not atone without the sacrifices and the goat: it does, because it says, ‘‘It is the Day of Atonement, to make an atonement for you’’ (Lev. 23.28); or you might think that the Day of Atonement atones for the penitent and impenitent alike, since both sacrifices and the Day of Atonement are efficacious in obtaining atonement. But just as sin offerings and trespass offerings atone only for those who repent, so, too, the Day of Atonement atones. . . for those who repent. (Sifra 102a)
Sincere repentance brings about both kapparah (acquittal) and taharah (purity), and allows men and women once again to come close to God — the essential meaning of at-one-ment — even in the absence of the Temple cult.
R. Jose ben Tartos said: Whence can it be proved that he who repents is regarded as if he had gone up to Jerusalem, built the Temple and the altar, and offered upon it all the sacrifices mentioned in the Law? From the verse, ‘‘The sacrifices of God are a broken spirit’’ (Ps. 51.17) (Tos. Zav. 7.2).23
Other acts were also said to stand in the place of sacrifice. Among them were prayer, charity, and Torah study. Death was also understood as making atonement; see, e. g., Sifre Num. 4; Sifre Num. 112; and Sifre Zuta to Num. 5.5—6. In addition, in ARN 4.11a, Rabbi Yolianan ben Zakkai, on seeing the ruined Temple, said to Rabbi Joshua: ‘‘My son, grieve not, we have a means of atonement that is like it, as it says in Hosea 6.6: ‘For I desire mercy, and not sacrifice.’’’
Teshuvah is also the trigger for national redemption just as it is for personal reconciliation with God, for the covenant between God and Israel has not been broken. ‘‘R. Ahia in the name of R. Tanhium b. R. Hliyya [taught]: ‘If Israel repents for one day, forthwith the son
VII THE EFFECT OF REPENTANCE: REDEMPTION
Repentance brings human beings back to God. It reconciles the two parties and makes redemption possible. Repentance is something men and women can do, and is something that God, in His infinite love, wants human beings to undertake. God, as the Rabbis understand Him, did not create men and women in order to send them to eternal damnation. In consequence, consistent with this theological perspective, the Rabbis taught that the Shechinah, the ‘‘divine presence,’’ tarried on the Mount of Olives across from the Temple Mount for thirteen and a half years after the destruction of the Second Temple in 70, proclaiming three times a day the words of Jeremiah, ‘‘Return, ye backsliding children, and I will heal your backsliding” (Jer. 3.22, recounted in Pes. de-R. K., piska 13.ii and Lam. R. 15b). For the Rabbis, Isaiah’s report of God’s plea to Israel, ‘‘Turn unto Me and I will turn unto you,’’ meant that God, being merciful, hears and responds to the longing of human beings to return to His love.
Redemption, however, unlike repentance, is understood to be an act of God.24 But what kind of divine act is it? In rabbinic Judaism redemption is conceived of as an ‘‘earned response’’ — human beings merit redemption through their good deeds and through their ‘‘repentance.’’ This means that God responds to men and women after they have responded appropriately to Him. Human beings must take the first step — they must begin to ‘‘turn’’ to the Almighty and then He carries them, in love, the rest of the way. Of course God, in His graciousness, acts on behalf of humankind for the benefit of men and women, to a degree greater than required according to a strict measure because of His affection for His creatures. In this way, God’s mercy and loving-kindness transform the situation from one of ‘‘strict justice’’ to one in which divine compassion gives new, transcendental, value to human deeds and human destiny.25 of David will come’’’ (PT Taan. i. i). The full exploration of this basic theological issue, however, is outside the boundaries of the present chapter.
24
In this context I refer to the redemption of the individual rather than national redemption, though in the latter case the same logic applies. ‘‘God said, ‘All depends on you. As the lily blooms and looks upward, so when you repent before me.. . then I will bring the Redeemer [and redemption]’’ (Mid. Pss. on Ps. 45.1).
The Rabbis, despite their commitment to the value of human deeds, were also certain that God’s mercy was nearly unlimited. Hence they taught that ‘‘all Israelites have a share in the world to come’’ (BT Sanh 10.i). Even sinners among the Jewish People are ultimately redeemed as a result of God’s love. This most divine response may also be understood as one of the consequences of the doctrine of zechut avot (the merit of the Fathers [Patriarchs]), which teaches that this patriarchal merit helpfully operates to the benefit of their descendants. Thus, even sinners within the Jewish People are not wholly devoid of
The dialectic of the covenantal bond, of God as a member of the community in relation, is nowhere more evident than in the repentance-redemption sequence. In Isaiah we read: ‘‘Let the wicked man forsake his way and the bad man his plans and let him return unto the Lord,’’ with the effect of his repentance being that ‘‘He [God] will have mercy upon him’’ (Isa. 55.7). For the Sages, this mutual activity involving both God and man perfectly characterized the process of redemption. In a striking midrash they taught: ‘‘It (man’s and God’s activity) is compared to the son of a King who was removed from his father’s house for a distance of a hundred days’ journey. His friends said to him, ‘Return to your father,’ whereupon he replied, ‘I cannot.’ Then his father sent a message to him, ‘Travel as much as is in your power and I will come the rest of the way to you.’ And so the Holy One, blessed be He, said, ‘Return unto me and I will return unto you’ (Mal. 3.7)’’ (Pes. de-R. K. 163b).
The Midrash on Psalms (85.3 [ed. Buber, i86b]) sums up this asymmetrical yet reciprocal situation as the Sages understood it: ‘‘When the Children of Israel said to God, ‘You return first,’ as it is said (Ps. 90.13) ‘Return, O Lord, how long?’ God replied: ‘No, but let Israel return first.’ Since you will not return alone, let us both return together, as it is said (Ps. 85.6) ‘Return (both of you), O God of our salvation.’ ’’
The repentance of men and women may seem, in the larger order of things, an insignificant matter compared to God's mighty act of redemption. Yet, despite the disproportion between the human deed and the divine response, the initiative from below is, for the Rabbis, a necessary part of the process. Man's repentance is, to use a chemical analogy, the small catalyst without which the desired reaction cannot occur. Men and women must play their distinctive and necessary roles in their own redemption. As we read in Soong of Songs Rabbah, ‘‘God says to Israel, ‘Open unto Me the door of repentance, be it even as narrow as the sharp point of a needle, and I will open it so wide that whole wagons and chariots can pass through it' '' (5.2 and 5.5, and Pes. de-R. K. 163B).
VIII CONCLUSION
The relationship between human beings and God, rather than the being of God alone, is the main subject ofrabbinic concern. Thus, while religion, in general, and Judaism in particular, are regularly thought of as religious-metaphysical systems primarily concerned with the transcendent, the
Some ‘‘merit.’’ Three classes of sinners were, however, excluded by the Sages from ‘‘the world to come.’’ They were: (i) those who deny the resurrection of the dead; (2) those who deny that the Torah is ‘‘from Heaven’’; and (3) those who are ‘‘Epicureans,’’ by which is probably meant those who deny God’s providential ordering of creation (BT Sanh. 102 b).
Inescapable fact is that religion, and most assuredly rabbinic Judaism, is mainly concerned to understand — and prescribe — who men and women are and what they might become.
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CHAPTER 37
THE RABBINIC THEOLOGY OF THE PHYSICAL: BLESSINGS, BODY AND SOUL, RESURRECTION, AND COVENANT AND ELECTION
REUVEN KIMELMAN
I THE RABBINIC THEOLOGY OF THE PHYSICAL
Rabbinic theology differs from contemporaneous Graeco-Roman theologies, Jewish or otherwise, in its emphasis on the physical as complement, not as contrast, to the spirit. It views the areas ofcorporeality, concreteness, and sensation as aspects of the religious realm. The rabbinic worldview focuses on the significance of the physical, whether it be the created world, the body, or the People of Israel. It affirms the physical as a medium of the spiritual. The physical is not overcome, superseded, or consumed in the spiritual. Rather the physical, the bodily, the carnal partake ofthe spiritual.
This appreciation of the religious significance of physicality is the hallmark of rabbinic Judaism and helps explain its approach to physical pleasure, the physical world, the physical body, the physical resurrection, and the election of the body of Israel. Indeed, it explains more about the distinctive theological positions of rabbinic Judaism than any other factor, for ‘‘rabbinic Judaism invested significance in the body which in the other formations were invested in the soul.’’1
This appreciation of the religious significance of the physical focuses on the distinctive elements within rabbinic Judaism. It contrasts with those passages in rabbinic texts that overlap with the dominant Hellenistic view in the Graeco-Roman world,2 or the dominant Zoroastrian view in the Babylonian world.3 The concern here is with those dimensions that
1 D. Boyarin, Carnal Israel: Reading Sex in Talmudic Culture (Berkeley, 1993), 5.
2 See Boyarin, Carnal Israel, 1—10, 77—80; S. Shimoff, ‘‘Hellenization Among the Rabbis: Some Evidence from Early Aggadot Concerning David and Solomon,’’ JSJ 18 (1987), 168—73; and especially L. Levine, Judaism and Hellenism in Antiquity: Conflict or Confluence? (Seattle, 1998), 3-32.
3 On the impact of Zoroastrian sexual views on Babylonian rabbis, see Y Elman, ‘‘ ‘He in his cloak and She in her Cloak’: Conflicting Images of Sexuality in Sassanian Mesopotamia,’’ in R. Ulmer (ed.), Discussing Cultural Influences: Text, Context and Non-Text in Rabbinic Judaism (Lanham, MD, forthcoming).
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Managed to resist the hegemony of the dominant culture. Much of the authenticating material is cited from liturgical sources on the assumption that rabbinic liturgical theology embodies its consensual theology.
II THE SAYING OF BLESSINGS
The rabbinic appreciation of the religious significance of the physical world comes through in their theology of blessings. The Torah decla
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