1. V. Kriuchkov, Lichnoe delo [Personal File] (Moscow: Olimp AST, 1996), part 1, pp. 184-200.
2. A. S. Barsenkov and A. Yu. Shadrin, “Politicheskii krisiz v SSSR 19-21 avgusta 1991 g.” [The Political Crisis in the USSR August 19-21, 1991], Vestnik Moskovskogo Universiteta, ser. 8, no. 3 (2001): 50. On the reasons for the failure of the August 1991 coup, see also V. Medvedev, “Avgust 1991,” Svobodnaia mysl’, no. 12 (1993): 67-77.
3. G. S. Shakhnazarov, S vozhdiami i bez nikh [With Leaders and without Them] (Moscow: Vagrius, 2001), p. 440.
4. On February 25, 1917, in Petrograd the number of strikers reached 200,000. At nine in the evening on the same day Lieutenant-General S. Khabalov received a telegram sent through direct lines to the general headquarters: “I command you to stop riots in the capital tomorrow. They are impermissible during this hard time of the war against Germany and Austria. Nicholas.” At ten in the morning, Khabalov, after reading the telegram to senior officers, ordered them to open fire if the mob became aggressive. Starting on the morning of February 27, the majority of troops refused to shoot at people. Here’s how Khabalov himself describes the situation at 8:00 a. m. on February 28: “(1) I have the main building of the Admiralty, four units of the Guards, five squadrons and companies, and two batteries at my disposal. Other troops have either taken the side of revolutionaries or agreed to remain neutral. Single soldiers and gangs wander around the city shooting at passersby and disarming officers; (2) all railroad stations are in the hands of revolutionaries who guard them closely; (3) the entire city is in the hands of the revolutionaries, telephones are not working, there is no communication with other parts of the city.” By noon it was clear to Khabalov that it was impossible to resist. Soon he was arrested by soldiers who were inspecting the Admiralty building. See A. Blok, “Posledniie dni starogo rezhima” [Final Days of the Old Regime], in Arkhivrusskoirevolutsii (Berlin, 1922), vol. 4, pp. 5-54. (The poet wrote the cited article using materials collected by the Extraordinary Commission of the Provisional Government during the investigation of illegal actions of former ministers.)
5. M. Sokolov, “Slava Bogu, perestroika konchilas’” [Thank God Perestroika Is Over], Kommersant, August 26, 1991.
6. M. S. Gorbachev, “O bezotlagatel’nykh merakh po uvelicheniiu proizvod-stva tovarov i uslug dlia naseleniia” [On Immediate Measures to Increase Production of Goods and Services for the Population], Izvestiia, August 5, 1991.
7. V. V. Gerashchenko to Prime Minister V. S. Pavlov, on price differences between agricultural raw materials and other products, June 26, 1991 (RGAE, F. 2324, Op. 32, D. 4005, Ll. 125-27).
8. O. Latsis, “Signal bedy, poslannyi nikuda. Chego opasalos’ pravitel’stvo SSSR za tri dnia do konchiny” [SOS Sent Nowhere: What the USSR Government Feared Three Days before the End], Izvestiia, June 28, 1996.
9. This is how G. Yavlinsky and M. Zadornov evaluated the convertible currency situation in the USSR in May of1991: “At the beginning of1990 the USSR still had convertible currency reserves—about $15 billion in accounts in foreign banks. By the end of the year the sum of debts to foreign partners for already-delivered goods ranged from $3-5 billion.” See G. I. Yavlinsky, and M. Zadornov, “Plius ‘Bolshaia semerka’: programma organizovannogo vozvrashcheniia v bol’shuiu ekonomiku” [Plus the G-7: A Program for an Organized Return to Big Economics], Izvestiia, May 20, 1991.
10. Memorandum prepared by the Division of Socioeconomic Policy of the CC of the CPSU on January 28, 1991, for M. S. Gorbachev, “On Unsatisfactory Supply of Raw Materials for the Economy in 1991” (RGANI, F. 89, Op. 22, D. 9, Ll. 2-4).
11. O. Latsis, “Kogda nachalsia krizis. O chem govorit spravka KGB SSSR, napisannaia v sentiabre 1991 goda” [When the Crisis Began: What a Note Written by the KGB in September 1991 Tells Us], Izvestiia, April 15, 1993.
12. A. Illarionov estimates the aggregate deficit of Russia’s budget, Russia’s share of the Union budget in 1991, as 31.9 percent of GNP. Average monthly rates of growth of the money supply from May through December 1991 increased up to 8.1 percent, and the ratio of M2 to GNP increased to a record 76.5 percent. From May to December 1991, the M2 was 60.7 percent of Russia’s GNP for the corresponding period. See A. Illarionov, Popytki provedeniia politikifinansovoi stabilizatsii v SSSR i v Rossii. 1995g [Attempts to Implement a Policy of Financial Stabilization in the USSR and Russia] (Www. budgetrf. ru). By S. Alexashenko’s calculations, the size of the 1991 budget deficit was approximately 34 percent of GNP, in accordance with international methodology. See S. Alexashenko, “The Collapse of the Soviet Fiscal System: What Should Be Done?” Review of Economies in Transition 4 (1992): 39, 40. The World Bank estimated the share of the 1991 deficit of GNP (taking into account forced savings) at 30.9 percent. See Russian Economic Reform: Crossing the Threshold of Structural Change (Washington: World Bank, 1992).
13. V. Medvedev, V komande Gorbacheva. Vzgliad iznutri [On Gorbachev’s Team: An Inside View] (Moscow: Bylina, 1994), p. 195.
14. From the memoir of Chairman of the KGB of the USSR V. Kriuchkov: “Pavlov spoke in detail about the economic situation, about a deep crisis that had already hit the country and that would grow in scope in the near future. He emphasized that we could not rely on credits; we simply could not get them because we were insolvent. The Soviet Union did not even have funds to pay interest on previously received credits.” See Kriuchkov, Lichnoie delo, p. 151. On the prime minister’s stroke related to his abuse of alcohol, see p. 182.
15. The following question was put to a vote: “Do you think it is necessary to preserve the USSR as a new federation of equal sovereign republics in which rights and freedoms of people of every ethnicity will be guaranteed to the full extent?” Of those who voted, 76.4 percent answered yes. The referendum was not conducted in six Union republics.
16. M. Sokolov, “Referendum: bros’te, nichego strashnogo” [Referendum: Drop It, It’s Nothing], Kommersant, March 4, 1991.
17. A. S. Cherniaev, assistant to President M. Gorbachev, “The armed forces of Ukraine declared that all armed units on its territory and all the property are to be placed under their jurisdiction. It’s sheer madness!” A. S. Cherniaev, 1991 god: Dnevnik pomoshchnika Prezidenta SSSR [1991: Diary of a Presidential Aide] (Moscow: TERRA, Respublika, 1997), p. 235.
18. In the fall of 1991, M. Gorbachev, while presenting arguments in favor of preserving the Union to leaders of the republics said quite reasonably: “There are no physical borders inside the country. We only have administrative borders. It did not occur to anyone to install border posts. Besides, 70 percent of the borders between the republics have been established under resolutions of regional executive committees and rural soviets... . Shall we also divide the armed forces?” However, as usually happens when a territorially integrated empire collapses, such words could not convince anyone. See Soiuz mozhno bylo sokhranit’. Belaia kniga. Dokumenty i fakty o politike M. S. Gorbacheva po reformirovaniiu i sokhraneniiu mnogonatsional’nogo gosudarstva [The Union Could Have Been Preserved. White Paper. Documents and Facts about Gorbachev’s Policy on Reforming and Preserving a Multiethnic State], edited by A. B. Veber (Moscow: “Aprel’-85” Publishing House, 1995), p. 296.
19. M. Sokolov, “Soiuz razvalilsia respublik svobodnykh” [The Union of Free Republics Has Collapsed], Kommersant, September 9, 1991.
20. On L. Kravchuk’s position during the first days of the coup, see T. Kuzio, Ukraine: Perestroika to Independence (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1994), pp. 171-72.
21. Soiuz mozhno bylo sokhranit’, p. 245.
22. On economic policy in the former Union republics in 1991, see working materials of the government (Ye. T. Gaidar’s personal archive).
23. L. I. Abalkin, Ktseli cherez krizis. Spustiagod. . . [To the Goal through a Crisis: A Year Later] (Moscow: Luch, 1992), p. 176.
24. G. S. Shakhnazarov, S vozhdiami ibez nikh (Moscow: Vagrius, 2001), p. 482.
25. Letter from V. V. Gerashchenko (Chairman of Gosbank) to President M. S. Gorbachev, August 9, 1991 (Archive of the Gorbachev Foundation, Shakhnazarov file, archival no. 10811, L. 27).
26. The Sixth Congress of People’s Deputies of the Russian Federation, April 6-21, 1992, transcript (Moscow: Respublika, 1992), vol. 1, p. 151.
27. V. A. Raevsky (Deputy Minister of Finance) and V. G. Gribov (Deputy Minister of the Economy and Economic Forecasting) to Committee for Effective Management of the Economy of the USSR, on measures to overcome inflation and to stabilize monetary circulation (k-28, P. 9), September 27, 1991 (GARF, F. 5446, Op. 163, D. 41, Ll. 28, 29, 30, 33, 34).
28. V. A. Raevsky (Deputy Minister of Finance) and V. G. Gribov (Deputy Minister of Economy and Economic Forecasting) to Committee for Effective Management of the Economy of the USSR, on an emergency Union budget and funds outside the budget for the fourth quarter of 1991, October 23, 1991 (GARF, F. 5446, Op. 163, D. 41, Ll. 49, 62).
29. S. G. Sinel’nikov, Budzhetnii krizis v Rossii [The Budget Crisis in Russia] (Moscow: Evraziia, 1995).
30. Letter from V. V. Gerashchenko (Chairman of Gosbank of the USSR) to the State Council of the USSR, on monetary circulation in 1991, October 24, 1991 (RGAE, F. 2324, Op. 32, D. 4006, Ll. 65-68).
31. S. P. Shpil’ko, L. A. Khakhulina, Z. V. Kupriianova, V. V. Bordova, L. G. Zubova, N. P. Kovaliova, M. D. Krasil’nikova, and T. V. Avdeienko, “Otsenka naseleniiem sotsial’noekonomicheskoi situatsii v strane (po rezul’tatam sotsio-logicheskikh oprosov 1991goda), Nauchnyi doklad” [Public Opinion on the Socioeconomic Situation in the Country (Based on Results of Sociological Surveys in 1991): A Scholarly Report] (Moscow: VTslOM, 1991), pp. 55, 56.
32. A. Orlov (Chairman of the Control Chamber) to Chairman of the InterRepublic Economic Committee I. S. Silayev, materials on control and analysis of implementation of Union budget and funds outside the budget for nine months of 1991 (GARF, F. 5446, Op. 163, D. 31, Ll. 66-75).
33. V. V. Gerashchenko (Chairman of Gosbank) and Yu. S. Moskovsky (Chairman of the Board of Vneshekonombank) to I. S. Silayev (Chief of Committee for Effective Management of the Economy), urgent message on the use of credit given by Riyadh Bank (Saudi Arabia), October 25, 1991 (GARF, F. 5446, Op. 163, D. 47, L. 7).
34. Yu. V. Poletaev (Deputy Chairman of the Board of Vnesheconombank) to the Chairman of the Committee for Effective Management of the Economy I. S. Silayev, on funding the purchase of grain from the USA under a guarantee of the U. S. Department of Agriculture, September 11, 1991 (GARF, F. 5446, Op. 163, D. 1436, L. 12).
35. I. Silayev to President M. S. Gorbachev, materials on the emergency budget for the fourth quarter of 1991 to be discussed at the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, October 19, 1991 (GARF, F. 5446, Op. 163, D. 41, Ll. 101-06).
36. A. Orlov (Chairman of the Control Chamber) to Chairman of InterRepublic Economic Committee I. S. Silayev, on the Union budget and legislative procedures for funding expenditures, reducing the deficit in the fourth quarter of 1991, and principles of forming the federal budget for 1992, October 1, 1991 (GARF, F. 5446, Op. 163, D. 41, Ll. 35, 37, 38).
37. I. Silayev, Committee for Effective Management of the Economy, “On monetary circulation,” October 1991 (GARF, F. 5446, Op. 163, D. 41, L. 40).
38. V. N. Kulikov (First Deputy Chairman of Gosbank) to Inter-Republic Economic Committee, Comrade I. S. Silayev, on the situation with monetary circulation (assignment of the Committee on Effective Management of the Economy, k-28, P. 9), September 24, 1991 (GARF, F. 5446, Op. 163, D. 41, Ll. 13-15).
39. Letter from I. S. Silayev to M. S. Gorbachev, October 3, 1991 (GARF, F. 5446, Op. 163, D. 36, L. 118).
40. Letter from V. A. Raevsky (Deputy Minister of Finance) to the Committee for Effective Management of the Economy, as addendum to the October 3, 1991, letter of the Minister of Finance of the USSR, no. 01-01/121-1, October 8, 1991 (GARF, F. 5446, Op. 163, D. 36, L. 119).
41. V. V. Gerashchenko to the Inter-Government Economic Committee, on Union budget allocations, February 3, 1991 (RGAE, F. 2324, Op. 32, D. 4006, L. 99).
42. V. V. Gerashchenko to the Council of Heads of Governments—Members of the Economic Commonwealth, on monetary circulation, December 9, 1991 (RGAE, F. 2324, Op. 32, D. 4006, Ll. 103-104).
43. V. V. Gerashchenko to President M. S. Gorbachev, on issuing money in 1991, November 13, 1991 (RGAE, F. 2324, Op. 32, D. 4006, Ll. 84-88).
44. Cherniaev, 1991 god, p. 280.
45. Shpil’ko and others, “Otsenka naseleniiem sotsial’no-ekonomicheskoi sit-uatsii v strane” [People’s Evaluation of the Country’s Socioeconomic Situation],
Pp. 6, 20, 21.
46. V. A. Mangazeev (Minister of Foreign Economic Relations) to Chairman of the Committee for Effective Management of the Economy I. S. Silayev, on payments for deliveries of purchased grain, August 29, 1991 (GARF, F. 5446, Op. 163, D. 1436, L. 4).
47. R. Braithwaite, Across the Moscow River: The World Turned Upside Down (Yale University Press, 2002), p. 249.
48. V. V. Gerashchenko to President M. S. Gorbachev, on gold reserves of Gos-bank, November 15, 1991 (RGAE, F. 2324, Op. 32, D. 4006, L. 90, 91).
49. Memorandum prepared by A. A. Butin (Acting Financial Director of Mosnarbank) prepared for negotiations with the Bank of England on the question of preserving a branch of Mosnarbank in London, January 23, 1992 (Ye. T. Gaidar’s personal archive).
50. Directors of commercial banks to President of the RSFSR B. N. Yeltsin, on Russia’s commercial banks abroad, December 19, 1991 (RGAE, F. 2324, Op 32, D. 4006, L. 110-12.
51. Cherniaev, 1991 god, p. 260.
52. G. Yavlinsky, Pereferiinyi kapitalizm. Lektsii ob ekonomicheskoi sisteme Rossii na rubezhe XX-XXI vekov [Peripheral Capitalism: Lecture on Russia’s Economic System at the Turn of the Twenty-First Century] (Moscow: EPItsentr Integral-Inform, 2003), pp. 24, 25.
53. RGAE, F. 692, Op. 1, D. 5, L. 32.
54. V. I. Akulinin (First Deputy Chairman of the Committee for Purchase of Food Resources) to Comrade I. S. Silayev, Committee on Effective Management of the Economy, on purchasing grain with convertible currency, August 28, 1991 (GARF, F. 5446, Op. 163, D. 1438, L. 57).
55. V. I. Akulinin (First Deputy Chairman of the Committee for Purchase of Food Resources) to I. S. Silayev, Committee on Effective Management of the Economy, on the volume of imported wheat and purchase of soybean paste, September 27, 1991 (GARF, F. 5446, Op. 163, D. 1439, L. 75).
56. Resolution of the Committee on Effective Management of the Economy of August 31, 1991, no. 4, “On urgent measures to provide the population with foodstuffs.”
57. V. B. Turbin (Deputy Minister of MVD) to I. S. Silayev (Chairman of InterGovernment Economic Committee), on providing bread and other basic foodstuffs to the population, November 8, 1991 (GARF, F. 5446, Op. 163, D. 562, L. 141).
58. Working group of the City Soviet (Gorsovet), on Russia’s relations with other republics, in preparation for a session of the Gorsovet under the President of the RSFSR, “Arkhangelskoye,” October 24, 1991 (Ye. T. Gaidar’s personal archive).
59. Shpil’ko and others, “Otsenka naseleniiem sotsial’no-ekonomicheskoi situ-atsii v strane” [People’s Evaluation of the Country’s Socioeconomic Situation], p. 49.
60. Resolution of the government of the RSFSR of December 19, 1991, no. 57, “On emergency measures for supplies of bread and baked goods to the RSFSR.”
61. Executive order of the government of the RSFSR of December 28, 1991, no. 244-p, “On additional measures for unconditional supplies of bread and baked goods to the RSFSR.”
62. D. A. Rustow, “Transitions to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model,” Comparative Politics 2, no. 3 (April 1970): 350, 351; J. Linz and A. Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe (Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), p. 17.
63. A memorandum prepared in October 1991 recognized the policy of Great Britain from 1940 to the early 1960s, which managed to carry out a relatively bloodless dissolution of the empire and to adjust to new world realities, as an example to be followed by the leadership of Russia. See “Strategy of Russia in transitional period,” October 1991 (Ye. T. Gaidar’s personal archive).
64. E. Todd, Posle imperii. Pax Americana-nachalo kontsa [After the Empire: The Breakdown of the American Order] (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, 2004), pp. 173-76.
65. On the possibility that commanders of military districts might decide to use tactical and operational-tactical nuclear weapons, see K. Sorokin, “Strategicheskoe nasledie SSSR” [The USSR’s Strategic Legacy], Mirovaia ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, no. 2 (1992): 51-65.
66. On Moscow’s lack of efficient control over individual components of tactical nuclear weapons, particularly outdated models, see also Ezhegodnik SIPRI. 2002 (Moscow: Nauka, 2002), p. 572.
67. M. Sokolov, “Sud’ba Soiuza: ‘N+0’ ili ‘9-9’ ” [Fate of the Union: N+0 or 9-9], Kommersant, September 2, 1991.
68. V. Portnikov, “Yel’tsin obsuzhdal s voennymi vozmozhnost’ yadernogo udara po Ukraine...” [Yeltsin Discussed the Possibility of a Nuclear Strike against Ukraine with the Army. . .], Nezavisimaia Gazeta, October 24, 1991.
69. Memorandum on Russia’s immediate actions in the field of military construction, disarmament, and outer space; withdrawal of nuclear weapons from former Union republics, 1991 (Ye. T. Gaidar’s personal archive).
70. Agreement on joint measures regarding nuclear weapons, see Resolution of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR of December 12, 1991, no. 2014-1, “On ratification of the agreement for establishment of commonwealth of independent states.” On the withdrawal of tactical nuclear weapons to central preproduction bases by June 1, 1992, for dismantling under joint control, see V. F. Davydov, “Raspad SSSR i nerasprostraneniie yadernogo oruzhiia” [Disintegration of the USSR and the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons], SShA: ekonomika, politika, ideologiia, no. 3 (267) (1992): 25, 29; S. M. Rogov, “Povorotnyi punkt v yadernoi konfrontatsii” [Turning Point in the Nuclear Confrontation], SShA: ekonomika, politika, ide-ologiia, no. 1 (265) (1992). On the concern of Western analysts, turning occasionally into open panic, about the fate of Russia’s tactical nuclear weapons if the Soviet Union should collapse, see G. Milkhollin, and D. Yait, “Razval sovetskoi yadernoi moshchi—blago ili ugroza?” [Collapse of Soviet Nuclear Power—Good or Threat?] Mezhdunarodnaia Zhizn’, no. 1 (1992): 43-55.
71. Priroda i zakomonernost’ mezhdunadornykh otnoshenii. Sovremennye mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia [The Nature and Order of International Relations: Contemporary International Relations], edited by A. V. Torkunov (Moscow: ROSSPEN, 2000).
72. On August 8, 1996, Lukashenko addressed the Parliament with an offer to conduct a referendum in regard to introducing changes in the Constitution. The Constitutional Court admitted that a referendum on such serious questions could not be compulsory, but only consultative. The government of Belarus pretended it was not aware of the decision of the Supreme Court of the country. On November 15, the head of the country removed Victor Gobchar, the chairman of the Central Election Commission, from office. Chairman of the Government of Russia Victor Chernomyrdin, Chairman of the State Duma Gennady Seleznev, and Chairman of the Council of the Federation Yegor Stroiev, who were traveling outside Belarus on business, suddenly changed their route and landed in the capital of Belarus on the night of November 21, 1996. The Russian authorities gave a clear signal to the Belarus elite and society that they would not support the opposition against A. Lukashenko’s regime. Alexander Lukashenko did not attend the celebration on the occasion of withdrawal of the last Russian strategic missile from the territory of Belarus, which was held on November 27, 1996 (after the referendum). See P. Sheremet and S. Kalinkina, Sluchainyipresident [Accidental President] (St. Petersburg: Limbus Press, 2004).
73. On December 25, 1991, M. Gorbachev signed a decree that stripped him of his authority as president of the USSR. At 7:38 p. m. Moscow time, the red flag was lowered at the Kremlin and the tricolor flag of Russia was raised.
74. In January of 1992, a survey of officers who participated in an all-army meeting showed that 73 percent of officers thought it natural that, on all issues regarding the future of the armed forces, decisions should rest with the military. On the USSR armed forces that could not be controlled and loss of control over troops by the Union leadership after August 1991, see Rossiia segodnia. Politich-eskii portret v documentakh [Russia Today: Political Portrait in Documents], edited by B. I. Koval’, issue 2, 1991-1992; Stanovleniie gosudarstvennosti. Armia ipolitika. Novyepartii. Tserkov’ i obshchestvo [Formation of Statehood. The Army and Politics. New Parties. The Church and Society] (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, 1993), p. 81.
75. The position of the author, and of leading specialists of the Institute for the Economy in Transition who hold views similar to his on key issues of the postsocialist transition in Russia, is described in detail in the following works: Ye. T. Gaidar, Dniporazhenii ipobed. Soch [Days of Defeat and Victory: Essays] (Moscow: Evraziia, 1997), vol. 1; Ekonomika perekhodnogo perioda: ocherki ekonomicheskoi politiki postkommunisticheskoi Rossii 1991-1997 [Economy of the Transitional Period: Sketches of the Economic Policy of Post-Communist Russia 1991-1997] (Moscow: IEPP, 1998); Ekonomika perekhodnogo perioda. Ocherki ekonomicheskoi politiki postkommunisticheskoi Rossii. 1998-2002 [Economy of the Transitional Period: Sketches of the Economic Policy of Post-Communist Russia 1998-2002] (Moscow: Delo, 2003).