The defensive preparations in the west were considerably hindered by the complicated and intermingled areas of responsibility which prevailed there. The title C-in-C West represented a pious wish rather than reflecting the real situation. In contrast to Eisenhower’s comprehensive powers, von Rundstedt had direct control of only a part of the armed forces in die west. It was understandable and tolerable that the flying units of Luftflotte 3 should still come under the command of the head of the Luftwaffe. When, on the other hand, paratroop units and Luftwaffe field divisions - nominally part of the Luftwaffe - were withdrawn from the direct control of the C-in-C West, this naturally caused friction. A similar situation existed with the Naval security units and the coastal batteries. The fortress commandant in a port city was always an Army officer, and organized the defense with land operations in mind — a state of affairs which often came into conflict with the ideas of the Navy. Superior authorities such as the Armed Forces High Command or Navy High Command were often forced to intervene and settle the arguments which thus arose.
Waffen-SS and reserve units were also only von Rundstedt’s to dispose of under certain conditions. He was often frustrated to find that only by chance had his staff come to learn of major manpower and equipment changes within such divisions. Military commanders in the west also had their own chain of command, which bypassed C-in-C West and ran direct to Army High Command in Berlin.
All of this could have been justified with the argument that different operational tasks required a different command structure. What remained completely incomprehensible however was the confused network o responsibilities within the Army itself Even there the C-in-C West was not assured of complete powers of command. His most potent weapon, the motorized divisions, were partly removed from his control, in that they formed part of the Army High Command reserve. It was precisely this fact which was to have such dire consequences for the initial German reaction to the landings. The 2nd Panzer Division for example was by no means untypical, when thrown in at the crucial point of the assault, in having to give an ear to four different command authorities: in the order of battle it formed part of Panzer Group West, tactically it belonged to the I SS Panzer Corps, territorially it was under the control of the military commander for Belgium and Northern France, and for supply purposes it was still in Fifteenth Army. Nor was this by any means an exceptional case.
Even such an experienced officer as Gen. Blumentritt, the Chief of the General Staff at C-in-C West, was apt to get hot under the collar, and he gave vent to his feelings in a letter to Jodi in January 1944: “Everything here is in a complete mess, tangled and confused at every possible point.”
Blumentritt may thereby have been thinking of the prolonged argument between Field Marshals von Rundstedt and Rommel, which had been going on since the end of 1943. Rommel’s Army Group B Staff had originally been languishing in Italy. Perhaps Hitler saw in this a suitable opportunity to use the “Desert Fox” in the west, since nobody knew the western Allies as well as Rommel. His staff were therefore transferred to France in the New Year, in order to improve the defensive fortifications along the coast - technically a job which fell within the responsibility of the armies under C-in-C West. Rommel, who had a direct line to Hitler, then also managed to arrange things so that all troops from Holland to St. Nazaire (Army Commander Netherlands, Fifteenth Army, and Seventh Army) were placed under his command from January 15, 1944. Not satisfied with this, his hunger for power also soon gave him the veto on the use of motorized units, and he also tried to bring parts of the First and Nineteenth Armies in Southern France under his control. Von Rundstedt, seeing his own influence diminishing day by day, finally sent a note to the Armed Forces High Command in the spring of 1944, which he rounded off by saying that should his authority be restricted any further, there would seem to be little point to his continued service in the west. This had the desired effect. The dispute was terminated forthwith at the beginning of May with a victory for von Rundstedt: C-in-C West was placed in control not only of Rommel’s Group B, but also of the newly-formed army Group G (First and Nineteenth Armies) and Panzer Group West. This was only a formal arrangement, however, since the restrictions on his authority mentioned above still remained in effect. In other words, the situation now, after months of frustrating arguments, was virtually the same as at the end of 1943. To illustrate this in a little more detail: when C-in-C West laid out the new organisation for his command authorities on May 12, 1944, it took eight pages just to list his main areas of responsibility.
One may well enquire into the exact reasons for such a situation. In the authors opinion the following should be borne in mind: firstly the system of divided responsibility was deeply rooted in the traditions of German leadership, the tendency running through civil and military, private and public institutions ever since the foundation of the German Empire in 1871, irrespective of the ruling political system, Bismarck’s “Lesser German Empire” did not grow organically, but was a conglomeration of varying mentalities and interests, which naturally gave rise to much rivalry. Nor did this simation change at all in the 20th century.
Secondly, Hitler was very careful to observe the principle of power sharing. Nobody was allowed to become powerful enough to threaten him. In this the German dictator was simply following the established tradition. This naturally proved to be a breeding ground for petty jealousies, self-seeking servility, and obsession with prestige at all levels in the power structure. In relation to military matters one often has the impression that, for many high-ranking officers, the thing closest to their heart was not the military objective, but rather their careers or the reputation of their branch of the service or military unit. This was not an unknown motive in the Allied camp, and one has only to think of Patton, Montgomery and MacArthur in this respect. Amongst the German leadership, however, this situation and attimde was rather more the rule than the exception.
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