Sometimes the clandestine resistance movements managed to
capture enemy weapons. After the Italians surrendered, the'
Yugoslav partisans acquired the Italian occupying forces' equip
ment. But the resistance more often depended on the Allies to
supply arms.
Career soldiers in every country remained sceptical about the
"little war'. The British, especially Churchill, appreciated its importance.
They created a Special Operations Executive (S.O.E.)
to supply equipment. Each of the exiled governments which had
been granted asylum in London, including the French National
Committee, looked after its own nationals. The news that the
Free French Movement had defended Bir-Hakeim against
Rommel's Afrika Korps did much to buoy the spirits of the Resistance
in occupied French.
On the other hand, the British confined their sponsorship of
the clandestine war to harassment of the enemy in multiple engagements.
Although the Americans organized a nub of resistance
against the Japanese in the Philippines, and after 1 943 they
provided most of the equipment for the European resistance,
they found it difficult to adapt to resistance methods ofwarfare.
Since the Red Army and the partisans were fighting side-by-side
on home ground, they could be organized under a single command.
Soviet Russia could also rely on support in every country;
the communist parties were loyal to Russia and had a great deal
more experience in clandestine operations than most of their
fellow citizens. A number of national communist chiefs, notably
Thorez from France and Togliatti from Italy, spent the entire
war in Russia. Allied policies towards the resistance were identical
in one respect. They supported resistance movements when
to do so favoured their own interests. When it did not, they
fought against them.