A chapter dealing with Iranian feudalism in a distinguished series dedicated
to The rise and fall of the Roman world bears the title ‘Iran, Rome’s greatest
enemy.1 This title is more than merely a justification for the inclusion of a
chapter on Iran in a work devoted to the history of the East Roman empire.
It also reflects a host of fears and prejudices fostered for long centuries in
the Roman world, since the trauma of Crassus’ defeat by the Parthians
at Carrhae. Not even extended periods of decline and internal disarray
within the Parthian monarchy, during which it was repeatedly invaded
by the Roman army, could dispel the myth of the uncompromising threat
posed by Iran to the Roman order. The replacement of the Parthian Arsacid
dynasty by a vigorous new one, based in Fars, namely the Sasanian dynasty,
at a time when the Roman empire itself was facing one of its severest
crises, only aggravated its inhabitants’ deeply rooted fear of Iran. Ancient
writers in the Roman oikoumen¯e passed on this attitude to modern western
scholars.2
It is the Sasanian bogeyman which has left a deep imprint in modern
historiography. The Sasanian state is widely regarded as a much more centralised
and effective political entity than its Parthian counterpart, with a
far better army. The great pretensions and aspirations of its monarchs are
believed to have been fed by the fervour of religious fanaticism, inspired
by the Zoroastrian priesthood, which is commonly depicted as a wellorganised
state church. No wonder that such a state posed the gravest
threat to its greatest rival – the other great power of late antiquity.3 Each of
these accepted beliefs raises a multitude of problems, and a fundamental
revision is called for. Only a few of the more salient points can be dealt
with here.
The Sasanian empire embraced two distinct geographical areas, the very
fertile lowlands of Mesopotamia and the Iranian uplands, which were
separated from each other by the mighty Zagros chain stretching from
the Kurdistan highlands to the fringes of the Persian Gulf in the south.4
Mesopotamia, where a complex irrigation system permitted dense settlement,
was the economic heart of the Persian realm. Its rich agriculture
generated the largest part of the Sasanian state’s tax revenues and supported
a network of major cities: Ctesiphon, the capital; Veh Ardashir, on
the west bank of the Tigris opposite Ctesiphon, which was founded by the
first Sasanian monarch; Perozshapur on the Euphrates, which commemorated
the site of Shapur I’s victory over Gordian and exploited the large
number of Roman captives secured then; and Veh Antiok Khusrau, which
was a similar foundation by Khusro I to celebrate his capture of Antiochon-
the-Orontes and to provide a home for the captives and booty from his
successful 540 campaign (see above, p. 120).
By contrast, the Iranian plateau was sparsely settled, with its main centres
of habitation clustered around the sources of water emerging from the
Zagros. Rainfall on the plateau is low and beyond the rivers and qanats
(underground water channels) lies desert: the Gedrosian to the south-east,
where much of Alexander’s army perished in 324 bc, and to the north the
salt desert of the Great Kavir. On the fringes of the Sasanian world were
areas of considerable military importance. In the north-west, Iran competed
for influence with Rome among the nobilities of Armenia, Lazica, Iberia
and Albania, and attempted to control movements across the Caucasian
passes. In the wide expanses of Transoxiana, Iran confronted its traditional
enemies: the succession of nomadic confederations of the Central Asian
steppes. These included the Hephthalites or White Huns, who dominated
the frontier in the fourth and fifth centuries; and the Turks, who cooperated
with Khusro I in the elimination of their mutual enemy, the Hephthalites,
in the 550s, but then rapidly emerged as a much more powerful threat during
the rest of the sixth century. The vast barrier of the Zagros restricted
communications to a limited number of major passes, so that the structural
backbone of the empire was simple: from the economic and political heartland
of lower Mesopotamia, routes up the Tigris led to the area of conflict
with Rome in the north and north-west; while the road to the east crossed
the Zagros intoMedia and then continued along the southern flanks of the
Elburz range, another major defining mountain range, towards Khorasan
and the frontier.
The Sasanian heartland was located in Fars, the relatively fertile region
at the south-western end of the Iranian plateau, where the family combined
positions of religious authority (the chief priesthood of the temple
of Anahita at Istakhr) and secular power (governorship of Darabjird). After
two decades in which a strong local power base was transformed into authority
over the Iranian plateau, Ardashir descended to theMesopotamian lowlands,
overthrew the Arsacid monarch and was crowned ‘king of kings’ at
Ctesiphon in 226. Military success, and in particular conflict with Rome,
was an important mechanism for demonstrating the legitimacy of the new
regime. The initial thrusts of the two first Sasanian monarchs, Ardashir I
(224–40) and Shapur I (240–70), against the Roman east turned out, in
the long run, to be little more than a series of wars of plunder: the Romans
were defeated three times in the field, with Emperor Valerian being captured
at Edessa in 260; the great cities of Nisibis, Carrhae and Antioch
were sacked; and ravaging extended into Cappadocia and Cilicia as well as
Syria – but there were no permanent gains.5 Under their immediate successors,
the initiative seems to have passed momentarily to the Romans.
The conflicts between the two empires at that time brought the problem
of Armenia to the fore, and this was to be a major bone of contention for
most of the following century (see below, pp. 156–7). The attempt of Shah
Narseh (293–302) to regain the upper hand ended in humiliating defeat by
the Romans in 297, followed by a no less humiliating treaty. The tide was
partly reversed during Shapur II’s long reign (309–79). The wars fought
between the two powers at the time were largely over contested frontier
lands – first and foremost Armenia and northern Mesopotamia. Stability
began to emerge after Julian’s invasion in 363 permitted the Persians to
regain Nisibis and other territories in upper Mesopotamia, and this was
reinforced by the treaty between Shapur III (383–8) and Theodosius I in
384, which arranged the division of Armenia.6
This ushered in a long period of relative quiet in relations between the
empire and Persia, apart from two brief conflicts in 421–2 and 440–1. On
the first occasion, the dispute was caused by the Roman reception of Christian
fugitives, especially from the Arab tribes allied to Persia. Yazdgard
I (399–420) had been favourably disposed towards Christians and other
minority religious groups within his kingdom, but energetic Christian missionary
activity seems eventually to have forced him to permit persecution;
an Arab chief, Aspabad, was instructed to prevent the flight of Christian
converts to the Romans, but he proceeded to join the exodus, converted
and, now renamed Peter, became bishop for the wandering tribal groups
in the desert.7 Persian demands for subsidies towards the cost of defending
the Caspian passes (the so-called Gates) caused the second conflict,
when Yazdgard II (438–57) attempted to exploit Theodosius’ concern over
the Vandal capture of Carthage. On each occasion Roman armies checked
Persian attacks and peace was rapidly restored, with renewed treaties that
contained clauses to regulate the alleged origins of the war.8
A plausible explanation for the change from persistent warfare in the
third and fourth centuries to peaceful relations in the fifth is provided by
the other external problems which faced successive rulers. Developments
in the west and the Balkans, as well as internal problems in Isauria, commanded
the attention of the emperor at Constantinople, while Sasanian
shahs had to contend with the equally serious threat posed by the Hephthalites
on their north-east frontier. This Sasanian problem is not regularly
reported in our sources. The succession ofGreek classicising historians from
Priscus of Panium through to Theophylact Simocatta narrate diplomacy
and warfare that involved Romans and Sasanians, but seldom extend their
horizons further east.9 Sasanian sources are mostly preserved for us through
compilations from the Islamic period, of which the most important are the
Ta’rikh of al-Tabari in Arabic and the Shahnama (Book of kings) of Firdausi
in New Persian. Both date from the tenth century and depend on lost Iranian
sources, in which anecdotal material had substantially ousted reliable
information, so that the resulting narratives are dominated by charming
and exotic stories. Though al-Tabari attempted to cut his way through the
more sensational of his source materials and to produce a sober historical
narrative, he still incorporated two parallel versions of Sasanian history: it
is not safe to trust his information uncritically.10 Furthermore, these Iranian
sources are more informative for the royal court and internal affairs
and, like their Roman counterparts, are silent about a difficult frontier
relationship in which the Persians were often at a disadvantage. Only for
the reign of Peroz (459–84) is there substantial information about Perso-
Hephthalite relations, partly because Peroz was defeated in 464–5 when
the Roman ambassador Eusebius was accompanying the royal army, and
partly because two decades later Peroz perished with much of his army in
a catastrophic attempt to reverse the previous humiliation.11
The death of Peroz was followed by a period of dynastic weakness in
Iran. Peroz’s brother Valash ruled for four years (484–8) before being overthrown
by Peroz’s son Kavad I (488–96), who relied on Hephthalite support.
Kavad, however, was in turn ousted by the nobility and replaced by his
brother Zamaspes (Jamasp); but he was returned to power (498–531) with
Hephthalite assistance, after marrying their ruler’s daughter. Kavad’s reign
witnessed the rise of the Mazdakite ‘movement’ (see p. 149 below), which
advocated communal rights over property, and perhaps also women. It
appears to have received some support fromthe shah, and can be interpreted
as an attempt to undermine the entrenched power of the hereditary aristocracy.
An indirect consequence of Kavad’s dynastic problems was resurgence
of warfare with Rome: Kavad undoubtedly needed money to repay the
Hephthalites and to enhance his position as supreme patron within Persia,
and this led him to ask the Romans for contributions towards the costs of
defending the Caspian Gates. Anastasius’ refusal provided a pretext for war
(502–5), and although Kavad’s first campaign secured considerable prestige
and booty – with the capture of both Theodosioupolis and Amida – the
Roman generals gradually stabilised matters after that.12
Sixth-century Romano-Persian relations are characterised by two opposing
tendencies: a recollection of the relatively harmonious fifth century,
when elaborate diplomatic practices for managing relations had emerged;
and international rivalry, caused both byweakness in the Persian shah’s position
and by mutual suspicion of each other’s intentions. In 527, towards the
end of Kavad’s reign, war broke out again (see above, p. 119). Tension had
risen as the empires competed for the allegiance of the principalities around
the Caucasus, where acceptance of Christianity by local rulers threatened
to weaken loyalties to Persia. However, the flashpoint came when Justin
I (518–27) refused to cooperate with Kavad’s plans to ensure the succession
of his third son, Khusro. Although the Persians took the offensive, a
series of invasions failed to capture any major Roman city, and two pitched
battles – at Dara in 530 and at Callinicum in the following year – resulted
in a victory apiece. Hostilities were concluded with the ‘perpetual peace’ of
532, when the new Persian shah, Khusro I (531–79) accepted a lump sum
of 11,000 pounds of gold in lieu of regular contributions for the defence of
the Caucasus.13
Peace did not last. Justinian (527–65) exploited the quiet on his eastern
frontier to launch the reconquest of Africa and Italy, but his startling victories
were brought to Khusro’s attention; jealousy fuelled suspicions about
Justinian’s long-term intentions, and Khusro exploited a dispute between
client Arab tribes to attack in 540. After spectacular Persian successes in this
first campaign, the Romans organised their defences and a truce confined
fighting to Lazica after 545. However, their Arab allies went on fighting (see
below, p. 188). This ended with a decisive victory for the Ghassanid allies of
Byzantium in 554 near Chalkis, when the Lakhmid ruler al-Mundhir III –
scourge of imperial provinces for the previous half-century – was killed.
Peace finally came in 562 with an agreement that was intended to last for
fifty years; the detailed terms illustrate the range of disputed issues that
could provoke conflict, and are preserved in an important Fragmentum of
Menander the Guardsman.14 Peace lasted for a decade, but on this occasion
the Byzantines were the aggressors: Justin II (565–78) objected to paying
for peace (at the rate of 30,000 solidi per year) and believed that he could
count on the support of the Turkish confederation in Central Asia, which
had replaced theHephthalites as Persia’s north-eastern neighbours, to crush
their common enemy. Two decades of fighting ended when Khusro I’s son
and successor, Hormizd IV (579–90), was overthrown in a palace coup;
Hormizd’s son, Khusro II (590, 591–628), was almost immediately challenged
by Bahram Chobin, who had gained great glory from defeating the
Turks and was the first non-Sasanian to seize the throne (590–1). Khusro
sought assistance from Emperor Maurice (582–602), was reinstated by a
Roman army in 591, and peace was again arranged.15
The final conflict of the two great rivals of the ancient world broke
out in 602, when Khusro took advantage of the murder of his benefactor
Maurice and the arrival in Persia of Maurice’s eldest son Theodosius (or at
least a plausible impersonator); Khusro could shed the image of imperial
client, present himself as the supporter of international ties of gratitude
and friendship, and obtain significant booty and military glory into the
bargain. For twenty-five years the conflict ranged across the entire Middle
East, from Chalcedon on the Bosporus to Gandzak on the Iranian plateau,
until a daring counter-offensive byHeraclius (610–41) prompted the Persian
nobility to overthrow Khusro in 628.16 Once more peace was restored,
but the defeated Sasanian dynasty lapsed into a rapid turnover of rulers
(eight within five years, including, for forty days, the Christian and non-
Sasanian Shahrvaraz). The last Sasanian ruler Yazdgard III (633–51) had
only just ascended the throne when he had to confront Islamic attacks;
the diminution of royal prestige and the weakness of his armies after a
quarter of a century of unsuccessful warfare against Byzantium made Persia
particularly vulnerable, and Yazdgard was forced to flee to the north-east,
where he was eventually killed.
Wars and animosity loom large in the record of the relations between
Byzantium and Persia, both of which laid claim to universal ascendancy.
The imprint they have left on the Byzantine sources tends to obscure the
fact that both sides could also exploit a rhetoric of peace and co-operative
relations. The Sasanians, who had to contend with a succession of nomadic
and semi-nomadic powers along their extensive frontiers, tried to impress
on the Byzantines that they were defending these frontiers for their mutual
benefit. This claim justified repeated demands for diplomatic subsidies, but
Sasanian internal propaganda depicted these as tribute, which aggravated
imperial resistance to paying up:17 international prestige was one of the
factors that individual Sasanian monarchs used in order to balance the
divergent constituencies within their realm and preserve their own supreme
position.
World History
