Summerraids intoByzantine Anatolia diminished in intensity onceAbbasid
power began to fragment both on the periphery and in the central cities
during the internal conflicts of the middle decades of the ninth century.
A slave revolt broke out in southern Iraq in 869 and the rebels, mostly
of east African origin and known as the Zanj, took over Basra and even
started striking their own coins before eventually being overwhelmed in
883. Then, from the 890s onwards for almost a century, the Carmathians
(Qaramita) backed by bedouin tribes posed a constant challenge, sometimes
amounting to a serious threat to the state. Even before inner turmoil
diverted the caliphate’s resources, growing military and economic power
enabled Byzantium to undertake offensive actions. One Byzantine expeditionary
force penetrated to Amida, where it took many prisoners in 851, and
a Byzantine fleet raided the Egyptian port of Damietta in 853 (see above,
p. 298). The central government in Samarra or Baghdad could do little
effectively to deter this.
Ninth-century Byzantine–Muslim diplomatic practices and protocols
are well documented in theGreek and Arabic sources.Muslim geographical
texts such as that of Ibn Khurradadhbih, with its itineraries and other data
concerning the empire, also testify to growing contacts and exchanges.70
Famous Byzantine embassies to Baghdad include those in the reigns of Leo
Vand Theophilos.71 Two of the most important missionswere those of John
the Grammarian of 829 and 831: returning from his first mission, John is
said to have advised the emperor Theophilos to build the palace of Bryas ‘in
imitation of those of the Saracens’.72 Not all the information passed through
formal channels.Members of Syrian Christian communities, some of whose
members also knew Greek, were important intermediaries between the two
empires and cultures. They could carry out translations of ancient texts73
and they could also transmit intelligence of vital relevance to contemporary
politics, war and commerce. The frontiers were not tightly sealed between
Byzantium and the lands under Abbasid rule. In fact, in every century
renegades fled from one side to the other: many of them were neither
Greek nor Armenian by origin, and some moved repeatedly to and fro.
The migrants included the Banu Taghlib in the seventh century, Tatzates
in the late eighth century, Theophobos in the ninth century, Samonas in
the early tenth century and Bardas Skleros in the late tenth century.74 Such
defections reveal the potential for the movement of individuals and even,
occasionally, of whole groups or communities across the frontiers. Precisely
for this reason, attempts were made by the respective authorities to keep
vigilant watch over the border zones. It is probable that the Byzantines had
developed techniques for reporting and tracking, and for mobilising their
own military forces to cut off and destroy enemy raiders in Anatolia, by the
late seventh or earlier eighth centuries. Documentation of these practices
exists from the tenth century, but the basic military defence measures were
most probably in place much earlier.75
Emperors, caliphs and amirs took responsibility for major operations on
the Byzantine–Arab frontiers intermittently between the seventh and the
mid-ninth century, but none persisted in campaigning in person. Too many
other priorities and pressures were in play, and important as the frontier
was, it did not monopolise their attention. Constans II spent much of
his time on or near scenes of military campaigning; the state of emergency
required the emperor’s continuous personal involvement. Leo III and Constantine
V managed to lead far more effectively than their seventh-century
predecessors had done (see above, pp. 265–6, 273, 277), but only a few
of the earlier ninth-century emperors came from a military background
and those who scored significant successes did so in fighting the Bulgars,
not the Arabs (see above, p. 257). So far as the Muslims were concerned,
no leader after their campaigns of conquest in the seventh century, and
occasional expeditions of the eighth and earlier ninth centuries, managed
to assemble sufficient human and material resources to undertake further
major offensives or to conquer fresh territories. The personal presence of
a sovereign was necessary to make the respective military systems function
effectively on both sides of the frontier, yet neither caliph nor basileus
could long give the Byzantine–Muslim frontier his full attention in the
light of pressures elsewhere. No single campaign, battle or other brilliant
tactical or political feat could resolve the underlying military challenges
and political tensions in northern Syria and upperMesopotamia. Processes
of political and military deterioration undermined Muslim strength in the
area, but limited resources, the cost and complexity of mobilisation and
fear of military coups continued to frustrate the Byzantine emperors, too.
Internal conflicts greatly complicated the conduct of warfare and diplomacy
on their eastern frontier. No systematic institutional solution showed
signs of emerging there for either Byzantines or Muslims, and indecisive
if incessant warfare and diplomacy remained the norm. The approximate
limits of Byzantine control to the south-east in the mid-ninth century were
not radically different from those which had emerged some two centuries
earlier, in the aftermath of the earliest Muslim conquests. Decisive change
could wait.
World History
