On land, novel factors in the war had created a dilemma that stood for
years beyond the ability of military leaders to solve. Machine guns, barbed
wire, and modem transportation networks combined to form a defensive
system that an advancing enemy could not break through; indeed, attempts
to do so led to hideous casualties. A lack of imagination on the part of the
generals combined with an absence of effective countertechnology and a
failure of will on the part of political leaders to produce prolonged catastrophe.
In contrast to that grim record, the Allies, led by Britain, were able
to devise a successful response—and in a timely way—to the threat of the
submarine. As on land, military conservatism at the highest levels stood in
the way of an effective solution, but,, in the end, a new generation of navy
leadership emerged that proved less hidebound than the military brass in
adapting to the new technology of war.
The first hint of severe crisis came in the fall of 1 9 1 6. The German navy
had failed to alter the balance of power in the North Sea when it met the
British Grand Fleet at Jutland. Now, within a few months, the authorities in
Berlin turned to an intensified form of submarine warfare against merchant
vessels. Some restrictions remained, but the upward trend in Allied losses
suggested what a potent weapon the submarine might become. In October
1916, for example, German submarines sank 175,000 tons of Allied shipping,
af)eak so far in the war.
Britain stood as the chief target of the submarine offensive. Since the last
decades of the nineteenth century, there had been a steady rise in the amount
of food the country needed to import from abroad. By the start of the war,
fully 80 percent of the bread consumed, along with vast quantities of other
foods, came from foreign sources. An.effective submarine blockade promised
to drive Britain quickly to the brink of starvation.
Apart from Britain's food needs, the nation's war effort, from shipping
armies to France to supporting far-flung operations from the eastern Medi
terranean to the Persian Gulf, depended upon an unbroken stream of
merchant traffic. Statistical analysis showed the German High Command
that Britain could be knocked out of the war within six months if German
submarines disrupted the island nation's sea traffic. The Germans hoped to
destroy 600,000 tons of British shipping per month. Neutral countries like
Norway whose ships played a crucial role in the carrying trade with Britain
would become too frightened to continue.