The ontology of Gilbert (general accounts in Jolivet 1992b:141-146; Marenbon 1998:168-171; Jacobi 1996:12-14; Jacobi 2002:74-76), which has pertinently been called a ‘‘metaphysics of the concrete’’ (Maioli 1979), is a combination of doctrines, broadly coherent, but not without indeterminate elements. It is distinguished from the philosophy of nature practiced at Chartres by, above all, the theory of forms, of individuals and of universals. It also adopts an original vocabulary, whose basic elements are the terms: subsistens, subsistentia, concretio, tota forma.
Subsistens (which will be translated below as ‘‘sub-sistent’’) corresponds to Boethius’ id quod est (De hebdomadibus), that is, ‘‘the <thing> which is’’ (cfr. de Rijk 1988:75), the determinate entity, which is such from the inherence of a multiplicity of forms. As a synonym for subsistens, Gilbert uses the term substantia, in virtue of the fact that it ‘‘is under’’ (sub-stat) the accidents; substantia, however, is ambiguous, because it is also able to refer to forms.
Subsistentia (‘‘subsistence’’) corresponds to the esse or id quo of Boethius, ‘‘that through which the <thing> which is is,’’ the formal principle, which makes the subsistent exist and which confers on it its substantial properties. The subsistentia is referred to also as natura, nativorum forma, esse. The subsistentiae can be simple or composed of other subsistentiae: humanitas is composed of animalitas and rationalitas, etc. Of the subsistent Gilbert says that ‘‘it has’’ (habet) the subsistentiae, or ‘‘participates’’ (participat) in them. To include under one general name both subsistents and subsistences, Gilbert uses the neutral plural (e. g., singularia) or the term substantiae. In the constitution of the subsistent, the accidental forms are added to the subsistence: they confer on the subsistent its accidental characteristics of quality and extension (quantity).
Concretio (‘‘concretion’’) is a term that refers to the ordered aggregation of the many subsistences and accidental forms that constitute the subsistent. These forms support (con-crescere) one another, beginning from the more generic and descending gradually in ever-increasing determinateness: they are related to one another as generales and differentiales; in this way, the formal structure of the subsistent follows the order of Porphyry’s tree. The more general forms are the causes of the increasingly less general forms that adhere (adsunt, adhaerent; e. g., albedo to corporeitas) to them, in a relation of consequence (complexionis consequentia). The first subsistence, the most general, is preceded only by the primary cause and constitutes the basis of the process of ordered aggregation of forms that constitutes the subsistent (Comm. De hebdomadibus, p. 209, ll. 67-85). It is not clear, however, if this first subsistence is a maximally indeterminate substantial form, which ‘‘precedes’’ the corporeitas and the spiritualitas, the two most general forms that distinguish the corporeal from incorporeal things, or if it is one of these two.
Tota forma (‘‘complete form’’): the subsistences of a single subsistent taken together and in their totality constitute the tota or propria forma or proprietas (in the case of Socrates, it can be called socrateitas), which confers to the subsistent at a time that it is something and its unity. The tota forma is made up of all the subsistences and all of the accidental forms of quality and extensive quantity, which the subsistent actually (actu) has had, has, and will have in the future, and even those which it will never have, but could possibly have according to the potentiality of its own nature (natura or potestate: Comm. De trinitate p. 144, ll. 75-77; cf Comm. Contra Euticen p. 274, ll. 81-82). In one passage, Gilbert says that the forms that constitute a complete form are infinite (Comm. De trinitate p. 90, l. 50). The numerousness of the forms that make up the complete form, which extends to the future and the possible, makes impossible an adequate understanding of this by man: finite reason cannot but proceed through partial representations of things (Maioli 1979:46; Jacobi 1995a:80s., 1996:14). The unifying principle that holds together in an individual and organic whole the totality of the substantial and accidental forms that constitute the tota forma is God as simplex auctor or qui est solum bonum (Comm. De hebdomadibus, p. 219, ll. 42-57), from which every subsistent ‘‘flows’’ (fluxit. p. 220, l. 81). Yet Gilbert also speaks of the unitas of the subsistent as deriving from the ‘‘coaccidental unity’’ (unitas coaccidens) that accompanies every form, substantial or accidental (Comm. Utrum Pater, p. 176, ll. 15-22). The accidental determinations of non-extensive quantity and the other seven categories do not make up a part of the total form; these seven categories do not correspond to forms but only indicate extrinsic relations that the subsistent maintains with other subsistents (extrinsecus affixa, status).
As can be seen, concepts of simplicity and composition are fundamental to Gilbert’s ontology. Entities are either simple or composite. Above all, the principles, also called genuina, that constitute the object of theology - God, prime matter (yle, silva), the archetypal ideas - are simple entities because they do not derive their being from a multiplicity of other entities. In the Commentary on Boethius, Gilbert does not dwell on the contrast between the theory of the plurality of principles and Christian doctrine, while in the biblical commentaries he adopts Augustine’s view of the creation of matter (Jolivet 1992a). The forms or subsistentiae, which go on to constitute subsistents, originate as images or copies or reflections (the manner of this derivation is not better specified) of the exemplary (exemplar, ydea) ideas. Of these forms, those are simple which are not in turn composed of other forms, like corporeitas or albedo; but they are not simple in the same respect as the principles, as the forms do not exist if they are not within a compound. Most entities are composite, that is to say, created subsistents (nativa) and the greater part of their forms. Subsistents are composite both in the sense that, in order to constitute them, their esse or formal principle must inhere in something (this type of composition is called coniunctio), and in the sense that their complete form is constituted of a multiplicity of forms (concretio). Moreover, some subsistents are made up by putting together a number of subsistents as their parts, such as man, constituted of his body and his soul, which constitute his parts, each with their own forms. The forms of the subsistent parts are at the same time forms of the whole subsistent: the rationality of the soul of Socrates and the whiteness of his body are the rationality and whiteness of Socrates.
The moment of origin of the constitution of a subsistent through the coniunctio of esse in it is the divine act, which makes the forms inhere in the subsistent. It is called generatio or creatio. With respect to this original moment, the theory of Gilbert seems to present a serious problem: ‘‘what the quo est makes into the quod est cannot be the quod est itself - so what is it?’’ (Marenbon 1998:169). A possible response is that there is no substrate, in which the forms inhere to constitute the subsistents, except for a subset of the forms that constitute the whole; so that, supposing we were mentally to abstract all the forms from the subsistent, nothing would remain: ultimately, the subsistent would be identical with the total form. But this solution is a speculation that goes beyond Gilbert’s text (Jacobi 1996:16). Another possible reply, closer to Gilbert’s text, is that the original substrate in which the forms inhere is the ‘‘primordial cause,’’ which is spoken of in Comm. De hebdomadibus (p. 209, ll.
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67-85), that “precedes,” in concretio, the most general form. But the problem remains, what is this primary cause: prime matter, God, the ideas? In any case, how is the most general subsistence related to the primordial cause? The response that Gilbert would probably have made is that man cannot give an answer to this question, as his knowledge, discursive and distinct, is limited to the world of compounds (philosophy of nature) and the forms abstracted from these (mathematics), and cannot raise itself so as to grasp their relation with the absolute simplicity of the principle from which they originate.
World History
