Thought

Although today we might scoff at the endeavor, paraphrasing Aristotelian treatises as difficult as the De anima is an impressive enterprise in any language, let alone in the higher style of ancient Greek. It may well have been undertaken in connection with teaching, but we have as yet no further evidence on that point. As he explains in the preface to In De anima, Sophonias aimed not merely at paraphrase but at a combination of paraphrase and Commentary. For him, the defining characteristic of a commentary is that the commentator divides the philosophical work into discrete, verbatim quotations and adds his own clarification of the philosopher’s words that, as Sophonias states, are often ‘‘oracular’’ in their obscurity. Characteristic of paraphrases is that the paraphrast speaks in the voice of Aristotle, rewriting the text in his own style, and clarifying the meaning through examples and similes, doing this in a continuous composition as opposed to one arranged under different headings. In the paraphrases conventionally ascribed to him, Sophonias never cites either Aristotle or his other sources by name, but he stays very close to the original texts, abridging considerably, replacing difficult or obscure words here and there, adding some glosses and examples. Whole sentences are lifted directly from Aristotle with scarcely a change or only moderate ones. The major changes are due to abridgement and omission. The same approach is also applied to his commentary sources, which, moreover, also go through a process of combination.

Most historians of philosophy hold that Sophonias contributes nothinG of his own in the way of argument or interpretation, apart from his peculiar method of paraphrase and compilation as well as certain scattered remarks here and there (but see Blumenthal 1997; Byden 2006; Ebbesen 1981:333-340; Tatakis 2003:203). However, both at the beginning and end of the De anima, Sophonias does allow himself to speak in his own words. In the preface, he explains his aims and methods, as already mentioned; in an epilogue, he reveals his philosophical, or rather theological, interest in how Aristotle’s psychology relates to the question of the immortality of the soul and the resurrection of the body, an interest he has also already indicated earlier in the treatise (see CAG 23,1 p. 7. 29-38, and p. 132,39 - 133,24; cf. Constantinides 1982:131, n. 109). With regard to the Aristotelian tradition, Sophonias’ chief value today lies in his offering an indirect tradition for the textual transmission of Aristotle, and he is occasionally cited as a textual witness by the editors of Aristotle. He has proven valuable in corroborating fragments of Philoponus’ lost commentary on Book 3 of De anima (cf. Van Riet 1965), and may prove useful in similar, as yet unstudied contexts.