Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg was the prime minister of Germany from
1909 to the middle of 1917. He was the major civilian official empowered
to deal with German foreign policy and the conduct of the war. His freedom
of action was restricted, however, by the predominant role Emperor Wilhelm
II played in the German political system. Similarly, the leaders of the
military establishment had extraordinary influence. Bethmann's responsibility
for the start of World War I has been a highly controversial question.
Of course, other powerful figures such as the country's military commanders
stood at the top of the system. If Bethmann, the civilian leader, deliberately
helped to bring on the war, the taint of waging aggressive war can
scarcely be placed on the military alone. Historians once saw Bethmann as
a German moderate with good intentions tragically carried along by the
fanaticism of military leaders and the kaiser. A newer trend in scholarship
sees him as a prime mover in bringing Germany into the war.
Bethmann was bom November 29, 1856, at Hohenfinow. He was the son
of a Prussian landowner who also held local political office. Educated as a
lawyer, the future prime minister served with distinction in the Prussian
government until 1907. At that point, he took a leading role in the German
imperial government as well, becoming minister of the interior and deputy
prime minister. In 1909 he took over as prime minister.
Bethmann's bland personality and his mixture of policies have made him
difficult to characterize. He tried in vain to halt the naval competition
between Germany and Great Britain, but he also expressed concern about
the danger posed by Serb nationalism to Austria-Hungary, Germany's chief
ally. Similarly, he was bedeviled by the apparent increase in Russian
military power on the eve of World War I.
In the July crisis of 1914, Bethmann quickly followed the lead of
Emperor Wilhelm II in backing Austrian plans to punish Serbia for the
assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand. Most historians now reject the
view that the kaiser and the military leaders took an aggressive stance and
thus dragged an unwilling prime minister along a path that led to war.
Instead, Bethmann himself encouraged Austria to act vigorously against
Serbia; otherwise, he feared, Austria might feel forced to turn away from
its alliance with Germany. Thus, he used German influence to promote a
war in the Balkans, and he accepted the possibility of a much larger conflict
involving all the Great Powers. Bethmann's most vocal critics have claimed
that he intended from early July onward to go much further in exploiting
the crisis brought on by the assassination. In this view, his intentions
included crushing Serbia, humiliating Russia, and establishing German
domination in Europe.
Once the conflict had broken out, Bethmann more clearly followed a
policy of moderation. He sought to limit the wilder plans of nationalist
groups that advocated annexation of huge chunks of territory after Germany
had won the war with a decisive military victory. He preferred a reorganized
Europe in which Germany would quietly dominate a group of political and
economic satellite states like Belgium and Poland. The prime minister also
opposed the policy of unlimited submarine warfare against merchant shipping.
In his eyes, such aggressive actions were certain to pull the United
States into the war.
Bethmann was less perceptive when it came to choosing among military
leaders. He was appalled by the failure of General Erich von Falkenhayn,
the army chief of staff, to win a decisive victory at Verdun, and he promoted
the idea of bringing in Paul von Hindenburg and Erich Ludendorff, the
successful generals from the eastern front, to take over the high command.
He hoped that their prestige would facilitate the search for a compromise
peace. Uistead, the arrival of the eastern generals in Berlin in fall 1916
quickly eroded Bethmann's position.
Facing Hindenburg and Ludendorff, the prime minister found it impossible
to take advantage of American efforts to get a compromise peace in
late 1916. The military leaders blocked such possibilities by insisting on
keeping Belgium in any peace settlement. And Bethmann had to give way
to the military's demands for the unrestricted use of submarines starting in
early 1917. Nonetheless, Germany's highest military leaders became in
creasingly uncomfortable with a prime minister they could not control
completely. Under pressure from the military chieftains, he fell from office
in mid-1917.
Bethmann spent the remainder of his life at Hohenfmow writing his
memoirs. He died at his ancestral home on January 1, 1921.
World History
