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29-07-2015, 07:09

Rundstedt powerless

In this duel between Field-Marshal von Rundstedt and General Eisenhower, the former had at hisdisposal atthebeginning of February (after he had lost the 6th Panzerarmee, taken away to help the Hungarian front), 73 divisions, including eight Panzer or Panzcrgrcnadicr. But the infantry divisions had fallen to an average of about 7,000 men each. As for the armoured formations, whatever may have been the excellent quality of their materiel, they suffered a continual shortage of petrol because of the Allied air offensive against the German synthetic petrol plants. In other words, as had started to become evident in the battle of Colmar, the crisis in munitions was getting ever more desperate at the front. The land forces of the Third Reich, moreover, could not rely on any support from the Luftwaffe, whose jet fighters were fully engaged attempting to defend what

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A //ie Allies pushed on to the Rhine, the cities of Germany continued to suffer under the day and night efforts of the U. S. 8th and 15th Air Forces and R. A.F. Bomber Command. These are the gutted remains of Stuttgart.


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Was left of Germany’s cities against the redoubled attacks of the British and American Strategic Air Forces.

The last straw was that Rundstedt, in his office at Koblenz, was faced by a hopeless situation, and had been stripped of all initiative in the direction of operations. On January 21, he received the following incredible Fuhrerbefehl, with orders to distribute it down to divisional level:

"Commanders-in-chief, army, corps, and divisional commanders are personally responsible to me for reporting in good time:

”(a) Every decision to execute an operational movement.

'Y6J Every offensive plan from divisional level upwards that does not fit exactly with the directives of the higher command.

”(c) Every attack in a quiet sector intended to draw the enemy’s attention to that sector, with the exception of normal shock troop actions.

’'(d) Every plan for withdrawal or retreat.

"(e) Every intention of surrendering a position, a strongpoint, or a fortress.

"Commanders must make sure that I have time to intervene as I see fit, and that my orders can reach the front line troops in good time.’’

And the Fiihrer further announced that any commander or staff officer who by "deliberate intent, carelessness, or oversight’’ hindered the execution of this order, would be punished with "draconian severity’’.



 

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