Following an attempted insurrection in 1310 and the consequent establishment of the Council of Ten, it was decreed that henceforth some 630 soldiers were to be permanently maintained for the protection of the republic, comprised of 100 to patrol the lagoon and canals in small boats; 30 to guard the Doge’s Palace; 200, specially selected by the heads of the city’s 6 sestieri (quarters), to guard the Piazza di San Marco; and 10 to patrol each comrade (parish), of which there were 30 at that time. The arms of many of these were stored in an armoury in the palace, for which the Council of Ten was responsible, and many of the 2,000 weapons still in the armoury today carry the initials ‘CX’ (Council of Ten). This Council was also responsible for Venice’s sophisticated spy network, which in time embraced all of Europe and much of the Mediterranean sphere of Islam.
In addition to the above, each of the sestieri was also required to permanently have 1,500 men in readiness to meet any emergency, when half were to muster in the piazza while the other half remained behind to guard its own sestiere. In the case of a general levy, Venice could raise the best-trained and largest infantry militia in all of Italy, a census of 1336 indicating that the city could call on the service of 40,100 able-bodied men between 20-60 years of age. These were organised into duodene of 12 men, from each of which one man would be chosen by lot for active service, the others contributing to his expenses. If the need should arise a second man, and sometimes even a third, would be similarly chosen to join the first, while under dire circumstances up to 3 men might be required from each duodena from the outset, as for service against Genoa in 1350 and 1378. The duration of such service was apparently entirely at the discretion of the Council of Ten: for example, the Venetian fleet defeated at Pola in 1379 had been at sea for a whole year and had twice been refused permission to return home. Though its strength was at least halved by the Black Death in 1348 (when three-fifths of Venice’s population died), this form of militia organisation remained in existence until the end of the 15th century, by which time some of its members were included amongst the provisional, a body of regularly paid professional infantry. The militias of Venice’s mainland possessions (Terraferma), constituting the shortlived provisionati di San Marco, could theoretically themselves field 15-20,000 men by 1477, each major city being expected to field 500 in 1478. Normally, however, militia contingents, where they accompanied land-armies, tended to be utilised in the capacity of pioneers. The one exception to this, in the period up to about 1440, was the occasional contribution of small detachments of crossbowmen, usually only 1-300 men and at the most about 7-800, organised in companies of 25 men each commanded by a nobleman.
Other than this militia, in the course of the 14th century Venice came to possess no native land army, tending to rely instead on mercenaries or allied contingents. From the late-14th century onward the republic began to employ more and more of the former, so that by 1404 it could field 9,000 cavalry and 10,000 infantry against Verona and Padua. Its first attempt at maintaining a small standing force (250 lances) in 1402 was shortlived, but in 1406 a permanent force of 500 lances (plus some infantry) was approved by the Senate, Taddeo dal Verme being appointed its captain-general with his own condotta of 100 lances and 100 infantry. 8-900 lances were taken into permanent employ in 1413 following a war against the Hungarians, and though this number had declined to about 400 by 1422, the employment of some 400 more was authorised that year and the standing army was increased to 1,000 lances and 3,000 infantry by 1425 and 3,000 cavalry were being maintained by the end of 1426. Wartime demands frequently saw Venetian armies of 20-30,000 men in the field at this time, of whom two-thirds or more were usually condottieri (in 1432, for instance, the republic fielded 12,000 mercenary cavalry and 8,000 mercenary infantry plus 11,000 militia), and thereafter, following each successive peace treaty, a larger mercenary element tended to be retained in permanent employ when the majority of the army was subsequently disbanded — 5,000 horse and 2,000 foot in 1433;
6.000 horse and 2,000 foot in 1454; 6,000 horse and 3,000 foot in 1480 (a year in which 8,000 cavalry were actually under contract); 6,500-7,000 cavalry by 1485; and allegedly, though improbably, 10,000 cavalry and
7.000 infantry by the beginning of the Italian Wars in 1494, when the republic’s contribution to the anti-French Holy League was 8,000 cavalry and 4,000 infantry. For much of the first half of the 15th century a considerable element of the standing army was made up of lame spezzate (ie, ‘broken lances’), men of condottieri companies re-employed by the republic after the death or retirement of their leaders, whose names the surviving lances tended to retain (eg, the Roberteschi, Gatteschi and Colleoneschi of Roberto da Montalbodo, Gattamelata and Bartolomeo Colleoni). Venice had 400 lanze spezzate in her employ as early as 1427, and by the 1470s there were considerable numbers of them, by that date often commanded by Venetian officers. Thereafter, however, such troops were either allocated to the companies of other condottieri or else gradually pensioned off, so that by the beginning of the 16th century they had virtually disappeared.
Venetian lances, like those elsewhere in Italy, at first consisted of 3 men, comprising a man-at-arms (called an elmetto or veto armigero by the mid-15th century), plus a second, less well-equipped man-at-arms and a mounted servant or page. By the 1470s at the latest, however, 4 men per lance was becoming commonplace in Venetian armies in wartime, though only being first officially recognised in the peacetime army in 1490, increasing to 5 men in 1494 (when it was termed a corazza, though elmetto had by that time seemingly assumed the same meaning). One of the additional men was frequently a mounted crossbowman; provision for a detachment of mounted crossbowmen, for use as bodyguards, was included in most large condotte in the second half of the 15th century, and by 1490 mounted crossbowmen were a recognisable, separate arm of the republic’s forces under their own captain, comprising as much as a third of any cavalry force (with elmetti and light cavalry providing the other two-thirds). There were even some mounted handgunners. Italian lances, incidentally, did not include an infantry element, unlike those of contemporary France and Burgundy; foot-soldiers were raised instead by an extension of the condotte system and were commanded by contracted constables, under the overall command of a ‘captain of the infantry’ (who, however, was normally a mounted condottiere with his own retinue of some 100 or more cavalry and mounted crossbowmen). At first the infantry were equally divided into crossbowmen, shield-bearers and spearmen, but by the 1440s these had begun to be replaced by a two-fold division into archers, crossbowmen and handgunners on the one hand, and sword-and-buckler men and halberdiers or pikemen on the other, handgun companies (largely composed of Germans and other Oltramontani) having been first introduced in the period 1433-48. The training of Venetian citizens in the use of the handgun, to reduce the republic’s reliance on foreign mercenaries, commenced only in 1490, but by 1493 Friuli alone could field 900 militia handgunners. There were in addition some Swiss mercenary infantry in the late-15th century, plus Albanian and Cretan infantry throughout much of the period. For full details on the size and organisation of condottiere companies see volume 1, pages 35-38.
As will have already become apparent, Venetian army commanders were inevitably condottieri, and those that the republic employed were generally the best there were, including in the 15th century Gianfrancesco Gonzaga, Michele Attendolo, Sigismondo Malatesta, Carmagnola, Gattamelata (‘The Floneyed Cat’) and Colleoni. Nevertheless, one or two Venetian noblemen called proweditori (commissioners) generally accompanied each condottieri army on campaign to ensure that the republic’s interests were represented at all times, and condottieri who fell foul of them were in danger of losing their command, their freedom or even their lives. These proweditori in addition sometimes commanded troops on the battlefield. Commander-in-chief of Venice’s armies was a condottiere with the rank of Captain-General. The titles Governor-General and Lieutenant-General, at first implying lower status, are also to be found.
Venice generally maintained sizeable forces in Friuli (her eastern frontier, under Turkish attack from 1470 on), and in her overseas possessions, particularly in the Morea and Albania, and it was from these territories that the republic obtained its ‘stradiots’, a type of lance - and bow-armed light cavalry, with ‘a reputation for ill discipline’, that first began to appear in Venetian armies during the war of 1463-79 against the Ottoman Turks in the Morea and Dalmatia, against whom they were considerably more effective than conventional Italian men-at-arms. They were employed in Friuli by the late-1470s, and in 1479 1,000 from Coron were taken into permanent employ and transferred to Italy, another 1,000 being taken on in 1482. By 1497 there were as many as 3,000 in Friuli alone, providing most of the Venetian garrisons there. Each company (they were seemingly organised in tens and hundreds) was recruited and led by its own local nobility, resulting in a strong bond of kinship and loyalty among them. Their overall commander in Venetian service was an official called the ‘proweditore of the stradiots’ who, unlike most proweditori, actually led them on the battlefield too; this post first appeared during the War of Ferrara (1482-84), during which the stradiots ‘were largely responsible for the Venetian victory at Argenta’ in 1482. Further details of these colourful soldiers can be found under figure 68 below and in Armies of the Sixteenth Century.
The Navy
Whatever ambitions or successes Venice may have had on land at different times throughout this period, she remained first and foremost a maritime power; which inevitably presupposed the continuous availability of a considerable number of ships and seamen ready for action at all times. Obviously, the size of fleets varied, but even at the very beginning of this period they generally averaged about 25-30 galleys, plus smaller vessels, transports and, occasionally, large oar-and-sail propelled warships called galeazze. As with the republic’s land forces, in the mid-14th century the navy’s strength was seriously reduced by the Black Death, so that the fleets of her allies had to be depended on as a stopgap solution to the shortage of manpower that resulted — after the Genoese capture of Negroponte in 1350, for example. King Peter of Aragon provided 30 warships and John VI Cantacuzene, Emperor of Byzantium, provided 20, of which Venice was to pay
For the crews and upkeep of 12 and 8 vessels respectively. Although her resources had still not fully recovered even 30 years later, Venice’s increasing maritime potential is nevertheless evident in the War of Chioggia of 1378-81 (the Fourth Genoese War), when even after the loss at Pola in 1379 of most of a fleet of 20-24 galleys, another flotilla of 13 galleys was still to be found at sea, and in December of the very same year an additional fleet of 9 great galleys (i. e., armed merchantmen) plus 25 light war galleys was fitted out in Venice. Indeed, it was her ability to constantly — and speedily — replace lost ships that was one of the republic’s greatest strengths, an ability which resulted from the early establishment of a well-organised, state-run shipyard called the Arsenal (the name deriving from the Arabic Dar sina’a, meaning ‘House of industry’). At the beginning of this period up to 10 ‘galleys of the guard’, ready for action, were maintained here in peacetime, plus 10-12 more that could be made ready virtually immediately and a further 25 in reserve that could be fitted out at short notice (this last figure occurring in a document of 1417 entreating that this traditional requirement be observed). In 1442 Venice called upon the Arsenal to complete 50 new galleys and fit out a further 25, another 50 being made ready in 1453. Under increasing Ottoman pressure, the size of the republic’s fleets grew steadily larger. In 1470 she fielded as many as 73 galleys, leaving only 24 unfinished vessels at home, and over the next 2-3 years fleets totalling 70-100 galleys were regularly maintained at sea.
Surprisingly it had taken until the 1470s for Venice to recognise the Ottoman Turks as their principal maritime enemy, until the realisation was finally, forcefully driven home by the loss of Negroponte to them in 1470, when the Venetian fleet in the area, comprising 40 galleys, was obliged to fall back on Crete by the sheer size of the opposing force — 100 light galleys and 200 or more auxiliary vessels. Venice’s response in 1473, when it was seen that the capacity of the Arsenal was no longer adequate to produce the larger fleets that were called for, was to build an extension (called, appropriately enough, the ‘Newest Arsenal’) so that up to 80 galleys could now be simultaneously constructed and stored, a capacity that was increased to 116 soon after, a ‘mothball fleet’ of 25 completed, fitted-out war galleys being permanently stored there ready for emergencies. This latter figure was increased to 50 in the late-15th century, and to 100 in the first half of the 16th century (though it is unlikely that this last target was ever achieved). Despite all these preparations, however, it is sad to relate that on the occasion of the Ottomans’ next advance in 1498 the Venetians had only 13 light galleys at sea, and even at the Battle of Zonchio in 1499 there were only 48 light galleys and 17 great galleys.
At the beginning of the 14th century galleys usually had 120 oarsmen (galeotti), comprising 2 men per bench and 30 benches on each side, though this figure could be increased to 180 by the addition of a third man to each bench, a practice which became customary in the course of the 14th century. Of the 180 oarsmen, 20-30 were designated ‘bowmen’, and later these included handgunners and artillerists and had no connection with rowing (see note to figure 65). In addition there were some ‘bowmen of the quarterdeck’ {balestrieri della popa), who were young nobles serving a sort of apprenticeship, rather like midshipmen; in 1400 each galley was required to carry 4, then 6, and by 1483 8 such youths. In total the average galley crew numbered 200 men up until the early-15th century, when Doge Thommaso Mocenigo (1414-25) ordained that this figure should be increased to 300. Even thereafter 200-230 seems to have remained the norm. The galley commander, called a sopracomito or patrone, was usually a nobleman appointed by the state (though the post was often purchased after 1329), as too were fleet commanders (capitani). Supreme naval commander was the senate-elected ‘Captain-General of the Sea’, who had final authority over all other Venetian fleet commanders everywhere.
In addition to Venice herself, Dalmatia and the republic’s Greek colonies, notably Crete, were also expected to supply crews (though not ships), the usual custom being to send galleys out to them from Venice with skeleton crews of only one man per bench. 9 out of a fleet of 14 vessels were manned by the Greek colonies in this way in 1403.
Artillery
Venice had cannon even in the first half of the 14th century and had started to mount them on her ships in 1379 during the War of Chioggia. Like her ships, Venice’s artillery too was manufactured in the Arsenal, which, according to the traveller Arnold von Harff, by 1497 contained 3 mortars, 38 ‘main pieces’, 160 large guns, 44 ‘carthouns’, and more than 500 smaller guns. Nearly all of these were of copper, the 5 largest each being of 3 pieces that screwed together and could fire 1,000 lb shot. 400 of the smaller guns were each mounted ‘on 2 strong wheels’ for land use. Harff reckoned that he had never seen such an abundance of artillery before, though he had visited armouries in Brescia, Verona, Padua, Vienna, Modon, Corfu, Romania, Candia, Cyprus and elsewhere. Despite the fact that the last 5 of the aforementioned were Venetian possessions, HarfTs guide nevertheless insisted that ‘in every town under their dominion [there] was more artillery than we saw here’. Despite the establishment in 1471 of a state-run scheme designed to train
Venetians in the manufacture and use of artillery, most of the republic’s gunners appear to have still been foreigners even in the late-15th century, notably Germans, Burgundians and Englishmen. By the 1480s command of the artillery was the responsibility of a proweditore-general.
World History
