If the catastrophe which befell the Axis forces in Tunisia was a defeat of some magnitude and of so far unforeseeable consequences for the Third Reich, for Fascist Italy it was nothing less than a death sentence, without appeal or reprieve.
The mobilisation decree of June 10, 1940 had given Comando Supremo an army of 75 divisions. Since that date 20 more had been raised, but these were not enough to make up for the losses sustained since June 10, 1940.
Two divisions had disappeared with the Italian East African empire and 25 more went in the Libyan, Egyptian, and Tunisian campaigns between Decembers, 1940 and May 13, 1943. Of the divisions which had fought in the ranks of the Italian Expeditionary Force (later the Italian 8th Army) which Mussolini, overriding all objections, had sent to join the "crusade against Bolshevism”, only straggling remnants had returned. The table below bears eloquent witness to these losses. It was drawn up by the Historical Services of the Italian Army and relates to the state of the Italian armed forces at the time of the defensive battle of the Don.
Less than three years of hostilities had therefore cost Italy more than a third of her field army. Even so, on the date in question, no fewer than 36 divisions were immobilised outside Italy and her island dependencies, occupying France or repressing guerrillas in the Balkans.
The situation from Crete to the Italian-Yugoslav frontier as laid down on April 6, 1940 was clearly not improving. Far from it. A communique from Rome gave 10,570 killed, wounded, and missing among the Italian occupation troops in the first five months of 1943. The maquis were organising in Savoy and the Dauphine, whilst in Corsica arms were reaching the resistance fighters via the underwater shuttle-service run by Lieutenant-Commander L’Herminier in the submarine Casablanca. No massive recoupment of losses could therefore be made from these 36 divisions.
The defence of the Italian peninsula, Sardinia, and Sicily was thus entrusted to some 30 divisions, but not all these
Were immediately available. Two armoured divisions, including the Blackshirt "M” Armoured Division, equipped with German tanks, had not yet finished training. A great effort was therefore made to reconstitute the "Ariete” and the "Centauro” Armoured Divisions, which had escaped from Russia under conditions which we have already described. And so Comando Supremo had only about 20 divisions (with equipment no better than it had been in 1940) with which to face the threatened invasion. Its pessimism, in view of the Anglo-American preparations in North Africa, can well be imagined. No reliance could be placed on the so-called "coastal” defences (21 divisions and five brigades) which, as their name indicates, were to offer an initial defence against the enemy landing on the beaches. These units had only local recruits, all in the top age-groups, and they were very poorly officered. Mussolini quoted the case of Sicily, where two battalions were commanded by 2nd Lieutenants retired in 1918 and only recently recalled to the colours. The weapons and equipment of these formations were even more deficient than those of any other divisions.
World History
