The March to Captivity

Tl HE Division had to disengage from the enemy completely, and this could only be achieved by constant and rapid marching. The soldiers had to keep marching to reach territories occupied by the Allies. Until they did, rest stops were forbidden; marching was to continue day and night because of the constant threat of a final Red Army onslaught designed to capture the Wehrmacht units that had faced it. On 8 May 1945 I returned to the frontline on the opposite bank of the Mur River, to urge all units still on the front, particularly rearguard units, to effect immediately a speedy withdrawal.

The Division maintained radio communication with the reserve-training regiment commanded by Captain Makarushka until the evening of 7 May, when it was broken. However, the regiment knew that the Division’s mustering place was in the regiment’s district. Since radio contact could not be reestablished with the reserve regiment, the Division had to allow for the possibility that something untoward had happened. The Division sent the chief liaison officer to inform the reserve regiment of the arrival of the rest of the Division in the Volkermarkt district.

The Mur River was crossed in accordance to plans and without any delays. The crossing was aided by the bridge recently built by the sapper battalion. General Shandruk, Wachter, and Dr Arlt visited the Division’s staff.

All units were well supplied with food. Moreover, they would have been able to replenish their stocks with provisions stored in supply camps west of Graz if individual units had had enough space to carry such supplies.

The entire Division was moving constantly. It was difficult to command the entire Division because the troops had spread out over such a large area. It was still possible to issue orders to our horse-drawn and motorized

Units, but the infantry often hitched rides with other motorized units to make their way west.

After the Division moved across the Mur River and away from the enemy, the commanders attempted to reach the front of the marching column to reestablish command over the Division. At first the command remained behind purposely, to clear up some tactical difficulties and to help the Ukrainian soldiers get to the west as quickly as possible. The fact that the Ukrainians had become mixed in with other, non-Ukrainian units was of little significance.

The main goal, for the Division as well as for the entire German Army, was not to fall into the hands of the Soviets. In this case, speed was of more importance than holding individual formations together, especially because the Allied forces would eventually stop all soldiers. Then there would be plenty of time for roll calls. On the other hand, the cavalry corps had remained fairly cohesive, mainly because it had enough field radios to maintain communications and also because its units had natural means of rapid transport.

Soviet planes made a few more bombing and strafing runs on the marching columns, but these attacks did not cause many casualties. The last such attack occurred on lo May.

In the meantime, the liaison officer who had been sent to the reservetraining regiment notified us that the area in and around Volkermarkt contained no English formations and, instead, that a strong regiment of Tito’s partisans were stationed there. The reserve regiment, whose units were placed at a distance from one another, came under heavy attack, suffered heavy casualties, and attempted to break through to the north. During the fighting, the regiment disintegrated. Later, I found only the commander of the regiment, some of the company commanders, and a few infantrymen.

In light of the situation and acting on his own initiative, the liaison officer intercepted the Division at the crossroad just to the north of Wolfsberg and redirected it farther to the north, to the direction in which all German units were marching.

The advance units of the Division were undoubtedly informed of the change in direction by the guides sent ahead by Makarushka. Thus, the Division found itself in the main column of the retreating German Army, which was moving through Twimberg-Judenburg-Murau-Mauterndorf, in the direction of Radstadter Tauern and Radstadt. The fact that a greater number of Ukrainians did not fall into the hands of Tito’s partisans in the Volkermarkt region can be attributed to the initiative of the liaison officer, Michel, and to Captain Makarushka.

The March to Captivity

General Freitag with his staff rushed toward the front of the column, to assert command of his troops. In the afternoon of lo May the Division’s command post was set up in the marketplace in Tamsweg; in the evening the post was moved to St. Andrae, some three kilometers to the north. On that same evening came the news that the Allies were interning all foreign national and Waffen SS units in Tamsweg. This report was delivered and confirmed by Wachter’s aide-de-camp. As an officer of the Wehrmacht I drove to the Allied checkpoint in Tamsweg to find out whether there was a way of bypassing it. Before I left, I asked Wachter and the Division’s command staff to wait for my return. Freitag lay down to rest, and Wachter promised they would wait for me.

I went through the checkpoint without difficulty but could not bypass the heavy traffic of the stalled column of troops and vehicles. I did, however, send the staff secretary. Nodinger, back to the Division’s headquarters to repeat the request that they await my return, because I wanted to scout another route.

1 finally returned to Mauterndorf in the late afternoon, having been severely delayed by the crowded roads. 1 met the ist liaison officer, the ist staff secretary, and the sapper battalion commander to give them the new route for the Division’s march. They told me that General Freitag had fallen into despair about the overall situation and committed suicide. The rumor that he had shot himself was eventually confirmed. They claimed that Freitag had earlier made plans to escape into the mountains with them, but he had apparently abandoned this plan when they declared they would not follow him because they considered it completely nonsensical. The liaison officer also informed me that General Shandruk had probably gone to meet with the Americans in Radstadt. The report on Wachter was that he had disappeared in an unknown direction into the mountains.

Unfortunately, this was the way the Division’s headquarters dissolved, rather prematurely. The suicide of the commander bears witness to his lack of responsibility toward his unit. Freitag should not have behaved in such a manner, because his obligations to the Ukrainians had not been completed. He had capimlated far too soon, because he imagined that the difficulties ahead were insurmountable. His work was nowhere near finished.

I could not get through to the front of the Division’s column or get to General Shandruk because of the overcrowding on the road and at the pass at Radstadter Tauern. I therefore established contact with an English brigade and reported a number of the Division’s units to them. The English assigned a large field near Tamsweg for the mustering of the Ukrainian

Division. In the opinion of the English brigadier, the Ukrainian units that had surrendered in Radstadt had nothing to worry about.

The command of the Ukrainian troops arriving at Tamsweg was assumed by Major Pobihushchyi. I decided to stay at the headquarters of the ist Cavalry Corps and, from there, helped the Ukrainians assemble at the indicated gathering point. I later made several visits to the soldiers of the Division who were interned at the camp in Tamsweg. My visits continued until the entire camp was moved to Spittal. For the most part, the German personnel of the Division had separated themselves from the Ukrainians, while those who remained were later separated by the English.

In Mauterndorf I had enough time to meet with Colonel Bisanz, and we offered the Ukrainians advice and various pointers. Colonel Bisanz believed that his work on behalf of the Ukrainians had come to an end, and he headed toward Radstadt. I was taken to the prisoner-of-war camp, where the news of Freitag’s suicide was corroborated by a local German police official. Freitag’s body was recovered and buried at the cemetery in St. Andrae. It came to light that the detention of all units of foreign nationals and of the Waffen ss had come as a result of provocative actions taken by an SS unit in the area. The checkpoint on the road was dismantled on the following day. Thus, the suicide of the Division’s commander became even more tragic.

Later, the Ukrainians were transported from the region of Spittal. Some went to Rimini, in northern Italy, and the rest to Radstadter Tauern. With this relocation the Ukrainian involvement in the German war effort came to an end.

Origins of the Ukrainian Division “Galicia’

After the German occupation of Ukrainian territory, the participation of the Ukrainian populace in paramilitary and military forma-I tions increased noticeably. In the territory of the General-gouvernement (as a result of the unification of Galicia), the number of Ukrainian auxiliary police increased, as did the number of Ukrainians in Werkschutz and in other support formations that came under the jurisdiction of the administrative (and, more specifically, police) authority. Here and there (particularly in the Kolomyia region), men were pressed into Waffen SS units in barbaric fashion, without any consultation with Ukrainian intermediaries, and often without the knowledge of the central German authorities of the Generalgouvernement. Moreover, many Ukrainians ended up in the ranks of the German armed forces for varying reasons. For the most part, these Ukrainians were taken into military or support formations and units, for service in the central and eastern regions of the expanding Reich.

All of these formations had little significance for the Ukrainians, either politically or militarily, because they were small and generally did not incorporate Ukrainian officers, even of the lowest ranks. Moreover, there was no political basis for promoting the interests of Ukrainians. The same applies to the so-called “Ukrainske Vyzvolne Viisko” (uw) or Ukrainian Liberation Army, which came into existence at the beginning of 1943. Such German behavior could be understood because, for them, the question of Ukrainian nationhood did not exist, whereas the formation of a larger military unit composed primarily of Ukrainians would have constituted a political act.

The events of the war in early 1943 allowed for increased speculation that a large Ukrainian military formation could become a reality. The

Catastrophic defeat at Stalingrad, the Red Army’s recapture of the eastern lands bordering on Ukraine, and the successful Allied landing of troops in Northern Africa had a sobering effect on German troops in the east, and strengthened the position of those Germans who advocated cooperation with the non-Russian nations of Eastern Europe. Hitler’s declaration of Eebruary 1943 expressed the hope that other nations threatened by the Bolshevik onslaught would stand united on the Eastern, anti-Bolshevik front. This was, perhaps, the first indication of an impending change in policy. Soon after came the formation of large Latvian and Lithuanian Waffen SS units.

A realistic assessment of German-Ukrainian relations led to the conclusion that talks directed toward creating a Ukrainian military formation could only occur in the Generalgouvernement and, in particular, in Galicia, where the regime was incomparably less severe for the Ukrainian population than in Reichskommissariat Ukraine. Therefore, on 8 March 1943, I wrote to Governor General Hans Frank, requesting the use of a variety of means to form a volunteer Ukrainian military unit on the territory of the Generalgouvernement—a unit that would fight side by side with the Germans against the Soviets. That same day I conferred on this subject with Dr Ludwig Losacker, Director of Internal Affairs in the Generalgouvernement and former Vice-Governor of Galicia, who understood the need for Ukrainian-German cooperation.

In order to resolve the question of a Ukrainian military formation, it was necessary to find a German sponsor who would take the matter upon himself and whose rank would guarantee success. The Governor of Galicia, Dr Otto Wachter, was such a man. He was an Austrian by birth (son of an Austrian general), and an able and ambitious man with direct connections to Himmler, because of his rank of SS Gruppenfiihrer. From his experience of working with his aides—Dr Otto Bauer, Dr Losacker, and Colonel Alfred Bisanz—and through contact with Ukrainian officials, Wachter realized that the Germans had committed grave errors in their policy toward Eastern Europe. He decided that this policy should include a far greater amount of cooperation between the German administration and the Ukrainians. Galicia, in his opinion, was a country in which the influences of German (Austrian) culture, dating back to the late eighteenth century, had to be restored. Wachter believed that there should be closer German-Ukrainian cooperation, and that all but the highest administrative posts of the country should be given to Ukrainians.

Wachter’s conception of regional policy was very useful for us at the time, but neither he nor Bauer could fully realize their plan because they were dependent on Berlin, where the governing approach to Ukrainians was more consonant to that of Eric Koch. Wachter often used his political connections without the knowledge of his superior, Hans Frank, because the latter did not understand the political issues of the East, and because his influence in Berlin had declined considerably. Moreover, Wachter ably took advantage of the strained relations between Frank and Himmler.

I spoke with both Wachter and Bauer in general terms about the need for a Ukrainian military formation. In March 1943 Wachter felt that the time had come to take the proposal for creating a Ukrainian military unit in Galicia to Berlin for further discussion. He discussed the matter with the chief of the SS Hauptamt, Gottlob Berger, who oversaw the foreign national formations in the Waffen SS, and with Himmler. He then received a general authorization to initiate a military formation of Galician Ukrainians.

In late March and early April 1943 Wachter had not yet started the negotiations with Ukrainians, but his associate. Colonel Bisanz, began to spread the word around Lviv about the formation of a Ukrainian army. Bisanz had already begun discussions with individual veterans and had begun recruiting men into the putative formation. There was some danger, of the uncontrolled creation of Ukrainian military detachments without consultation or negotiation with the Ukrainian community, for it was certain that the Germans could easily organize some sort of a Galician formation, even without the consent of the Ukrainian population.

In this situation I decided to become actively involved in these matters. On 3 April I had lengthy discussions with Wachter and Dr Bauer, and raised the issue of the desire of Ukrainians to fight alongside the Germans against the Bolsheviks. I also warned the Germans not to carry out any recruiting drive for the putative military formation without a firm political basis of support in the Ukrainian community. I argued that a campaign without such endorsement could not possibly produce any desirable results, and would never win the support of the Ukrainian community. Further discussions followed, on the one hand between Wachter and myself, and on the other, with numerous Ukrainian citizens. Wachter was in constant contact with Berlin throughout this time.

At this point a digression might be useful, in order to explain some of the Ukrainian motives for the creation of a Ukrainian formation within the framework of the German armed forces; to speculate on the German goals and motives for allowing the creation of such a formation; and to examine the differences in the Ukrainian and German views on the subject.

I had discussed these matters with many individual Ukrainians, particularly veterans, and almost openly declared my ideas at the leadership meeting of the Ukrainian National Committee (composed of members of the Military Commission, professional soldiers, and heads of Ukrainian regional committees) held on 18 April 1943 in Lviv. I repeated these ideas on my numerous trips into the countryside, as well as in a speech delivered at Neuhammer during my visit to the Division in May 1944.

These are the main theses of my deliberations on the creation of the Division, which I delivered as a paper at a conference on 18 April 1943:

We live in the midst of the cruelest of wars, in which no mercy is shown; in which only might, physical might, has any value. Our moral positions are lofty, but our physical strength is lacking. It is for this reason that we remain the object and not the subject of the events unfolding around us. To improve our chances, our dream has been the creation of our own armed force. A variety of efforts have been undertaken to this end since the general declaration of war. The establishment of the Ukrainian Armed Forces is our desire, because then we will become an allied fighting force recognized for having sacrificed our blood for our cause. In this way, we will become an active force in politics....

A variety of armed units are being organized in the Eastern Territories, and they are composed of Ukrainians, but the units themselves are not Ukrainian. They are not linked to the organized Ukrainian world. No Ukrainian political institution stands behind them, because in none of these units was there any German declaration of political intent. The spilling of Ukrainian blood (including hundreds at Stalingrad) has no bearing on Ukrainian-German relations, or for that matter, our role in the world. Given the choice between the two kinds of army, the insurgent and the regular, we stand firmly behind the latter....

Only now do we come to a partial realization of our efforts. Why only now? Because earlier, the Germans had refused to allow Ukrainians into the political arena, even at the lowest level. There are two German approaches to dealing with Ukrainians; Erich Koch’s, the completely negative; and that of the Galician authorities, who rely on the compromise between the ideas of the Reich and the needs of other nations. These two approaches are in constant opposition. In the Galician sector, the idea of cooperation was adopted—a concrete turning point in Ukrainian-German relations. This new policy can be the beginning of a solution to the problems in the Eastern campaign if it passes the test of maturity....

This humble initiative does not satisfy our desires, but that is a matter of sentiment. Gold logic and sober social and political realism, supported by the experience of three years, teaches us to see reality for what it is, and not to paint it with bright or dark colors depending on our moods.

We are for the creation of the Division because it is demanded by Ukrainian interests. Our advantages are the following: (i) instead of an anonymous force we become a recognized part of the struggle against bolshevism; (2) we enter the political arena (no matter how humbly) of Europe and the world; (3) we take measures to preserve our physical well-being and we establish the nucleus of an army; (4) this can be the starting point for the development of future plans; (5) only in this fashion can we establish a military academy for our youth, run by a Ukrainian officer corps. This academy will be able to instill discipline, obedience, sincerity, honesty, resoluteness, a sense of responsibility, and other military virtues. Our war with Moscow will take on official form.

What will happen if we do not take advantage of this opportunity? The thinking of Koch and Globocznik' will win out. For these reasons, we accept this task, despite its humble form, and despite the fact that it will not be accepted by a section of our society.

There is no room here for negativism. Instead, we need as positive an attitude as is possible. Difficulties in the realization of this matter will arise, both from the side of the Germans (the Koch camp) and from the side of the Ukrainians.

In this speech I also made a further reference to the education of our youth. I claimed that if we thought it important to send our students to study at German universities, then we should send our young men to study the skills of the German military.

At the time of the creation of the Division, the imminent defeat of the Germans was obvious. However, the defeat of Germany need not have entailed a Bolshevik victory. One could still hope there would be political chaos in Central Europe and an invasion of the Balkans by the Western Allies. In such a scenario, the Division could have played a significant role as a Ukrainian national army. We also had hopes that the creation of the Division might encourage a change, at least tacitly, in German policy in eastern Ukraine. We hoped that the policies of Wachter would spread eastward and allow the creation of a Ukrainian power base (especially military), beyond the borders of Galicia.

The thinking of the Germans, particularly Wachter’s, was somewhat different. They believed that German-Ukrainian cooperation could be used to harness Ukrainian forces to the German war effort and serve as a springboard for a new form of German hegemony in Eastern Europe. Neither side ever completely trusted the other. Moreover, each “partner” approached the other in different ways. Wachter would say, “You, the Ukrainians, now have a chance to show us what you are capable of, and in time you will develop an appropriate place for yourselves in Europe.” The Ukrainian approach was, “Create a satisfactory political climate and base for us, define our place in Europe, and in time we will go along with you.”

In carrying on the negotiations concerning the Division, I had my eye on a number of other advantages we might have been able to gain, and about which I spoke at numerous meetings. to the creation of the Division, we expected a relaxation of the strict political regime in the General-gouvernement, while at the same time, Ukrainian substance would be preserved. In addition, it would be possible to exploit a succession of minor concessions to strengthen the Ukrainian position, acquire new posts in the administration of the region, and attain economic and cultural goals far more easily than it would have been to wrest such rights from the Germans in a major treaty.

Therefore, both before the Division was formed and after the Act of 28 May 1943, the Ukrainian Central Committee put the following demands to the German authorities:

-  Amnesty for all political prisoners, particularly for the members of Stepan Bandera’s Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists

-  Privatization of all Ukrainian assets

-  Autonomy for district Ukrainian auxiliary police

-  Return of control of the press

-  Reorganization of the so-called “Building Service”

-  Improvement of conditions for the Ukrainian Ostarbeiter working in Germany

In military matters, we demanded wider recruiting rights for the Division, which we wanted to extend throughout the territory of the General-gouvernement and the Reich. We also demanded that all Ukrainian personnel in military or paramilitary units other than the Division be transferred to it, particularly those individuals who were originally from the territories of the Generalgouvernement, or who were emigres from the region.

During the negotiations with Wachter it became clear that his jurisdiction was limited, and that it would not be possible to bargain with him for more. Wachter had gained support for the Division through Berger, but he also had opposition from Eric Koch and highly placed “dignitaries” of the Gestapo, who saw the Ukrainian problem exclusively in a negative light—from a military intelligence [Abwehr) point of view. In such conditions, the Division could not become generally Ukrainian in character but instead had to remain regional, or Galician. The extent of the unit’s Ukrainian character would have to depend on its personnel rather than its external organization.

Wachter could not give the Ukrainians any political guarantees, because he could not travel to Berlin to seek them. If he had done so, he would not only have not received any concessions, but he would also have jeopardized his own position there and, consequently, weakened the case of the Division.

Moreover, guarantees wrested from those who considered all negotiations and pacts as simply pieces of paper had no value. Realistically speaking, the negotiations with Wachter were of little substance, to say the least. Throughout the deliberations, it was necessary to recall that the Germans could always move to organize the Division without dealing with the Ukrainians at all.

During the discussions with Wachter, the following three points were established:

-  The Galician military formation would be a division.

-  It was to be a regional formation, as indicated by its title, “Division Gal-izien no. i”.

-  The uniforms and insignia of the Division would be those of the Waffen ss.

As in other large foreign national formations in the German Armed Forces, recruitment to the Division was to be voluntary. Religious affairs were to be exclusively in the hands of Ukrainian spiritual leaders. Liaison between the Division and Ukrainian and German officials was to be performed by the Ukrainian Central Committee (ucc).

The act proclaiming the creation of the Division was to include a general call to all Ukrainians urging them to join the ranks of the Division. Recruiting for the Division, the care of the soldiers and their families, and support in organizing the Division, was the responsibility of the Military Commission (MC). The members of the latter body were to be nominated by Wachter on my recommendation. Because of the importance of the matter at hand, the MC was to be headed by myself. The officer corps would be mixed—German and Ukrainian. A whole range of important details had to be finalized in the shortest time possible. At least a partial political amnesty was also to be announced.

After a meeting with Wachter and Bauer, I began discussions on the subject of the Division with Ukrainians, mostly with veterans and members of the UCC executive. However, my first meeting was with the most important of Ukrainian authority figures—the Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky. I heard him speak almost the same words I had heard from him during the summer of 1941: “There is almost no price which should not be paid for the creation of a Ukrainian army.” I did not have direct discussions with Ukrainian political groups, but these were conducted indirectly, since the individuals I had asked to join the MC were members of the political organizations in question. They had all discussed the proposed ideas with their parties before accepting my proposals. Several members of the UCC also conducted negotiations with political groups not represented on the UCC. It should be added that no one to whom I offered membership in the MC refused, except Dr Roman Dashkevych. Political factions (both OUN factions) were either positively or negatively disposed to the Division. Obviously, 1 discussed the matter of the Division at length with Dr Kost Pankivsky.

After the general discussions, I wrote to Governor Wachter on 8 April and informed him that our community was ready and well disposed to the formation of the Galician Division. I expressed the reservation that the regional designation belittled the significance of this formation. I also introduced a proposal for the organizational structure of the MC, as well as a list of the prospective members.

On 15 April the first meeting of the MC took place and, later, the regional conference of the heads of committees and veterans’ associations. On 28 April the ceremonial proclamation of the creation of the Division took place, accompanied by a manifesto from Governor Wachter and the Governor General, Hans Frank, who was represented by Dr Losacker. That day, my own proclamation appeared. Both manifestos explained that the Waf-fen SS Grenadier Division “Galizien” was formed in accordance with the principle of voluntary participation in the war against the Bolsheviks, emphasized the legal equality of the Ukrainian and German soldiers, and proclaimed the provision of insurance for the family of the volunteer, on the same footing as the German soldier’s. It also stressed that religious matters would be in the hands of Ukrainian priests. However, one last-minute change was made without prior consultation with the UCC: the latter body was no longer responsible for liaison, and the head of the MC was to be Alfred Bisanz. The purpose of this tactic was clear: to keep the influence of the UCC at a minimum, and to keep the MC under strict control.

Nevertheless, the MC worked with the ucc harmoniously, and all important decisions were handed down only after agreement was unanimous. Of the many demands issued to the Germans, few were realized. Despite continuous attempts to obtain general political amnesty for Ukrainians, the number of political prisoners actually released was only about 150, including the officers of the Ukrainian Police Company no. 213, which consisted of the two Ukrainian companies organized by the leadership of the OUN during the summer of 1941.

After the Act of 28 April 1943, the most important matters were the attempts to have the recruiting campaign apply throughout the General-gouvernement (which was a success) and the Reich (which failed); to draw Ukrainian officers to the Division; and to provide officer training for a few hundred of our young men who had a secondary education.

In conclusion, it is necessary to emphasize that, of those Ukrainians who contributed their energies to the organization of the Division, all had exclusively Ukrainian interests in mind. In their understanding, the Ukrainian cause required the organization of a large Ukrainian military unit as the basis for a Ukrainian army, and they knew that the Germans would somehow have to be paid for this. They did not approach the matter sentimentally, but with cold political calculation. It would perhaps be of some relevance to note that the man who was entrusted with all aspects of our plans concerning the Division, the man who was to defend Ukrainian interests either in concert with the Germans or against them, and the man who was to conduct the termination of relations with the Germans and eventual transfer to the Western Allies, if the need arose, was a man of illustrious memory. Captain Dmytro Ivanovych Paliiv.

VOLODYMYR KUBIIOVYCH

NOTE

I Globocznik was the chief of German police of the Lublin district. He was notorious for his complete denial of the Ukrainian question and for atrocities committed against the Ukrainian rural population at his behest, which claimed about five hundred victims.

Appeal to Ukrainian Citizens and Youth by the Central Committee President on the Formation of the Ukrainian Division 6 May 1943

Tl HE LONG-AWAITED MOMENT has arrived when the Ukrainian people will again have the opportunity to come out with gun in hand to do battle against its most grievous foe—Bolshevism. The Fiihrer of the Greater German Reich has agreed to the formation of a separate Ukrainian volunteer military unit under the name SS Infantry Division “Galicia.”

Thus we must take advantage of this historic opportunity; we must take up arms because our national honor, our national interest, demands it.

Veterans of the struggles for independence, officers and men of the Ukrainian Galician Army! Twenty-two years ago you parted with your weapons when all strength to resist had ebbed. The blood of your fellows who fell on the Fields of Glory calls upon you to finish the deed already begun, to fulfill the oath you swore in 1918. You must stand shoulder to shoulder with the invincible German army and destroy, once and for all, the Bolshevik beast, which insatiably gorges itself on the blood of our people and strives with all of its barbarity to arrive at our total ruination.

You must avenge the innocent blood of your brothers tortured to death in camps in the Solovets Islands, in Siberia, and in Kazakhstan, the millions of brothers starved to extinction on our bountiful fields by the Bolshevik collectivizers.

You, who followed the thorny but heroic path of the Ukrainian Galician Army, understand more than anyone what it is to fight in the face of an enemy such as Red Moscow, shoulder to shoulder with an army capable of destroying the Red Monster.

The failures of the anti-Bolshevik forces of the European Entente in the years 1918 and 1920 testify irrevocably that there is only one nation capable of conquering the USSR—Germany. For twenty-two years you waited

With sacred patience for the holy war against the barbarous Red hordes menacing Europe.

It goes without saying that, in this titanic struggle, the fate of the Ukrainian people is also being decided. Thus, we must fully realize the importance of this moment and play a military role in this struggle. Now the battle is not uneven, it is not hopeless. Now, the greatest military power in the world stands opposed to our eternal foe.

Now or never!

Youth of Ukraine!

I turn to you with particular attention and call upon you to join the SS Infantry Division “Galicia.” You were born at the dawn of the great age when the new history of Ukraine began to be written in crimson Blood and golden Glory.

. When your fathers and elder brothers, first and alone in all of Europe, took up arms against the most fearful enemy of Ukraine and that of all humanity.

When your brothers, inflamed as you are now, first wrote into history the peerless heroic deeds of the Battle of Kruty.

When your brothers covered themselves with the glory of the first Winter Campaign, writing into history the heroic deeds of the Battle of Bazar.

It was then that You, our Youth, were born, then that You grew, as revolts rose up across the whole of Ukraine against the Bolshevik invader; an invader who, by ruin, famine, exile, torture, and murder, strove to wipe our nation from the face of the earth. Then You, our Ukrainian Youth, laid your colossal sacred sacrifices on the altar of your Fatherland. You burned with the sacred fire of love for it. Hardened your spirit for it, readied yourself for the right moment of reckoning by arms. With longing in your heart, with glowing embers in Your soul. You waited for this moment.

And now this moment has come.

Dear Youth! I believe that your patriotism, your selflessness, your readiness for armed deeds, are not mere hollow words, that these are your deep feelings and convictions. I believe that You suffered deeply and understood the painful experiences of the past struggles for independence, and that You culled from them a clear sense of political realism, a thorough understanding of the national interest and a hardy readiness for the greatest of sacrifices for it. I believe in You, dear Youth. I believe that You will not idle while the Great Moment passes by, that You will prove to the whole world who You are, what You are worth, and what You are capable of.

Ukrainian Citizens!

I call upon you for great vigilance. The enemy does not sleep. In the memorable years of 1917-19, enemy propaganda lulled our people with lofty words about eternal peace, about the brotherhood of nations. Now this propaganda aims to tear weapons from our hands once again, and the enemy disseminates countless absurd slogans, groundless conjectures, and febrile dreams among us. You know where this propaganda originates. You know its purpose. Counter it decisively, even when it comes forth under a Ukrainian guise, guilefully exploiting the uninformed and confused among the Ukrainian people. You know the value of arms, and thus I believe that, with God’s assistance. You will worthily pass the test of political maturity to which history has put you.

Ukrainian Citizens!

The time of waiting, the time of debilitation and suffering has come to an end. Now, the great moment of armed deeds has also come for our people. Side by side with the heroic army of Greater Germany and the volunteers of other European peoples, we too come forth to battle our greatest national foe and threat to all civilization. The cause is sacred and great and therefore it demands great efforts and sacrifices.

1 believe that these efforts and sacrifices are the hard but certain road to our Glorious Future.

VOLODYMYR KUBIIOVYCH President

Ukrainian Central Committee

Appeal to the Able-Bodied Youth of Gahcia

Tl HE POPULATION OF Galicia has shown many examples of its gratitude since German soldiers first expelled their Bolshevik oppressors. The Galician villager was conscious of the importance of his work and duty, and labored mightily and with sacrifice to lend a hand in feeding Europe. Galician intellectuals, industrial workers in factories and mines, clerical workers in institutions and business offices, all worked with all of their might. The army of Galician men and women who work in German industry and food supply is preparing bread and weapons for victory.

Time and time again, the Ukrainians of Galicia voiced the wish to participate in Germany’s armed struggle, with weapons in hand. The Fiihrer has acknowledged the will of the Galician people, and has allowed for the formation of the SS Infantry Division “Galicia.” The volunteers will be under the spiritual care of Ukrainian priests.

The volunteers, as members of the Division, will wear national insignia. The volunteers whose fathers fought bravely in the ranks of the former Kaiser’s Imperial Army will have priority for acceptance in the Division.

Ukrainian youth of Galicia! You have earned this right. You are called to battle with your deadly enemy, the Bolshevik, to fight for your faith and for your Fatherland, for your families and your family fields, and for the just, new order in Europe.

For hundreds of years, your ancestors stood to face the hordes from the East. In this heavy hour of crisis, show your manliness and readiness once again.

Dr Otto Wachter Governor of the Galician District

On the Formation of the Ukrainian National Committee and the Ukrainian National Army March 1945

The formation of the UNC is a new page in the socio-political life of Ukrainian citizens, who, governed by a pervasive love for the Homeland, desire to see it free of its invader.

The UNC is the spokesman of these hidden sentiments in our citizens and it firmly strides along the path which leads to the formation of a sovereign nation-state.

To this end, the UNC is organizing the Ukrainian National Army (UNA), whose purpose is to renew the armed struggle for Ukrainian statehood.

The UNA, in Ukrainian uniform, under the national flags sanctified by the battles of the past, under the command of its own Ukrainian officers, will stand under the ideological and political leadership of the UNC. Its ranks will be filled primarily by Ukrainians in the German Army and in other military and police formations.

The building of a nation-state requires Ukrainians of sound body and mind who are deeply nationally and socially conscious. To further this goal the UNC will ensure the protection of all Ukrainians in Germany, equalization of rights of Ukrainian workers with those of their counterparts of other nations, and primarily will ensure their widest possible religious, moral, cultural, and material welfare. The unc will also ensure the release of all political prisoners.

Foreign and ancient borders separating the individual Ukrainian lands have generated differences in thought and deed. These must disappear in a unified march to a common goal. The UNC wishes to speed up this process

Of unification of the Ukrainian populace, not only through a wide-ranging educational policy but also by a united Ukrainian approach to all matters.

The UNC will cooperate with National Committees of other nations enslaved by Muscovite Bolshevism who are fighting, as are the Ukrainian people, for Independence and Freedom.

The UNC will staunchly strive to perform the duties placed upon it by Ukrainian citizens, and it will perform them with confidence, providing that every consciously Ukrainian individual concentrates all of his efforts on the Common Struggle for a Common Victory.

Major General Pavlo Shandruk Head, Ukrainian National Committee

Professor VOLODYMYR KUBIIOVYCH and Oleksander Semenko Vice-Presidents, Ukrainian National Committee

Petro Tereshchenko

Acting General Secretary, Ukrainian National Committee