Despite these problems, the immediate heirs ofMichael VIII had some successes.
This is a time of significant contradictions: between the ideology of
government and actual government, between a progressive impoverishment
of the state and the wealth in some segments of society, in the ambivalent
relations between Byzantium and the west. Many of these contradictions
exploded in the great civil war of 1341–54, which left Byzantium a greatly
altered state in a changed world.
Andronikos II and his successor, Andronikos III (1328–41), shifted once
again the centre of their interest, from western Europe to Asia Minor
and the Balkans. Yet they had to retain close diplomatic relations with
western Europe, primarily to ward off an attack and secondarily to seek aid
against the Turks. On the whole, there is a shrinkage of the areas of interest
and involvement in terms of foreign policy. Here the major successes of
Byzantine policy were with regard to the splinter states of Greece: Thessaly,
which was acquired piecemeal in 1333, and Epiros, where the city of Ioannina
accepted Byzantine overlordship in 1318, and the rest of the despotate in
1340. In the Peloponnese, the process of reconquest proceeded throughout
this period; after 1349, the Byzantine possessions, organised as the despotate
of the Morea, became one of the most vital parts of the state.
Relations with western Europe were successful as far as the first objective
is concerned: there was, in fact, no major expedition against the Byzantine
empire. The reduced Byantine diplomatic activities centred around
efforts to thwart any coalition of forces that might attack the empire; that
is, to make alliances with Ghibelline forces.Matrimonial policy served this
purpose, as Andronikos II took as his second wife Yolande-Irene of Montferrat,
whose father was allied to Castile, and Andronikos III married Anne
of Savoy, daughter of Count Amedeo V. For the rest, Andronikos III had
even less close relations with the west than did his grandfather Andronikos
II, although the penetration of individual westerners, of western customs
and ofVenetians andGenoese into the empire continued apace. The second
aim, an alliance against the Turks, was not successful, for it hinged upon the
union of the churches, discussions on which took place under Andronikos
II after 1324, Andronikos III and John VI Kantakouzenos (1347–54), but
foundered upon the divergent interests of the papacy and the Byzantine
emperors.
The situation in AsiaMinor became the nemesis of the Byzantines. The
area rapidly fell into the hands of the Turks, especially after the Byzantine
defeat at the battle of Bapheus, near Nikomedeia (1302). Andronikos II
made a number of efforts to remedy the situation, and for a short time,
in 1294, the campaigns of the great general Alexios Philanthropenos raised
hopes. But he was opposed by powerful landlords in the area, was pushed
into an unsuccessful rebellion, and his successeswere short-lived. The countryside
was rapidly brought under Turkish control, and one by one the cities
were starved into submission. The Ottomans took Prousa in 1326, Nicaea
in 1331 and Nikomedeia in 1337. Further south, Ephesos, Smyrna, Miletos,
Sardis and Tralles (Aydin) fell to the Seljuq emirates in the first decade of
the century. Philadelphia and its immediate region remained as the sole
Byzantine possession, until 1390.7 Andronikos III waged several campaigns
in Asia Minor, to no avail. More importantly, after 1329, Andronikos III
and, later, John Kantakouzenos had close relations of friendship and alliance
with the amir of Sarukhan and with Umur, amir of Aydin. Directed originally
against the Genoese lords of Phokaia and Lesbos, this became a more
general alliance, in the course of which the Byzantines recognised the Seljuq
conquests in Asia Minor.