Now all of Genghis’ Mongolian rivals had been vanquished apart from the Naimans and Jamuqa, who had now gone to join them. The ruler of the Naimans, Inancha-bilge Khan, was old, and hi; heir was a stupid and irresponsible young man known as Tayang Khan (another empty Chinese title, meaning in this case ‘Great King’). According to the Secret History he and his mother mocked Genghis and his followers as uncouth barbarians, boasting that they would round them up as slaves, and joking that they might allow the M ongol women to milk the Naiman cattle as long as they washed their hands first. Their general Kokse’u-sabraq, who had already encountered the Mongols at first hand, advised caution, but in 1204 Tayang sent a messenger to the Ongguts, asking them to join him in a war against Genghis. The Onggut chief Ala-qush-digit-quri refused, anc instead warned Genghis of the impending attack. When the news arrived the Khan established a camp at Keltegei Cliffs on the River Qalqa. The account in the Secret History of the preparations which took place there is the first detailed discussion of the organisation of the Mongol army, and it seems that many of its best-known features were introduced at this time. The soldiers were organised into units of ten, a hundred and a thousand, under officers appointed personally by the Khan. One thousand picked ‘heroes’ formed an elite guard unit under Arqai-qasar. There was also a smaller bodyguard for Genghis himself, consisting of seventy day guards and eighty night guards.
Then when his preparations were complete, in the early summer of 1204, Genghis rode out to meet the Naimans. On top of Mount Qangqarqan, overlooking the Sa’arl Steppe, they encountered a screen of enemy scouts, and in the ensuing skirmish a M ongol horse was captured and taken back to Tayang Khan. Genghis was aware that his mounts were still lean after the winter, and the march had tired them, so he accepted advice to camp on the steppe and rest. Because Tayang was known to lack determination, the Mongols were ordered to light extra camp fires, five per man, to give the enemy the impression of overwhelming numbers. The Secret History tells how scouts returned to the Naiman camp with the discouraging news that ‘there are more fires than stars’. Tayang was so worried that he proposed to retreat and try to lure the Mongols into an ambush, but his son Kuchluq regarded this as cowardice, pointing out that Genghis could not have that many men since so many of the Mongols were on their side, with Jamuqa. What was more the captured horse showed how out of condition Genghis’ mounts must be. Kuchluq went on to lament the fact that Kokse’u-sabraq was getting too old to take the field, and suggested that his grandmother should be sent for, as she would do a better job of commanding the army than Tayang. The Naiman Khan, insulted, agreed to fight. He crossed the Orkhon River and marched towards Genghis’ position, but then seems to have lost his nerve again, because as the Mongols deployed for battle the Naimans fell back and took up a defensive position on the slopes of Mount Naqu-kun.
According to the Secret History, Genghis personally took charge of the vanguard, with his brother Qasar commanding the main body. He issued his orders according to what must by now have been a standard tactical doctrine, with the troops marching in ‘bush clump’ formation, deploying in ‘lake array’, and charging with a ‘chisel attack’ (see Pages 70-1 for a discussion of what these terms may have meant). Certainly the order of the Mongol army as it advanced must have been impressive, because the same source goes on to describe how Tayang Khan’s morale collapsed even before a blow had been struck. In a well-known but rather puzzling passage, it relates how Tayang asked Jamuqa, who was standing by his side, who the enemy were and what they were doing. Jamuqa replied with a series of tall tales about the prowess of Genghis’ men, which frightened his ally into retreating further and further towards the top of the mountain. He then sent a message to his rival Genghis, assuring him that he had neutralised the Naiman threat, and that he had himself deserted them. Eventually the Naimans were forced to camp for the night on the summit, where Genghis surrounded them. During the night they tried tc break out, but many were killed by falling from the rocks, and in the morning the Mongols mopped up the survivors with ease. The Naimans were crushed beyond recovery, though Kuchluq managed to escape to the west. The Mongols who had followed Jamuqa also went over to Genghis, but their former leader was nowhere to be found.
The whole story is rather difficult to believe, as no motive is given for Jamuqa’s betrayal of the Naimans, and it is in any case implausible that Tayang should have been so demoralised that he allowed his army to be destroyed without a fight. We might also expect, if Jamuqa had decided to help Genghis, that he would have joined him after the battle, whereas he is next heard of as a refugee in the mountains, hunting wild sheep with a handful of companions. Rashid ud-Din says that in fact he did unintentionally demoralise the Naimans, but only because he panicked himself. The passage in the Secret History is surely an excuse to reproduce a number of verses which were current, extolling the valour and ferocity of the Mongol leaders. Jebei, Jelme, Qubilai and Subotei are described as four hounds fed on human flesh, who chase the enemy as wolves do sheep. The Uru’uts and Mangquts go into battle rejoicing and riding in circles, like foals kicking their legs in excitement as they are released in the morning. Qasar is a giant who can swallow a man whole, while Genghis himself has the look of a starved falcon eager for flesh. It must have made stirring reading for a Mongol audience, but for us it is unfortunate that the real events of the most decisive battle in Genghis’ early career have been obscured in this fashion.
After his victory at the Battle of Mount Naqu-kun, however i' was achieved, Genghis turned his attention to the Merkits. In the autumn he met Toqto’a in battle on the Black Steppe and defeated him. The Merkit leaders escaped, but many of theii people were captured. They were treated leniently, but subsequently rose in rebellion twice, obliging Genghis to disperse the survivors among the rest of his followers. Toqto’a joined up with Kuchluq the Naiman and fought another battle with Genghis at the Erdish River, where Toqto’a was killed and many of his men drowned in the river as they fled. Finally, in 1205, Jamuqa was brought in by his remaining followers. Predictably Genghis executed the men who had betrayed theii master, and then, according to the Secret History, forgave Jamuqa and urged him to join the Mongols. Jamuqa, however, replied that the two men could never trust each other again, and was put to death at his own request. Whether this is true, or whether this source is merely trying to avoid accusing Genghis of murdering his childhood companion, we do not know. Understandably, Morgan suggests that in relating this version of events the author of the History was displaying a rather cynical sense of humour. But the result was that Genghis now had undisputed control over the whole of Mongolia. After he had ‘unified the people of the felt-walled tents’, says the Secret History, ‘they assembled at the source of the Onon River in the Year of the Tiger. This was 1206, and the event was one of the most significant in world history - the great assembly, or ‘quriltai’, at which the united Mongol nation formally came into being.
World History
