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3-10-2015, 05:18

The functions of the Roman army in Egypt

Maxfield (1996: 10) has recognized four functions of the Roman army in a province such as Egypt, namely defence of frontiers against external threats, maintaining the internal security of the core of the province, supervision of imperial estates and monopolies, and ensuring the security of travelers. To this one might add, by analogy with the activities of the Ptolemaic armed forces, contribution to imperial military activities beyond Egypt; for the Roman garrison of the province contributed complete units and legionary detachments (vexillations) to actions such as the suppression of the revolt in Judaea in ad 66-70 and the annexation of the province of Arabia in the reign of Trajan, as well as wars of expansion and defence against the Parthian Persian empire (summarized in Alston 1998: 72-3).

Defence of the frontiers against external attack was a relatively unimportant function of the Roman army in Egypt, as external threats were limited for almost all of the Principate. The only conflict of any significance took place in the south at the very beginning of the period, in 25-22 bc. Strabo (17.1.53-4 = Eide et al. 1998, no. 190) records that the ‘‘Aethiopians’’ attacked the Thebaid, defeated the three Roman cohorts based at Syene (Aswan), and captured that town along with Philae and Elephantine. In response, the prefect C. Cornelius counter-attacked with 10,000 infantry and 800 cavalry against 30,000 enemy, leading his army into enemy territory. If Strabo’s account is to be believed, the Aethiopians did not provide significant opposition for Roman legionaries. He describes them as poorly armed and led. He also describes (17.1.53) the nomads of the region as ‘‘neither numerous nor warlike.’’

As a result of Petronius’ activities, Roman control subsequently extended c.130 km into Lower Nubia, the territory known as the Dodekaschoinos. This control took the form of detachments out-posted from the cohorts at Syene, stationed at important centers such as Talmis/Kalabsha, Pselkis/Dakka and Hierasykaminos/al-Maharaqqa (and, more briefly, at Primis/Qasr Ibrim). The presence of these detachments is attested primarily by dedicatory inscriptions set up by their members in the first and second centuries ad, including a series at the temple of Mandulis at Talmis, although there are some relatively insubstantial remains of military installations too (Speidel 1988; Alston 1998: 202-3).

The internal security role of the Roman army in Egypt is emphasized by the great concentration of forces at Alexandria throughout the Principate. As already noted, for much of this period the entire legionary presence in the province was located there, along with a number of auxiliary units. Unrest in Alexandria and beyond, requiring military intervention, is mentioned by ancient writers on a number of occasions. For example, Josephus (BJ 2.487-498) records that the ad 66-70 revolt in Judaea provoked even worse conflict than usual between Alexandria’s Jewish, Greek, and Egyptian populations, and that the prefect Tiberius Alexander unleashed the city’s two legions against the Jews. Other major disturbances in Egypt in the Principate included the diaspora Jewish revolt in Trajan’s reign and the boukoloi revolt of c. AD 171/2. At a much lower level of internal security and policing, in the villages of the chora, we see a good deal of papyrological evidence for Roman centurions as recipients of petitions relating to local disputes and crimes, many of them entirely lying in the civil sphere (Alston 1998: 86-96). Here the army is effectively acting as the lowest level of imperial control.

The roles of the Roman army in guarding and supervising imperial possessions and monopolies, and in providing security for travelers are best exemplified by the wealth of evidence from the Eastern Desert, much of it obtained in the course of fieldwork conducted over the last two decades. Evidence from the quarry sites at Mons Claudianus and Mons Porphyrites, including installations, inscriptions, and ostraka, provides vivid evidence for relatively small garrisons (Maxfield 1996: 18-19, on the basis of ostraka relating to water supply) on detached duty from the major auxiliary units, guarding the installations and supervising the civilian labor force (Maxfield 1996: 18-19; Maxfield and Peacock 1997; 2001a; 2001b; 2006; Bingen and Cuvigny 1992-2000). The written evidence ranges from the formal dedication of a temple to Isis by an officer of the ala Vocontiorum at Mons Porphyrites in ad 113 (AE 1936, 60) to a dipinto on an amphora shoulder by a cavalryman of cohors I Flavia Cilicum (Maxfield and Peacock 2006: 180-1, no. 9).

While the roads to the quarry sites provide evidence of the army’s role in policing the routes through the Eastern Desert, these duties are best demonstrated by the evidence from the roads from Koptos to the Red Sea ports of Myos Hormos (Qoseir el-Qadim) and Berenike. Again, the evidence is partly archaeological, with numerous relatively well-recorded fortlets and hydreumata (watering-places) along the routes, and partly written, with a selection of formal inscriptions as well as ostraka recovered in the course of fieldwork (for a recent study with references to past work, see Cuvigny 2003; selected earlier works include Maxfield 1996; Zitterkopf and Sidebotham 1989; Golvin and Redde 1987). As already noted, the inscription from Koptos (ILS 2483 = CIL III 6627) mentioned above shows legionary and auxiliary troops engaged in the construction of cisterns and forts on the Berenike route in the first century ad. On a more personal level a rock-cut inscription from el-Mweih on the Myos Hormos road by a cavalryman of the ala Vocontiorum (a unit well-attested in ostraka from sites on this route) records his five months’ duty at the fort there (ILS 9142). Undoubtedly the Roman state’s involvement in these activities was motivated by revenue protection rather than altruism toward the merchants who used the roads, since the provision of protection and infrastructure on well-defined routes not only prevented goods from being stolen but also ensured that they remained within the lucrative imperial regime for taxation of imported goods.



 

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