Israeli Intelligence was in a good position to evaluate developments in the Arab world, and had developed an efficient collection system over the years. Following Sadat’s elevation to the presidency of Egypt, there had been four periods of escalation in which it had noted major Egyptian
Mobilization and preparations to go to war. There had been numerous emergencies along the line and, on every occasion, the Israeli forces had invariably been strengthened and moved forward to the line in accordance with the operational plans existing at the time. A major mobilization involving the Egyptian home front was less frequent, however.
The first major mobilization to take place during Sadat’s period was at the end of the ‘Year of Decision’ — 1971 — when the Egyptians planned a surprise attack by fifty bombers on Sharm El-Sheikh (cancelled by Sadat because of the outbreak of the Indo-Pakistan War). During this alert there was a general mobilization of reserves, civilian vehicles and civil defence in the cities; GHQ and all Egyptian field forces were engaged in manoeuvres. Formations of tanks were advanced to the Suez Canal, as well as bridging and water-crossing equipment. Earth-moving activity took place along the water, positions were prepared for tanks and artillery, and the approaches to the Canal were opened up in the southern sector. The Egyptian media announced that war was inevitable, to the accompaniment of warlike statements by the leadership. A year later a second major mobilization took place, during December 1972, when Sadat planned an operation in which a paratroop brigade was to seize and hold territory in the Sinai until the United Nations intervened. During this mobilization too, the field forces went on manoeuvres, soldiers were called back from leave, work was stepped-up on the ramps and fortifications along the Suez Canal, with the preparation of areas for the launching of crossing vehicles and bridging equipment. A war atmosphere was created in the media, but neither the reserves nor the civil defence in the cities were mobilized; nor were ground units advanced to the Canal with their bridging and crossing equipment. The third and fourth periods of escalation and mobilization both took place in 1973 — in April-May and September-October.
Egyptian capability to attack Israel without advance warning existed — and indeed in the discussions that took place with members of the Israeli Cabinet in the days before the actual outbreak of war. General Zeira and his Director of Research, Brigadier-General Aryeh Shalev, acknowledged its existence, while indicating the low probability of its happening. The presence of the Egyptian Army in strength along the Canal was not in itself an indication of impending war, for this deployment had been in effect since 1969; nor, it was argued, were the signs of escalation a definitive signal, as three previous mobilizations had taken place since 1971 without the subsequent aggressive strike. The sole key to providing an advance warning now lay in the evaluation of Egyptian intentions, which in effect meant estimating what Egypt’s head of state. President Sadat, might decide. Such a task could hardly be made the exclusive responsibility of the Director of Military Intelligence. The mistake of all involved in intelligence and at the policy-decision level was in not relating the simultaneous increase in capability both in the north and in the south to Syrian and Egyptian intentions.
The Israeli intelligence community followed with interest the development of the major exercise in Egypt, while at the same time being somewhat concerned by the large concentration of forces in Syria, although all
The indications were that Syria was simply nervous about a possible Israeli reaction to Syrian operations in retaliation for their shooting down of thirteen Syrian aircraft on 13 September. The assumption, however, was that there was no real danger from Syria, who would never attack on her own. All they saw as they looked towards Egypt were preparations for an exercise, special precautions being taken for fear that an Israeli attack might be in the offing. There were numerous indicators that should have given rise to concern, but these were offset by perhaps twice the number of signs showing that there was no cause for alarm. Towards the end of September, however, information was received from various sources indicating that the Egyptians were preparing for an all-out war. In many cases, the intelligence material went into details of various developments about to occur. But, when these did in fact occur, they were ignored.
With the commencement of the Egyptian manoeuvres, the Israeli forces along the Suez Canal noted an increased degree of activity. A growing stream of information about the Egyptian preparations along the Canal began to flow back daily from their positions. Lieutenant David Abu Dirham, commanding one of the most northerly fortifications, Orkal, some five miles south of Port Fouad, reported that a ship was unloading artillery, equipment and ammunition at the port. Reports came in of artillery being moved into forward positions, unoccupied surface-to-air and surface-to-surface missile positions being manned, minefields being cleared along the Canal and Egyptian soldiers diving into the water to blow up underwater mines. The reports described improvement works on the various descents to the water, earth-moving activity, preparation of areas for crossing and for bridges and pontoons. However, as the Egyptians cleared mines at seventy points along the Canal, they laid them at others; some descents to the water were opened, others were closed. On the other hand, the normal daily routine — both of soldiers and of civilians — continued without any change; Egyptian soldiers continued to fish and to wander along the banks of the Canal without helmets; civilians continued their work as if nothing untoward were happening.
As the Egyptian exercise began, Israeli forces were placed on alert along the Canal, and Southern Command Headquarters issued instructions to ensure that all standing orders for such an alert were carried out. All mobilization systems were checked. Leaves were cancelled. General Gonen visited the Canal on 2 October and issued a number of orders to ensure a higher state of alert. He asked for permission to take a number of precautionary steps, some of which were turned down, but orders were issued to increase guards and security around all camps in the Sinai and to ensure that Operation ‘Shovach Yonim’,12 which would be put into effect should
The enemy move — and which had not been tested for some time — was familiar to all forces. Orders were also issued to accelerate the assembly of a preconstructed bridge, to be used in the event of an Israeli crossing of the Canal, and to place ambushes along the rampart.
According to the Agranat Commission’s13 report, on 1 October, Lieutenant Benjamin Siman Tov, the order-of-battle officer in Southern Command intelligence, had submitted a document to Lieutenant-Colonel David Gedaliah, intelligence officer of Southern Command, analysing the deployment on the Egyptian side as an indication of preparations to go to war, the exercise notwithstanding. Again, on 3 October, he submitted a document pointing out a number of factors that indicated the exercise might be a cover-up for preparations for war. But Gedaliah did not distribute this junior officer’s evaluation, and it was omitted from the Southern Command Intelligence report. In fact, the Director of Military Intelligence, General Zeira, did not learn about Siman Tov’s evaluation until March 1974, during the Agranat Commission hearings (whereupon he invited Siman Tov, who had been removed from Southern Command Intelligence, to his office, heard his story, and promoted him to the rank of captain).
On 5 October, the division requested reinforcements, which were to include additional troops to man the strongpoints along the Canal and forces for deployment in the passes some twenty miles east of it. In reply, they received a signal from Southern Command Headquarters repeating a signal from GHQ, to the effect that the Egyptian exercise was nearing its conclusion.
Meanwhile, Soviet broadcasts emphasized that the Israeli concentrations along the Syrian border were there with the intention of attacking Syria. Israeli intelligence estimated that Syrian apprehension as to the possibility of an Israeli attack had grown in the past twenty-four hours, and that the Syrian deployment was a result of their belief that, for political reasons (caused by Israel’s growing isolation in the world and the increased co-operation between the front-line Arab countries), Israel might launch a pre-emptive attack. Similarly, Egyptian fears of an Israeli attack were also emphasized, as was the fact that, for the first time since the War of Attrition, a major naval exercise in both the Mediterranean and the Red Sea was taking place.
At dawn on 5 October, it was noted that the Egyptian Army along the Suez Canal had reached a degree of emergency deployment and dispositions such as had never been observed previously by the IDF. An addition of 56 batteries of artillery, bringing the total in the forward areas up to 194, was noted. Furthermore, it was reported that all five infantry divisions were fully deployed, that all five concentration areas for bridging and crossing equipment were partially filled up, and that the ramps prepared on the sand ramparts enabling tanks to fire into the Sinai were
Occupied by platoons of tanks along the entire Canal. Mobile pontoon units were identified and the forward movement of additional concentrations of forces recorded. Reading all the various indications, the senior intelligence officer of the Israeli Navy expressed the opinion to his commanding officer early in the week that war was imminent. His appreciation was not accepted by GHQ.
On 30 September, the situation had been discussed at GHQ. General Tal expressed grave reservations about the soothing intelligence estimate, while General Zeira maintained that the probability of war was low, explaining that the Syrian concentrations were related to the incident of 13 September, when Syrian aircraft were shot down by Israeli aircraft, and that the Egyptians were simply preparing for a major exercise. But Tal was disturbed. He invited Zeira and Shalev to a meeting in which he again maintained that he did not accept their evaluation. They, however, did not accept his approach.
There was one other Middle Eastern element that could provide indications of imminent war, involved as it was in the military developments in the area: the Soviet Union. Three days before the war, a Soviet reconnaissance satellite was launched and proceeded to orbit above the Sinai, the Suez Canal and the Syrian-Israeli border area in addition to the area of Galilee. Each day its orbit was altered to take in the different sectors of Israel’s two front-lines. On Wednesday morning, 3 October, President Sadat summoned the Soviet ambassador, Vinogradoff. At approximately the same time. President Assad summoned the Soviet ambassador in Damascus to meet him. The two presidents indicated to the ambassadors that war was imminent, without entering into details. On 4 October, units of the Soviet fleet stationed in Alexandria and Port Said began to move out. This mass exodus strengthened the suspicions of Israeli Naval Intelligence. In the meantime, information was received of the arrival of giant Soviet Antonov An-22 aircraft in Cairo and Damascus and the evacuation by air of the Soviet families stationed there. The explanation of all these Soviet moves by Israeli Intelligence was: either they indicated a knowledge on the part of the Soviets that war was about to break out (and the evacuation and naval withdrawal might be a Soviet move designed to deter the Egyptians from such an action, since at the end of the ‘Year of Decision’ in 1971, during a previous general mobilization in Egypt, Soviet vessels had evacuated Port Said); or it might be that the Egyptians, together with the Syrians, had finally decided to liquidate Soviet presence in Egypt, although this did not seem very feasible.
On Saturday 29 September, at the Czech-Austrian border, two Palestinian gunmen held up a train carrying Russian Jews from Moscow to Vienna. They took as hostages five Jews and an Austrian customs official, and demanded facilities to fly themselves and the hostages to an Arab country. In the course of the negotiations, Bruno Kreisky, Austria’s chancellor (himself a Jew), initiated a proposal to close the transit centre for Jewish immigrants at Schonau, near Vienna. The hostages were released and the gunmen were set free. Israel was horrified and outraged, and the event dominated all the media. The Israeli Government became
Completely absorbed in this problem: Golda Meir flew to Strasbourg to address the Council of Europe and then, despite the misgivings of some of her Cabinet members, flew to Vienna in an abortive attempt to persuade Kreisky to reconsider his decision. She returned to Israel on Wednesday 3 October, and immediately convened a Cabinet meeting to discuss the Austrian developments. It is not clear to this day whether or not this operation was part of the general deception plan to divert Israel’s attention from developments along the front. The operation was carried out by a little-known Palestinian terrorist organization, but the fact that it was linked to Saika, the Palestinian guerrilla organization controlled by the Syrian Army, lends credence to the assumption that the operation was part of the overall deception plan. However, whether or not it was planned, the operation certainly did help to divert government and public attention from the ominous developments along the borders of Israel.
On Thursday evening. General Zeira brought the news of the evacuation of Soviet families from Egypt and Syria to the Chief of Staff; Zeira had been away ill for two days, and this new information gave him an uncomfortable feeling.
Early on Friday morning, military correspondents of the Israeli press were briefed not to exaggerate the reports coming from abroad about large Arab concentrations along the borders, but to indicate that the Israel Defence Forces were taking all necessary steps in the light of developments. That same morning however. General Elazar decided on a ‘C’ state of alert, the highest state of alert in the standing army; it was the first time that he had declared such a state of alert since he had become Chief of Staff. At the same time, a conference was held with the Minister of Defence. Zeira described the Soviet airlift, reflecting that this could indicate a final break between the Arabs and the Soviet Union, but that he did not consider this as very probable. He went on to say that the Soviets were obviously aware of the fact that the possibility of a conflagration existed; it may be that they had accepted the Arab claim that Israel was about to launch an attack, which they had incidentally echoed in their broadcasts. This, however, seemed unlikely, because in such a case the Soviets would doubtless have approached the Americans, who in turn would have made approaches to Israel counselling moderation. There had been no American approaches; so, Zeira concluded, it was conceivable that the Soviets were aware of the possibility of an Arab attack and feared for their families in the consequences of an Israeli counterattack. Nevertheless, the feeling of Intelligence was that the probability of an Arab attack was very low.
General Elazar had been convinced all along that he could expect adequate warning for mobilization from Military Intelligence, and an evaluation of the information that poured in during the fateful days of the first week in October vindicates his assumption. Yet, after the war, he was to maintain that a considerable amount of material indicating tjie probability of war had not reached him. There were, according to Elazar’s testimony before the Agranat Commission, items of information on Friday morning indicating the imminence of war, but these had not
Reached him until Saturday morning. Had he received this information, he maintained, he would have mobilized on Friday morning. In fact on Friday, he still considered that he would receive adequate warning in the event of war. Two days previously, on 3 October, he had addressed the Israeli press, who had asked him if the regular forces would be adequate to deal with the attack should war break out. He answered that they would not; at best, together with the Air Force, they could prevent a collapse in the event of a complete surprise. However, it was generally assumed that Israel would have adequate warning time in which to mobilize her reserves.
From Thursday evening, Zeira was torn by doubts, but he invariably comforted himself with the knowledge that the standing army was on the alert and that its strength was considered sufficient by GHQ to be able to withstand an initial assault. In this, he saw an additional insurance policy as far as the intelligence warning was concerned. On Friday 5 October, a meeting of the General Staff took place. The intelligence picture was again presented, but the probability of war breaking out was regarded as ‘the lowest of the low’. A staff conference at Southern Command, which took place at 15.30 hours reviewed all the preparations that had been made and discussed all the relevant operational plans. It was decided that next day half of the staff would visit the Suez front, while the other half visited other parts of the Command.
That night, the political and military leaders of Israel went to sleep with an uneasy feeling, but few dreamt that the country was facing an imminent attack. Had they been able to overcome their preconceived notions in time, the entire history of the next few days would have been very different. At 04.00 hours on the morning of 6 October, the strident buzz of the telephone ringing by his bedside awoke General Zeira. He listened to the voice at the other end and immediately dialled three numbers, one after the other, waking the Minister of Defence, the Chief of Staff and the Vice Chief of Staff (General Tal). He recounted the information he had just received — that war would break out that evening on both fronts towards sundown.
World History
