At all events, Zhukov, on going into battle on March 4, 1944, had under him three tank and six rifle armies, i. e. about 60 divisions and at least 1,000 tanks. Attacking on both sides of Shepetovka on a front of about 120 miles, he gained between 15 and 30 miles in less than 48 hours, so that by March 6 his 3rd Guards Tank Army was approaching the L’vov-Odessa railway line at Volochisk, the last but one communication and supply link for Army Group "South” before the Carpathians.
By March 9, having covered some 80 miles in less than six days. General Ry-balko’s tanks came up against the hastily improvised Tarnopol’ defences. At the same time, the 1st Panzerarmee and the German 8th Army were being severely mauled by the left wing of Zhukov’s forces and the 2nd Ukrainian Front, numbering seven rifle and two tank armies. Immediately the forces of Generals Hube and Wohler, which had not yet recovered from their losses at Korsun’, and had had part of their Panzer units transferred to Raus, buckled under the shock. In particular, the 8th Army was forced to withdraw towards Uman’.
Manstein, however, was not surprised by this new Russian offensive, whose purpose he saw only too clearly. Stauka’s aim was, in fact, nothing less than the cutting off of Army Groups "South” and "A” from the rest of the German troops fighting on the Eastern Front, pushing them south-west, as far as Odessa on the Black Sea, where they would stand no more chance of being evacuated than the defenders of the Crimea at Sevastopol’.
V A knocked-out German Pzkw IV. Notice the curved "skirt armour" around the turret, intended to explode anti-tank shells before they reached the main armour.
V V Czech troops, serving with the Red Army, break cover
For the attack.
World History
