The Americans thought shuttle missions to bases in the USSR would allow attacks on targets beyond the normal range of British or Italy-based planes. They also wanted a precedent for later operations against Japan, using Soviet Far Eastern bases. But ideas about the value of such missions proved greatly exaggerated. (Curiously, the British were not interested in them, although shuttle missions might have let Bomber Command hit eastern targets otherwise out of reach on short summer nights.) The Soviets agreed “in principle” to shuttle bases in October 1943, but showed little interest in getting things underway, and they cut down the size of the project. The Americans finally were allowed to use three bases in the Ukraine.
Although the Soviet personnel they worked with were friendly and cooperative, it became increasingly clear that Stalin had had second thoughts about the whole business. When the bases became operational, it was difficult to get an agreement with the Soviets on what targets to hit. In practice, few shuttle missions were flown, and they had little effect. The Eighth Air Force’s first shuttle mission proved disastrous. After bombing the Ruhland oil plant on June 21, six groups flew to the Ukraine with their P-51 escorts. That night, German bombers struck the base at Poltava, destroying 44 B-17s, 15 Mustangs, 200,000 gallons of gasoline, and ammunition and equipment, as well as some Soviet planes. Spaatz later admitted that this was the most effective operation the Germans ever launched against the AAF; it was one of the heaviest losses of equipment, although not of men, ever inflicted on the Eighth Air Force.
The Soviets would not let American units take over the defense of the bases, and they became increasingly uncooperative. The shuttle effort trailed off; it was a minor footnote to the strategic bombing offensive.
World History
