Strategic bombing, and the four-engine heavy bomber, retained pride of place as the Army Air Force grew. That growth was necessarily delayed by aid to Britain. In May 1941 the British took over 20 B-17Cs, after the planes were refitted with self-sealing tanks, as “Fortress I’s.” The U. S. Navy would not release the Norden bombsight to the British, who received the harder-to-use Sperry. The Americans advised using the planes only to train a nucleus of crews for later-model Fortresses, but the British, although skeptical of the planes’ ability to survive, sent them into combat. They were given to 2 Group, the stepchild of Bomber Command, for unescorted, very-high-altitude attacks deep in enemy territory, in daylight. The RAF again ignored American advice to use the B-17s in as big a formation as possible between 22,000 and 28,000 feet. Instead, they were sent out in tiny numbers at over 30,000 feet. The results were miserable; the British Fortresses flew just 48 combat sorties. It is unlikely that any harm was inflicted on the enemy; the most notable feature of the bombing was that on one mission to Bremen, on September 2, 1941, a “neutral” American civilian technician served as a bombardier! Operations were hampered by icing, oxygen and intercom failures, poor maintenance, and badly designed high-altitude equipment. The Americans rightly grumbled about British blunders, but the Allies learned a lot about high-altitude operations, and some weaknesses in the B-17 were disclosed in time for changes to the new B-17E.'
World History
