Israel was born in battle. Its army was forged in the fires of conflict and the ongoing struggle for existence that has characterized the State of Israel since its foundation. When the War of Independence ended, it gradually became evident that the new state would be obliged to live by the sword for many years before peace would finally be achieved, but it was clear that Israel would never be able to maintain a large standing army commensurate with the military problems posed by its neighbours. From an economic point of view, such a burden would be crippling. The logical answer was that Israel would have to establish an army of civilians, and that, in effect, the whole nation would have to be an army. Thus one of the most effective reserve systems (based partially on the system obtaining in Switzerland) was created. In periods of quiet, the nation devoted itself to its main objectives - namely, creating a democratic society, absorbing immigrants, developing education and a system of justice, and achieving economic independence. But, in times of crisis and of war, the nation donned uniform, and does so to this day, thus enabling Israel to field in wartime the largest army in the world in relation to the size of the population. The first campaign in which the reserve system was tested in war was the 1956 Campaign. It proved very effective. Indeed, this system has been one of the principal secrets of Israel’s military success over the years.
In all her wars, Israel’s troops have excelled in their bravery and courage, in particular in such classic struggles as the battle of Ammunition Hill between Israeli paratroopers and the Jordanian Arab Legion in East Jerusalem, and the Israeli armoured and infantry assault on what seemed to be impregnable Syrian positions and fortifications on the Golan Heights, during the Six Day War. The standard set by the best of the Israel Defence Forces has always been of the highest. The standards that the Palmach set in the War of Independence were maintained in the Israeli armed forces in their early years of organization by Moshe Dayan when he became Chief of Staff in 1953. 101 Commando Unit, which he set up under the command of Major Ariel Sharon and which mounted with great effectiveness the first major reprisal raids by the IDF against the Arab armies, established the fighting standards, and above all the standards of leadership, to which the Israeli Command aspired. Dayan instilled this fighting spirit ruthlessly into the armed forces, and set the paratroop forces, again under the command of Sharon, as the example to be followed by all Israeli fighting units. The success of this policy came to fruition in 1956.
The circumstances of the War of Independence, in which Israel suffered from weakness in manpower and lack of equipment in modern arms and weapons, evolved a military philosophy based on flexibility, surprise and
Improvisation. Night-fighting, speed, commando-type operations, the strategy of ‘indirect approach’ - all these became the hallmark of the philosophy evolved by the Israel Defence Forces. Above all, emphasis was laid on the inculcation of a flexibility of thought in the officers in the field, and in particular in the junior leaders, who were trained to be able to adapt themselves in the heat of battle to the inevitable changes that occur, and to avoid a slavish dictation by the book. There thus emerged from the ranks of the underground fighting in the heights and the plains of Galilee, the hills of Judea and the sands of the Negev Desert, an army led by officers who were always at the head of their men.
However, control of a large modern army was learned by a process of trial and error. The Israeli military leadership acquired its experience in battle. Young men trained to command at company, and at most at battalion level, suddenly found themselves performing the functions of generals handling armies. Initially, therefore, the military leadership was highly inexperienced, and in many cases was not equal to the very heavy task that fate had decreed for it in the field of battle. Many mistakes were made, some of them most tragic.
In the first two wars, the Israelis had a leader of world stature, whose place in history in the ranks of the outstanding leaders in the world is assured. David Ben-Gurion had the necessary foresight, understanding and wisdom to anticipate developments, and to a degree to prepare for them, and he had the ability to rouse the nation to an impressive degree of self-sacrifice. In 1948-49, Ben-Gurion led the Jewish population of Palestine - besieged, cut off, subject to a British naval blockade, deprived of basic weapons necessary for self-defence on many occasions, and fighting on all fronts against heavy odds. The brunt of this war was borne by the military leadership at the company and battalion level: here the loss of life was heavy. But, from the junior leadership in the field, from the battalion commanders downwards, emerged the future generals of the Israel Defence Forces and the leaders in the four wars that Israel was to fight before the first peace treaty with an Arab state was signed in 1979.
In subsequent wars, the standards set for personal example in Israeli leadership in battle were maintained, and played a very important part in the success of Israeli arms. The Sinai Campaign was the only campaign commanded by the late General Dayan, who, in the War of Independence, had commanded a commando battalion. The opening moves of this classic campaign were a brilliant application of the strategy of ‘indirect approach’. Not only were the Arab countries, particularly Egypt and Jordan, led to believe that the Israeli preparations were directed against Jordan and not against Egypt; the brilliant opening moves created a situation whereby the Egyptians were in the dark for some 48 hours as to whether the Israeli attack was indeed a major military offensive or merely yet another reprisal raid in depth across the border. The aims of the strategy were fully achieved. And, again, in the swift attack by the Israeli forces (and particularly by the 7th Armoured Brigade) the flexibility of thought and adaptation that characterized the Israeli moves came to full expression.
In the Six Day War, the Arabs were once more outgeneralled - but on three fronts. The extent of such an astounding victory however, led the Israeli Command to ignore many of the shortcomings within their own forces that had been revealed in the war - some of the Israeli achievements were in fact a function of Arab shortcomings and errors. The Israeli political and military leadership, which in matters of security was very much subject to the overriding authority and influence of Moshe Dayan, the Minister of Defence, was more and more guided by a preconceived concept of what they believed would be the considerations on the Arab side. The result was that President Sadat was able to adapt a brilliant deception plan to the concept as evolved in Israel in such a manner as to vindicate the Israeli evaluations. One of the major errors of the Israeli General Staff here was to judge the Arab General Staffs by its own standards of military thinking; as a result, it did not reach the correct conclusions in respect of the limited war strategy adopted by the Arabs in 1973.
The trauma of the Yom Kippur War, the initial success of the Egyptians and Syrians and the comparatively heavy losses sustained in the war - almost 3,000 killed - led to an agonizing public reappraisal of Israel’s defence posture and establishment. Many mistakes were revealed: the intelligence evaluation failure; the erroneous political evaluation; the tendency to fight the previous war; and so on. Israel has, however, passed through that fire.
Beside the heroic efforts of a ‘civilian’ army and inspired leadership, meanwhile, has been the recognition that air power was a vital element in the winning of wars. 1956 was the first campaign in which Israel, thanks to Mystere fighter aircraft supplied by the French, was able to hold its own in the air against the Arab air forces, and indeed succeeded at the outset in establishing command in the air and maintaining it. The Israeli preemptive air strike in 1967 was a brilliantly planned and executed operation, which in three hours of air operations accorded Israel command of the skies. This air superiority is an advantage that Israel is always concerned to maintain and, indeed, to use. This Was demonstrated graphically in June 1981. Aircraft of the Israeli Air Force, executing a brilliant precision bombing operation, destroyed a nuclear reactor being built with the aid of French technicians in the outskirts of Baghdad. This was a pre-emptive move against the acquisition by Iraq of nuclear weapons, which were avowedly designed for use against Israel. Once again, Israel was making bold use of a weapon of decisive power, honed in combat, and qualitatively equal, if not superior, to any other air force in the world.
World History
