It is useful to break down the classical period into two subperiods since, as we shall see, historical events at the end of the fifth and beginning of the fourth centuries ruptured certain ideological structures. In the first period, from the establishment of democracy in Athens in 508/7 bce to the end of the fifth century, democracy proved to be an effective and stable form of rule. Athens, in particular, grew in prominence during this period. Athens began as a relatively insignificant state and became the leader of an empire whose power was rivaled only by Sparta and its alliance of Peloponnesian states. As a result, Athenian democrats created the dominant ideological structures of the time. As we shall see, the concept of tyranny played a central role in democratic discourse, and was also a key term in the critical responses of elites.
The prominence of tyranny in democratic discourse is surprising since tyrants had largely disappeared from the mainland Greek world. The main alternative to democracy in classical Greece was oligarchy. Three factors explain the continued importance of tyranny in the ideology of democrats and oligarchs. Foremost among these is the legacy of elite discourses of the archaic period. As we saw, tyranny was represented as the opposite of good government (i. e. the sharing of political power among elites serving in formal public offices). This conceptual scheme continued to be useful to oligarchs, who still needed to buttress their rule ideologically against the threat of a charismatic leader who might become all-powerful by winning the support of the masses. Even more important however, was the utility and adaptability of the good-government versus tyranny scheme for democratic purposes. For example, democrats expanded the meaning of good government (eunomia) to include the orderly sharing and rotation of power among all citizens, not just among the elite. The terms isonomia (equality before the law), isegoria (equal right to speak publicly), and isokratia (equal power) that - along with eunomia - had probably served as watchwords for institutionalized elite rule in the archaic period, were now recast by democrats to embody the principle of political equality for all citizens (cf. Carmina convivialia 893, 896 (Page) and Raaflaub 2004b). Tyranny stood as the antithesis of these values, and indeed it was often through the (sometimes graphic) representation of the negative features of one-man rule that the positive features of democracy were articulated (Dewald 2003; Raaflaub 2003b; Forsdyke 2001; Pelling 2002; cf. Wohl 2002; Kallet2003).
The utility of the image of tyranny to democrats and oligarchs alike demonstrates a second factor behind the continued prominence of tyranny in Greek political thought. Tyranny, like all effective political symbols, was a condensed, multivocal and ambiguous term that could serve as a vivid negative example against which the positive features of both oligarchic and democracy could be articulated. Tyranny, in other words, was something that both oligarchs and democrats could agree upon, though for different reasons.
As I noted at the beginning of this essay, historical tyrants played a key role in developing the civic unity and strength of the polis. Nevertheless, elites had always presented tyranny as a threat to the wider community and not just to their own claims to power. Democrats in turn adopted and further embellished the image of the tyrant as destructive to his people. A favorite image was the portrait of the tyrant confiscating property and exiling and killing citizens indiscriminately in order to preserve his own power. In one such rendition, the tyrant Periander of Corinth consults his fellow tyrant Thrasybulus of Miletus on how best to secure his power. Instead of responding directly, Thrasybulus takes Periander’s messenger out into a field and begins to chop off the ears of grain that stick out above the rest (Hdt. 5.92). Periander understands Thrasybulus to be advising him to kill anyone who sticks out, and therefore undertakes to banish and kill the Corinthian citizenry indiscriminately. Indeed, the rule of Periander and his father the tyrant Cypselus was remembered in democratic traditions according to a stereotypical triad of abuses: ‘‘[Cypselus] banished many Corinthians, and he confiscated the property of many others. But he murdered many more by far’’ (Hdt. 5.92e.2, cf. 5.92h.1 with Forsdyke 1999).2
The idea of one-man rule as destructive to the lives and livelihood of its people is represented perhaps most graphically in Greek literature through the portrait of the Persian kings (Dewald 2003; Forsdyke 2001). Indeed, after the Greek victories over the Persians in 490 and 480/79, the Persian kings served as the exemplars par excellence of the evils of one-man rule. The conflict against Persian monarchies was therefore a third, and perhaps most important, factor determining the prominence of one-man rule in Greek political thought. In Aeschylus’ Persians and in Herodotus’ Histories the dramatic representation of the conflict between Greeks and Persians is cast as a confrontation of moral and most particularly, political values. The hoards of barbarian troops are driven into battle with a whip like slaves; they fight only because they fear punishment; and they die in droves. By contrast, the courageous and orderly regiments of Greeks fight heroically to preserve their freedom and they win a decisive victory despite their inferior numbers. While this ideological structure was flexible enough to be applicable to all Greeks who fought against the Persians (both democratic and oligarchic), it was also explicitly applied by the Athenians to reinforce the values of democracy (Forsdyke 2001, 2002, 2006). The Athenians believed that democratic government produced a spirited and strong citizen body whereas single-rulers made their subjects submissive and weak (Aesch. Pers. 188-96; Hdt. 5.91.1-2). Herodotus seems to reflect this aspect of official Athenian polis ideology when he writes (of an earlier victory against Athens’ neighbors):
It is clear that democracy [isegforia] is an excellent thing, not just in one aspect but in every way. For the Athenians, when ruled by tyrants, were no better than any of their neighbors in war, but when they had gotten rid of the tyrants, they became first by far. This shows, therefore, that when they were held down, they were cowardly, on the grounds that they were working for a master, but when they had been liberated, each man was eager to work for himself. (5.78)
One of the most striking examples of the focus on one-man rule as the antithesis of democracy in fifth century Greek thought is the celebration in democratic ideology of a pair of elite lovers for their attempt to kill the tyrant Hippias in 514 bce (Boedeker and Raaflaub 1998; Monoson 2000: 21-50; Ober 2003; Neer 2002: 168-81; Osborne 2006). These men were honored as founders of democracy, despite the fact that their act did not end the tyranny and was motivated by their anger over the unwanted amorous attentions of the younger brother of the tyrant. In a striking case of ‘‘willing collective amnesia’’ the Athenians erected statues of these men in the central public space (agora) and granted rewards to their descendants even throughout the fourth century.4 The importance of the tyrannicides in Athenian democratic discourse is one further example of the ways that the democracy used tyranny as a bogeyman against whom the Athenians were continually summoned to rise up in defense of their political system(Ober 2003). Another aspect of this same phenomenon was the promulgation and publication of laws declaring the tyrannicide exempt from prosecution (Arist. Ath. Pol. 16.10; SEG 12.87 with Ober 2003).
Although Athenian sources focus more frequently on the evils of tyranny as a way of signaling indirectly the strengths of democracy, occasionally we get explicit contrast of the defining features of each regime (Raaflaub 1989a). For example, in Euripides’ Suppliants, a messenger arriving at Athens from Thebes asks to speak to the tyrant of the land and is told, ‘‘You began your speech incorrectly by seeking a tyrant here, for our city is not ruled by one man, but is a free city. The people rule through the annual rotation of public offices and they do not give a greater share to wealth, but even a poor man has an equal share’’ (Eur. Supp. 403-8).5 In a particularly unique passage in Herodotus’ Histories, a relatively systematic discussion of the strengths and weaknesses of each type of regime is provided. While this ‘‘constitutional debate’’ is set in Persia, it clearly derives from Greek political thought (Pelling 2002). In accord with the patterns we have noted already, moreover, the main emphasis is on the contrast between tyranny and democracy (oligarchy gets less attention). Even more strikingly, the speech in favor of democracy focuses on the evils of tyranny and has relatively little to say about the positive features of democracy. After expanding at length on the tyrant’s power ‘‘to do whatever he likes’’ (poieein ta bouletai) without being held to account (aneuthunos), the advocate of democracy says: ‘‘First, the rule of the masses has the most beautiful name of all - political equality [isonomia] - and second it does none of the things that the monarch [mounarchos] does. Political offices are determined by lot, officials are held to account, and all public affairs are decided collectively’’ (3.80.6).
So far I have focused on the use of tyranny to articulate democratic values. Oligarchs, however, found tyranny a powerful concept for criticizing democracy. For oligarchs, the lack of accountability and unrestrained violence toward citizens that was conventionally associated with autocratic rule were the defining flaws of late fifth century democratic rule. The equation between tyranny and democracy in elite discourse took two forms.7 First, Athens’ increasing control over other Greek states over the course of the fifth century meant that it exercised power in ways that could be interpreted as tyrannical (Connor 1977; Raaflaub 1979). Not only did the Athenians exact tribute from other Greeks in ways that resembled the Persian king’s control of his Asiatic subjects, but they responded forcefully and sometimes brutally to any threats to their power. As Pericles, a leading politician ofthis period, is made to say in Thucydides’ History: ‘‘You already hold your power like a tyranny: it was unjust to take it in the first place, but it is dangerous to let it go’’ (2.63.2).8 An anonymous critic of the democracy, known as the Old Oligarch, expands on the equation between tyranny and the Athenian empire by applying the conventional triad of abuses associated with tyranny (see Hdt. 5.92e.2 above) to Athenian democracy’s behavior as imperial power: ‘‘[In order to preserve their power], the Athenians disenfranchise the good men [in subject Greek cities], and exile them and kill them; by contrast, they empower base men’’ (1.14).9
The second way in which critics equated democracy with tyranny was to suggest that the democracy treated elite citizens in ways that resembled the tyrant’s mistreatment of his subjects (Kallet 2003; Raaflaub 2003b; Ober 2003; Forsdyke 2005a: 267-77). This critique was based on three factors - the financial ‘‘exploitation’’ of elites through the liturgy system, the scapegoating of elite leadership for decisions made collectively, and ostracism. Since many public activities (e. g., festivals, naval warfare) were organized and financed by the wealthiest citizens, elites effectively subsidized the poor and consequently felt unduly burdened (Christ 2006: 143204). As the disgruntled Old Oligarch put it: ‘‘The people think it right that they earn money by singing, running, dancing, and sailing in the ships, so that they themselves have money and the rich become poorer’’ (1.13). This same writer touches on an even more keenly felt criticism when he adds: ‘‘And in the courts, the people concern themselves less with justice, than what is advantageous for them’’ (1.13). The idea that the people do what is in the best interest of preserving the democracy, rather than what is just, is the animating idea behind this short treatise, and recalls the traditional image ofthe tyrant who is willing to do whatever it takes to secure his power (Hdt. 5.92z.2).
Perhaps the most powerful representation of the democracy as tyrannical is Thucydides’ account of the downfall of Alcibiades. Thucydides reports that, despite Alcibiades’ brilliant leadership of the war against the Spartans, the Athenians grew alarmed by his flamboyant private lifestyle, and suspected him of tyrannical ambitions (6.15). Fearful for their democracy after a series of bizarre incidents involving elite social groups, the Athenians recalled Alcibiades from his command of the newly launched campaign in Sicily in order that he stand trial in Athens (6.53). Thucydides represents the Athenians as cracking down harshly on those whom it suspected (on the flimsiest of evidence) of plotting against the democracy (6.53-61). Both in its language and themes - not to mention his digression in the same passage on the Peisistratid tyranny - Thucydides evokes the traditional image of the tyrant in his portrait of the democracy’s behavior towards one of its ‘‘best’’ citizens (Forsdyke 2005a: 267-70). Just as Thrasybulus advised his fellow tyrant to cut down anyone who stood out (Hdt. 5.92 above; cf. Plato Resp. 567c5-7), so the Athenian democracy got rid of its ‘‘best’’ citizens in order to preserve its own power.
Xenophon paints a similar portrait of the Athenian people as unrelentingly harsh and willing to subvert justice in order to selfishly pursue their own interests. In his account of the trial of the generals who commanded the Athenian fleet at Arginusae in 406, Xenophon depicts the Athenian assembly as outraged when a speaker suggested that they follow the laws and grant the generals individual trials: ‘‘The masses shouted out that it was monstrous if someone prevented the people from doing whatever they wanted.’’ In its use of the catch-phrase ‘‘to do whatever one wants,’’ Xenophon recalls the traditional portrait of the tyrant who can do whatever he wants without being held to account (Hdt 3.80.3, see above). Plato echoes Xenophon’s application of tyrannical lack of restraint to democracy in his more systematic critique in the Republic (557b5; Forsdyke 2005b; Saxonhouse, this volume, chapter 23; and below).
The institution of ostracism was perhaps the most potent symbol of the tyrannical tendencies of the democracy according to elite critics. This institution allowed the Athenians to expel a single individual once a year by collective vote. Although the Athenians used this power moderately and limited the term of exile to ten years, elites (who were the primary victims of the procedure) considered ostracism the crowning injustice of democratic rule. Aristotle reflects elite views when he equates ostracism with the traditional image of the tyrant removing his political opponents. After retelling the story of Thrasybulus and Periander, Aristotle observes ‘‘ostracism has the same effect: to cut down the outstanding men, and to exile them’’ (Pol. 1284a36-8 with Forsdyke 1999 and 2005a: 274-7).
So far we have seen how elites criticized democracy by drawing on traditional portraits of the evils of one-man rule. But critics of democracy did not simply attack the prevailing political system. Rather, they argued for alternative political systems that sometimes entailed one man rule. We can catch a glimpse of these positive constructions of single rulers in the arguments made by the advocate for monarchy in Herodotus’ constitutional debate: ‘‘Nothing would appear to be better than [the rule] of the best man. For by using intelligence of such a sort, he would govern the masses blamelessly, and he would guard plans against the enemy best’’ (3.82.2). Thucydides develops this theory of good monarchy further in his portrait of Pericles. In Thucydides’ judgment, Pericles had the moral authority to guide the masses into making the right decisions. As a consequence, Pericles became more of an absolute ruler than merely a leader in a democracy: ‘‘Because he was powerful both in his reputation and in his intelligence, and, because he was manifestly incorruptible, he restrained the masses without compulsion. He was not led by the masses, but rather he himself was the leader. . . And what was in name a democracy, became in fact the rule of the foremost man’’ (2.65). Thucydides drew a strong connection between the moral qualities of Pericles and his ability to check what he perceived to be the unethical tendencies and thoughtless impulses of the masses, namely their propensity to swell up with overweening arrogance in good times and to fall into despondency and cowardice in bad times.
The monarchist solution, then, avoided the pitfalls of tyranny by suggesting that single leaders must meet the highest ethical standards, since it is only then that they can avoid becoming tyrants on the one hand, or pandering to the basest desires of the people and becoming demagogues on the other hand.1 The dangers of the latter scenario were illustrated for Thucydides and other critics by the fate of Athens following Pericles’ death. According to Thucydides, rival politicians looking to their narrow self-interest, fed the base desires of the people and ruined the city (2.65; Ar. Knights). On the other hand, the short-lived oligarchies of the late fifth century (411/10 and particularly 404/3) showed that restricting power to the ‘‘better’’ classes did not guarantee ethical and effective rule. Indeed, the oligarchs of 404/3 became known as the Thirty Tyrants because of the brutal nature of their regime. Their example invalidated any simple equation between wealth, social standing, and good government. One solution to this impasse, as we shall see, was to focus on the moral education of the rulers.
World History
