Thought

Psellos taught all branches of philosophy (i. e., logic, natural philosophy, and metaphysics). He was undoubtedly among the most prominent scholars of the eleventh and twelfth centuries and greatly contributed to the revival of philosophical studies in Byzantium. In particular, he provided philosophical instructions by closely reading and commenting on the works of ancient philosophers, and especially on Aristotle’s logical treatises, which he thought should be given a propaedeutic role as a necessary preparation for dealing with more philosophical issues, but also as an intellectual exercise which enables one to dispose off heretical views. Thus, Psellos commented on and paraphrased treatises from the Aristotelian Organon (Categories, De interpretatione, Prior Analytics). The commentary on Aristotle’s Physics attributed to him in some manuscripts has recently been argued to be the work of George Pachymeres. Moreover, Psellos wrote a large number of short treatises discussing particular philosophical issues raised, in part at least, by his pupils, such as, for instance, the distinction between homonyms and synonyms, the characteristic of substance as self-existent, the Platonic Forms, the unity of the soul and the body, the problem of evil, and dreams. He also compiled a short encyclopedia with the title De omnifaria doctrina, a set of brief outlines of various notions in philosophy, science, and theology. Many of the works attributed to him are spurious, for example the so-called De daemonibus.

Although the amount of attention he paid on Aristotle’s treatises was significant, there is no doubt that Psellos had a strong preference for Plato and the Neopla-tonists. His works show that he carefully read Plotinus, Porphyry, Iamblichus, and especially Proclus, whom he considered as an authority among ancient authors. He also had a close familiarity with most of the Greek commentators, whom he treated as helpful guides to the works of Plato and Aristotle, and drew extensively from them, for instance Alexander of Aphrodisias, Ammonius, Philoponus, and Olympiodorus. In general, Psellos was well acquainted with the whole corpus of Greek philosophy, which at the time was somewhat larger than it is now, since he read and used some works which have since disappeared; for example, Proclus’ Commentary on Plotinus, his Commentary on the Chaldaean Oracles, lamblichus’ On Pythagoreanism V-VII, and most probably other works which have not yet been identified.

In his philosophical views Psellos may not have been an innovator, but he systematically tried to reconcile the Christian dogma with the ancient philosophical traditions. This at times required some independent thinking on his part, in the form of a slightly different argument from those found in the ancient texts or some interesting additions to already established views. But there is certainly little evidence to support the view that he was a revolutionary or a cultural extremist in renouncing Christianity in favor of Hellenism. It is true, though, that in his attempts to advance philosophical learning he was often attacked concerning his theological orthodoxy, so that he often had to be careful to distance himself from heretical doctrines, as for example in his writings on the Chaldaean Oracles. Thus, Psellos was instrumental in the revival of the serious study of ancient philosophy, but at the same time he was able to clear himself of the charge of heresy, in contrast to his student John Italos.

Psellos strongly believed that the philosopher should be a man of comprehensive learning and he often stressed on the importance of polymatheia, that is to say of a boundless curiosity and wide knowledge, which he invoked in order to defend the study of the pagan texts of antiquity. There are many passages in Psellos’ writings in which he underlines the importance of rational philosophical thinking, logical syllogisms, and especially demonstrations, as something which essentially characterizes human beings and helps them in their attempt to understand reality, and in particular nature. Moreover, Psellos explicitly argued that logical reasoning does not bring one into conflict with Christian doctrine; on the contrary, the use of logical syllogisms is said to be an indispensable instrument in our pursuit of truth. At the same time, however, Psellos juxtaposed the kind of knowledge we derive from logical reasoning to another kind, namely wisdom or dialectic, which can be acquired neither through demonstration nor through inductive reasoning. For there are things, according to Psellos, which cannot be understood by rational thought, ineffable things which are beyond demonstration.

Indeed, Psellos, invoking Plato’s authority, claimed that wondering about the ineffable and the supernatural constitutes the ultimate task of philosophy. He, therefore, adhered to the view that the human mind is capable of grasping the truth both through reason and through illumination; that is to say, there are things which can be known by reason, while others, namely the ultimate principles of reality, can be known only by illumination. Difficult though it may be to draw the line between the things known by reason and those known by illumination, at least Psellos in many of his writings gives us some idea of how he understands the notion of illumination; he describes it as the state which presupposes the end of all rational thinking and the prevalence of silence after a great deal of turmoil. In this, Psellos clearly followed the Neo-platonists, and in particular Proclus, with the difference that in Proclus the soul’s illumination comes from the intellect, whereas in Psellos the Neoplatonic intellect is replaced by the Christian God.

See also: > John Italos > Logic, Byzantine