Given the diversity of the peoples inhabiting the Ottoman Balkans it is impossible to generalise about their condition and development in this period. The picture is also complicated by the fact that the landowning class everywhere except the Romanian principalities, and substantial numbers of the town-dwelling and administrative classes throughout the region, were Muslim and hence, with significant exceptions, of a different ethnicity than the surrounding population. Nevertheless certain shared factors shaped the lives of all the Balkan peoples.
The centuries of Ottoman rule had, firstly, increased the ethnic and confessional intermixture of the region. Christians had fled, occasionally en masse, to the more mountainous areas of the Balkan Peninsula or to the Habsburg Monarchy, and in their place the Ottoman authorities encouraged Muslims or more reliable peoples to settle. Secondly, the entire region was affected by the economic backwardness of the Empire: despite a gradual increase in trade with the outside world, and the emergence of limited handicraft-based manufacturing in the areas closest to Constantinople, the Balkans continued to be an economic backwater in comparison with Western and even Central Europe, not least because of the almost total absence of a transport infrastructure. Thirdly, and despite the survival of a native landowning class in the Romanian lands and the emergence of local Christian notables through commerce, the need for abject submission to Ottoman authority arguably bred in the sultan's non-Muslim subjects a form of political backwardness. Especially once central authority started breaking down in the eighteenth century, and personal security became ever more precarious, habits of 'dissimulation, evasive tacts and white lies' became a necessity for survival.9
The Greeks present perhaps the most complicated and diverse picture, scattered as they were across the Empire. The Greek diaspora included not only present-day Greece but also sizeable communities in the capital, Constantinople, as well as western Anatolia, the Romanian principalities and the rest of the Black Sea littoral. In addition the Orthodox clergy almost everywhere in the Balkans, with some exceptions, tended to be Greek, a fact resented by nonGreek communicants. Despite their own low level of education these clerics constituted what little there was of an educated elite in many areas. The offices of the Patriarchy and provincial bishoprics had to be bought from the sultan, with the incumbents expected to recoup the expense through their control of taxation and the judicial system; the Orthodox hierarchy thus became a byword for rapaciousness and corruption.
The Phanariots, a select group of families from the Phanar or lighthouse quarter of Constantinople, played a special role in the Greek world. They came to prominence towards the end of the seventeenth century, when the Ottomans' military reverses necessitated an increasing use of diplomacy, which in turn required language skills only Phanariots tended to possess. Such was the Phanariots' usefulness that they virtually monopolised the office of grand dragoman (interpreter), effectively the sultan's foreign minister, as well as key administrative posts in the Ottoman navy. Phanariots were also chosen, after 1714, as the hospodars or governors of the Romanian principalities, and this period of Phanariot rule in Moldavia and Wallachia became notorious
For its venality, despite the fact that Phanariot wealth was an important source of patronage for Greek culture.
Between this cosmopolitan, wealthy but corrupt elite and the overwhelming majority of Greeks there was a vast gulf. In mountain valleys and coastal hamlets most Greeks scraped a living as peasants and fishermen; some became klephts (bandits), preying on Muslim and Christian alike, but were frequently invested in the eyes of their fellow Greeks, as elsewhere in the Balkans, with the status of rebels if not freedom fighters. Equally important in fostering a national consciousness, however, were the activities of Greek traders and seafarers. Greeks had always had links with other lands, and in the eighteenth century 'the conquering Balkan Orthodox merchant' formed the nucleus of a wealthy and increasingly educated elite. After 1774, when Ottoman Greeks were free to trade under the Russian flag, trade with Western Europe not only made some Greeks extremely wealthy, it also exposed them to western ideas and influence, and their wealth enabled them to sponsor the education of other Greeks, in some cases at western universities.10 The number of books printed in Greek between 1775 and 1800, for instance, was seven times the number printed in the preceding 75 years.11 One of the first leaders of this new intelligentsia was Adamantios Korais, an indefatigable classicist and publisher of ancient Greek texts, but aimed at a modern audience, that it might ponder the connection with its Hellenic past. By the 1790s some Greeks had identified liberation from the Ottoman yoke and the revival of a Byzantine Greek empire as the ultimate goals of the Greek nation. One such was Rigas Velestinlis, who was inspired by the French Revolution to publish a constitution for the projected new state and who was executed by the Ottoman authorities at Belgrade when, in 1798, he attempted to foment a Balkan uprising.
Among Albanians it is more difficult to discern anything like a common identity for much of the eighteenth century. Albanian speakers divide into two major dialects, Ghegs in the mountainous north of present-day Albania and Kosovo, and Tosks in the southern lowlands. Ghegs still lived in an essentially tribal society, and these clans spent much time fighting one another, with the Ottoman authorities content to exact tribute from them in return for local autonomy. The Tosks by contrast were absorbed as peasants into the Ottoman feudal system. Confessionally Albanians were split between the majority Muslims, a small number of Catholics around Shkoder and an Orthodox minority in the south-east. To complicate matters Catholics used a Latin script, Orthodox a Greek one and Muslims an Arabic script. Albanians' conversion to Islam appears frequently to have been for purely tactical reasons, to avoid the child levy or to secure the privileges of being Ottoman; certainly Muslim Albanians played an important role in the Ottoman period as soldiers and administrators, and were among those encouraged to take the place of Orthodox Serb emigrants from neighbouring Kosovo.
In the Albanian heartlands, however, tribal feuding was the bane of what little economic and cultural life there was, and in the second half of the century it produced two powerful local warlords. Mehmet Bey Bushati seized control of the pasalik of Shkoder in 1757. His son, Kara Mahmud, fought off the sultan's armies in the 1780s with Habsburg support and was finally recognised as governor of Shkoder in 1788; on Kara Mahmud's death in 1796 power in northern Albania was held by his younger brother Ibrahim Pasha until 1810. Even more successful was Ali Pasha, a bandit turned bandit hunter who in 1788 was appointed governor of loannina in Epirus and who used this strategic crossroads to extend his power over much of the western Balkans. Exploiting the rivalry of the great powers in the region, and increasingly dismissive of the sultan's authority, Ali Pasha and the eldest of his 100-odd sons after 1810 controlled southern Albania and the whole of western Greece including the Peloponnesus. If only fortuitously, this ruthless warlord provided the first focus for an Albanian national identity.
The Romanian principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia were unique, in that they had an autonomy of sorts, although in the eighteenth century this meant less than hitherto. Since medieval times the princes had been vassals of the sultan, to whom a yearly tribute was due; in return the boyars remained dominant in each principality, electing their prince from their own ranks, exempting themselves from taxation and loading it all onto the peasantry. Over the centuries there was a steady increase in the tribute and other contributions exacted by the Porte, including levies of foodstuffs for Constantinople. By the early eighteenth century up to five-sixths of each principality's revenue went to the sultan.12 Phanariot Greeks, increasingly influential at Constantinople, started settling in the principalities as merchants and ecclesiastics. By the turn of the century the shifting balance of power between the Ottoman Empire and its rivals placed the Romanian princes in a dilemma, and when Moldavia sided with Russia in the war of 1711, the Ottoman response was to replace the native rulers with Phanariot hospodars (literally governors) who would ensure the loyalty of these lucrative frontier provinces.
The Phanariot period, in Moldavia from 1711 and Wallachia from 1715, lasted until the 1820s and was one of unbridled corruption, which spelt misery for the majority of Romanians. Phanariot rule was seen as alien, although by the eighteenth century many Phanariot families had Romanianised through intermarriage, while the native boyars adopted the notoriously luxurious Phanariot lifestyle. The hospodars, like the Greek Patriarch, had to purchase their office, usually with borrowed money, and expected to recover their costs, with profit, as did all those whom they appointed to subordinate offices. Competition for these posts among Phanariot families was fierce, with the result that the average 'reign' of a hospodar was two and a half years, although several individuals held office repeatedly. While office was seen as a path to enrichment, the hospodars were nevertheless expected, on pain of death, to ensure the flow of wealth and supplies to Constantinople, so, with the boyars determined to avoid any taxation, the burden on the peasantry increased. By mid-century, however, the flight of Romanian peasants to neighbouring lands had become so widespread that even the Phanariot rulers felt obliged to tackle the issue of land reform. The solutions adopted were more efficient tax collection and the regulation of labour dues, usually upwards. This did little for the peasants while exacerbating relations with the boyars, who consistently obstructed such reforms as the taxation of the minor nobility. The boyars' political aspirations by the late eighteenth century centred increasingly on the restoration of genuine autonomy, if not full independence, and they had every reason to hope for outside support. The Treaty of Kufuk Kajnarci, in 1774, formalised Russia's interest in the principalities: henceforth Russia had a right to advise on their governance, and the amount of tribute, as well as the prices for Romanian supplies, was supposed to be regulated. In practice it proved difficult to hold the Ottoman government to these terms, and in the war of 1787—92 Russia aimed to detach the principalities entirely from Ottoman rule. The distractions of the French wars, however, meant the postponement of this agenda.
Among the South Slavs an important minority were Muslim. In the vilayet of Bosnia Muslims had long constituted the majority, a situation which appears to have been more the result of mass conversions than an influx of Ottoman Muslims. Generally, in Bosnia, the landowning class, as well as many of the officials, the urban merchants and even some peasants, were Muslim Slavs. Only in the eighteenth century did the demographic balance start swinging towards the Christians, until by the end of the century Muslims accounted for 33 per cent of the population, Orthodox Serbs 43 per cent and Catholic Croats 20 per cent.13 Bosnia's Muslims enjoyed an unusual degree of autonomy: nominally the sultan's pasha was in charge, but in practice the 39 kapetans or district military administrators were the real power in the province. In addition Bosnia was host to large numbers of janissaries, 20,000 in Sarajevo alone, and their economic independence made them, as in Constantinople, unruly. For much of the century Bosnia was wracked by open conflict between kapetans and janissaries, with the pasha only intermittently in control.
The position of Christian South Slavs was generally grimmer. Catholic Croats, most of them peasants, were concentrated in Bosnia, where their potential as supporters of the Habsburg enemy made them objects of suspicion. The Habsburg Monarchy indeed claimed the right to protect the Catholic population, financed the education of some of them in Croatia and called on Christians to revolt when it went to war against the Ottomans in 1788. Although some Croats joined the invaders, others fought on the Ottoman side, suggesting that the Porte's mistrust of the Croats was misplaced.
By the late eighteenth century Orthodox Serbs, whether in Bosnia or the neighbouring pasalik of Belgrade (the core of what became Serbia), more probably merited the suspicion of being potential rebels. In previous centuries Serbs, as members of the Orthodox millet, had been regarded as more reliable than Croats, which was why many of them were settled on the Bosnian frontier.14 Serb Orthodoxy had its own Patriarch at Pec in Kosovo. But by the 1700s Serb dissatisfaction with Ottoman rule was a matter of record: substantial numbers had risen in support of the Habsburgs in the 1680s and again in 1737; many migrated north to Habsburg territory; among those who remained, disaffection continued to be high, even surviving the negative experience of Austrian rule in 1718—39, when Serbs found themselves subjected to the proselytising attentions of the Catholic Church. Ottoman attitudes in turn were affected by the Serbs' stance and in particular by the unremitting hostility of the Serb Patriarchs, to the extent that in 1766 the Patriarchate was formally abolished. Henceforth what cultural and educational opportunities were available to Serbs were provided by the Metropolitanate at Sremski Karlovci, in Habsburg territory. Ottoman Serbs remained a largely peasant people.
Yet the Ottoman system, even after the reacquisition of Serbia in 1739, allowed Serbs some elements of self-administration. Land tenure was still largely timar, not giftlik, so that the Serb peasant had some property rights and freedom of movement. As in the Greek lands, local government was mediated through councils of notables for each knezina or district, who elected the knez or headman. The knezes were responsible for tax collection, law and order and judicial functions affecting Christians only. Although the majority of Serb notables were illiterate, they were able to amass considerable wealth as merchants, especially livestock traders; they were thus the natural leadership of the Serb community. Relations with the Ottomans remained relatively stable until the war of 1788—91, when once again the Austrians recruited Serb units, operating behind Ottoman lines. Yet again, the Habsburgs' defeat and withdrawal led to mass flight and Ottoman reprisals. In the end, the Ottoman government offered an amnesty and 50,000 Serbs returned to the pagaltk, but in the process many had become proficient in arms.
Montenegrins deserve special mention because their development in the Ottoman period set them apart from their fellow Orthodox Serb brethren. The forbidding terrain of the 'Black Mountain' made its subjugation problematical even for the Ottomans, although the Montenegrins, like their Albanian neighbours, retained a tribal system which ensured that they spent as much energy fighting one another as they did repelling outsiders. No Ottoman system of land tenure was ever imposed on Montenegro, nor was it ever easy to collect taxes. Instead, the only authority acknowledged by Montenegrin tribesmen was the bishop of Cetinje monastery; from the eighteenth century this office of prince-bishop, or Vladika, was held hereditarily by the Petrovic family. The Vladikas profited from their access to the Adriatic to secure support against the Ottomans, first from Venice and then increasingly from Russia; Bishop Vasilije was a frequent visitor to St Petersburg and, in 1754, published a History of Montenegro in Moscow. Relations were spoiled only when, in 1766, an impostor claiming to be the murdered Tsar Peter III turned up in Cetinje and managed to oust the Vladika; only 15 years after 'Stephen the Small' was assassinated by an Ottoman agent in 1773 was Montenegro again courted by Catherine the Great for its support against the Porte. The Montenegrins remained largely isolated, however, and it was thanks to their own efforts that the pasha of Shkoder, Kara Mahmud, was beaten back and, on his second foray into Montenegro, captured and beheaded in 1796.
Finally, the lot of the Bulgarians was determined largely by their proximity to the Ottoman capital. Spread across several provinces today divided between Bulgaria, Macedonia and Greece, they remained an Orthodox peasant underclass, with few notables, because the concentration of giftlik land was highest in these areas and because there was a much higher population of Muslims, including ethnic Turks, in addition to the minority of Bulgarian-speaking Muslims, the Pomaks. Towns remained almost exclusively Muslim, with the exception of the ubiquitous Greek merchants and a few Bulgarians; only towards the end of the eighteenth century did Bulgarians start entering trade guilds in numbers. The abolition in 1767 of the Archbishopric of Ohrid by the Greek Orthodox Patriarch in Constantinople meant that henceforth the priesthood was mainly Greek, and what little schooling was available to Bulgarians was in Greek. Although the Bulgarian population had the same degree of local self-administration as other Christian peoples, the benefit of this was vitiated by the high degree of public insecurity, not only because of banditry and marauding soldiery but, increasingly, because of the same breakdown of Ottoman official control over local Muslim notables that afflicted other provinces.
World History
