In spite of this snub, Guderian went back to Ziegenberg on January 1, 1945 in the hope of getting O. K.W. to see things his way. In his view, the centre of gravity of German strategy had to be brought hac-k to the Eastern Front. But when Himmler was about to unleash the "Norciwinci” offensive which was to follow "Her'bst-nebel", with Saverne as its objective, Jodi was as unenthusiastic about Guder-ian’s ideas as Hitler had been. "We have no right,” he pointed out to him, "to give up the initiative we have just regained;
Shown the door for the second time, Guderian nevertheless made a third attempt to see Hitler to remind him of his responsibilities towards the Eastern Front. As the days passed without any decision being made, the Russians completed their preparations and, according to Gehlen’s reckoning, their "steamroller”, now building up its pressure, had at least: 231 infantry divisions, 22 tank corps, 29 independent tank brigades, and three cavalry corps, supported by air forces that the Luftwaffe could not hope to match.
After taking the advice of Colonel-Generals Harpe and Reinhardt, commanders of Army Groups "A” and "Centre”, against which the threat was mounting, Guderian drew up the following programme and presented it to Hitler on January 9:
1. Evacuation of the Kurland bridgehead.
2. Transfer to the East of a number of armoured units then fighting on the Western Front.
3. Abandonment of the line of the Narew and withdrawal of Army Group "Centre” to the East Prussian frontier, which was shorter and better protected.
4. Evacuation of the Army Group "A” salient between the bridge at Baranow and Magnuszew through which, according to Gehlen, 91 Soviet infantry divisions, one cavalry corps, 13 tank corps, and nine tank brigades were ready to break out.
In presenting these proposals, Guderian might have had in mind Jodi’s opinion that some ground could still be sacrificed in the East. But he had hardly put before Hitler the comparative table of opposing forces which accompanied the plan, than the Fiihrer broke out into a spate of abuse and sarcasm. A violent scene then took place which Guderian has described as follows:
"Gehlen had very carefully prepared the documentation on the enemy situation, with maps and diagrams which gave a clear idea of the respective strengths. Hitler flew into a rage when I showed them to him, called them 'absolutely stupid’ and demanded that I send their author immediately to a lunatic asylum. I too became angry then. 'This is General Gehlen’s work,’ I said to Hitler. 'He is one of my best staff officers. I wouldn't have submitted it to you if I hadn’t first agreed it myself. If you demand that General Gehlen be put into an asylum, then send me to one too!’ I curtly refused to carry out Hitler’s order to relieve Gehlen of his post. The storm then calmed down. But no good came of it from a military point of view. Harpe's and Reinhardt’s proposals were turned down to the accompaniment of the expected odious remarks about generals for whom 'manoeuvre’ only meant 'withdraw to the next rearward position’. This was all very unpleasant.”
World History
