The Twentieth Congress of the CPSU, in February 1956, brought fundamental changes to the East Central European countries. The principle of peaceful coexistence, which was articulated by the Soviet leadership as early as 1953, now acquired the status of long-term doctrine, and would be in force until the dissolution of the Soviet Union. This principle, based on the thesis that war between the socialist and capitalist camps was not inevitable, enabled the countries ofthe Soviet bloc to concentrate their resources on internal development to a much greater extent than before.
This was a promising development from the point of view of East-West relations in general, and it also led to significant changes within the Soviet bloc, both in terms of the relationship between the Soviet Union and its allies (as mentioned above) and in terms of the internal development of each East European country. Khrushchev’s vision for the Soviet bloc was to ensure sustainable political stability through a general process of de-Stalinization, in which each state could maintain economic growth and provide sufficient food supplies and tolerable living conditions without changing the basic structure of the Leninist-Stalinist Communist system.
The Twentieth Congress of the CPSU in 1956 created the necessary conceptual preconditions for this move. Although party leaders in Eastern Europe were not invited to the meeting at which Khrushchev delivered his secret report on the crimes committed by Stalin, they were subsequently sent the full text of the speech. In Poland, against the wishes of Soviet leaders, the speech was circulated for three successive weeks in April 1956 to a much wider audience, including nonparty members.465 Nor did the Kremlin anticipate that the text would fall into the hands of Western intelligence services. The US State Department then published the full text on June 4, and, thereafter, it was broadcast on Radio Free Europe in the various languages of the region.
Just as the original process of Sovietization between 1944 and 1949 was different in each Eastern bloc state, de-Stalinization took a significantly different course in several of these countries. Seeking to maintain political stability at any cost, the Soviets did not impose truly radical changes, so they left de-Stalinization mostly in the hands of "local Stalins." In turn, the leaders of the GDR, Czechoslovakia, and Romania claimed that their countries did not
Need any new, significant changes because they had been evolving since 1953. Nevertheless, large numbers of political prisoners were granted amnesty in the spring and summer of 1956 in the GDR, Czechoslovakia, and Poland.466
The attitude of the leaders in Bulgaria was very similar, although they could not avoid sacrificing some of their colleagues. Vulko Chervenkov, the Bulgarian dictator, was forced to hand over leadership of the party to Todor Zhivkov as early as 1954, and in April 1956 he lost the office of prime minister as well. A revised outcome to Trajcho Kostov’s show trial in 1949 transpired soon after. However, Chervenkov kept his position in the leadership with the dual role of deputy prime minister and member of the Politburo, and he was quite successful in sabotaging the process of de-Stalinization until 1962. Nevertheless, since Chervenkov was the first top-level victim of de-Stalinization in the Soviet bloc, his downfall had an important impact in the whole region and inspired hope for similar changes in other countries, especially in Hungary.
In Poland, the situation was also unique. Boleslaw Bierut, the leading Polish Stalinist, fell ill while attending the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU and died in Moscow. Khrushchev nominated his successor, Edward Ochab, who appeared to be the optimal candidate to implement the Soviet policy of de-Stalinization. In April, in the spirit of controlled liberalization, a general amnesty liberated and rehabilitated several thousand political convicts, and in the same month the parliament engaged in a real discussion of important national issues.467 Wladislaw Gomulka, the former head of the party who had managed to survive the Stalinist show trials that befell his counterparts elsewhere in the region, emerged from prison, raising the question of whether he might return to the country’s leadership. From the beginning of 1955, ferment spread in the party and the larger society. After the publication of Khrushchev’s speech, people not only ridiculed the most extreme aspects of the Stalinist system and the mass terror, but they also clamored for more political freedom and national sovereignty.
In Hungary, Rakosi managed to muster Soviet support to stay in power until July 1956, although conditions for an anti-Stalinist turn had been ripening since the fall of 1955. Writers, journalists, and other intellectuals exerted pressure for change, especially after Rakosi had been forced to admit his personal responsibility for some of the worst show trials of the late 1940s.
Within the Petofi Circle, founded as the official discussion forum of the party’s youth organization, opposition to the established leadership began to surface, and Nagy emerged as the reformers’ choice for the top leadership post.
Meanwhile, communications and interactions within the Soviet bloc also began to change. Since 1949, the citizens of "fraternal" countries were almost hermetically closed off from one another, but in the summer of 1956 the obligatory visa system was partially abolished. Officials passed other measures to promote tourism and freer movement. Easier contact and direct communication between the societies of East Central Europe were to play important roles in the revolutionary events that broke out in the fall.
The normalization of relations with Yugoslavia - suspended in 1948 - was an element of the change taking place.468 The rapprochement took place under continuous Soviet leadership, since for Khrushchev it was very important to reintegrate Yugoslavia into the Eastern bloc. Apart from reestablishing the unity of the Communist camp and dissolving the Cominform, Soviet leaders hoped to establish a foothold in the Mediterranean. Rapprochement with Yugoslavia, however, did not imply that Moscow was prepared to accept the Yugoslav model of socialism for its East Central European allies. In fact, the Kremlin was wary of Yugoslavia’s growing influence in the region, most notably in Poland and Hungary. Soviet officials suspected that the Yugoslav socialist model - with an active popular front, extensive workers’ selfmanagement, and a record of attentiveness to local and national concerns - might prove more appealing than the Soviet system. Thus, the Kremlin’s main purpose for convening a Soviet bloc summit in late June 1956 was to inform the allies about Tito’s recent two-week visit to the Soviet Union and to insure they did not misinterpret the evolving relationship. Later in July, the presidium of the CPSU sent a secret communique to the leaders of the allied countries, cautioning them that the Soviet Union would take a dim view of any exaggerated promotion of the Yugoslav model.469
At the same time, the Soviet leadership started worrying about the course of internal developments in East Central Europe. Their concerns were not without foundation, for on June 28, 1956, an armed uprising broke out in the industrial city of Poznan in Poland, in the course of which the workers fought a real battle with Polish military and state security troops. The events unfolded along the lines of the pattern seen before in Plzen and East Berlin: a mass demonstration began with demands of an economic nature, but quickly turned
Into an anti-Communist uprising. The insurgents seized the police headquarters, armed themselves, and then broke into the public prosecutor’s office. They stormed prisons, fTeed prisoners, and then assaulted the headquarters of the security forces. The violence claimed the lives of seventy-three civilians and eight members of the armed forces, while several hundred people were wounded.470
Following the Poznan uprising, the Soviets were eager to avoid further outbreaks of social discontent in the region and decided upon political intervention as their method. They decided to replace Rakosi as the head of the Hungarian party in July 1956, thereby hoping to ease political tensions in the country. CPSU presidium member Anastas Mikoian went to Budapest, and advised the reluctant Hungarian Workers’ Party Central Committee to elect Erno Gero, another leading Stalinist, as first secretary of the party. This displeased the Hungarians who - since the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU - had been expecting a more flexible and reformed Communist system. Realizing the seriousness of the situation, Mikoian informed local leaders that the Soviet Union would not hesitate to assist the Hungarian party.471 Khrushchev passed a similar message to Tito through Veljko Micunovic, the Yugoslav ambassador in Moscow, informing him that, should conditions deteriorate, the Soviet leadership was prepared to use all possible means to deal with the situation in Hungary and prevent a breach in the socialist camp.472
World History
