During the night our reconnaissance elements were able to determine that the enemy had taken up a defensive position some two miles distant in Defuy Woods. The regiment ordered the 2nd Battalion to cross the highway at 0600 and take the woods. Units from the 123rd Grenadier Regiment were to advance on our right. (Sketch 5)
At H hour the battalion attacked with two companies (6th and 7th) in the assault and two companies (5th and 8th) echeloned to the left rear. Our left flank advanced toward the northeast corner of the woods. I rode between the 6th and 7th Companies. There was no sign of the grenadiers on our right. At this point we received this order: “Stay the advance. Remain where you are.”
I transmitted the order and galloped back to the regimental command post on Hill 260 to find out the why and wherefore of the order. Colonel Haas wanted the attack held up until the 123rd could get going and he had no idea when that would be.
In the meantime the French artillery had become active and was laying its fire on the two reserve companies which were bunched together in the open.
Sketch 5
Assault on the Defuy Woods,
(a) Battle near Pretz on August 6th. (b) Position at which attack was halted August 7th. (c) Storming of Defuy Woods, (d) Rommel's movement to cut off
French retreat.
The French artillery observers had an excellent view of our lines from the northern edge of the woods.
I dashed forward with the battalion order for the assault echelon to entrench in the potato fields and vegetable plots. On my way back, a French battery drew a bead on me, and I had to zigzag to avoid getting hit by the shrapnel it was throwing my way.
The French artillery fire, with medium guns adding their weight, increased in intensity. The 5th Company was lying on the ground in closed column, and a single shell wiped out two entire squads. The front-line units were well concealed and dug in and so did not share the fate of the 5th Company.
A battery of the 49th Artillery Regiment, which took up the fight from positions near Hill 260, received a bad mauling from the French counter-battery fire.
The battalion and regimental command posts were located close together in a cut on the highway a mile and a quarter northeast of Vaubencourt. It did not take the French batteries long to lay an extremely heavy concentration on the cut. And no wonder! The heavy traffic in messengers and horsemen, not to mention the numerous command posts had given the location away. Shell after shell came howling down upon us sending cascades of splinters, earth and stones flying over our heads. This fire kept up for hours, making it impossible for us to resume our attack.
Tired and exhausted, I tried to catch up on some lost sleep while lying in the roadside ditch. We had by now become so inured to the shelling that even bursts in the immediate vicinity failed to unduly disturb us. Although the greater part of the woods bordering our portion of the roadway was torn up during the course of the day, we sustained few casualties.
Towards dusk, the order came to resume the attack on the Defuy woods. It ended our brooding inactivity. The 3rd Battalion would lead the assault, with the 2nd Battalion on its left and the 123rd Regiment on its right. As the units took their positions, the French artillery fire diminished noticeably and then fell silent.
I rode ahead and set the Battalion in motion. Amazingly, we encountered neither artillery nor small-arms fire from the French. Had the enemy cleared out again?
The front line—a skirmish line at four-pace intervals—crossed the low ground six hundred yards northwest of the woods and climbed the slope. On the right the grenadiers and the 3rd Battalion were abreast of each other. The reserve (1st Battalion 124th Infantry and the Machine-Gun Company) followed a couple of hundred yards behind the attacking troops.
I rode behind the 7th Company which was on the extreme left. Dusk was falling.
All remained quiet until we were some 150 yards from the woods, when, to our surprise, the French opened on us. A brisk fire fight resulted, and the company reserves were rushed up and hit the dirt alongside the men in the front line. Nobody had much protection, and the heavy fire drove the entire regiment to cover. Some of the machine-gun platoons unlimbered their weapons and opened up on the French. They were trying to shoot over the heads of our own front line, but the yells that came from up ahead told us that our machine guns were firing into our forward elements. The entire action was over in less time than it takes to tell it.
I was mounted on the extreme left flank of the battalion. From there I galloped across to the machine guns, had them cease fire, dismounted and handed my horse to the first man nearby and then took charge of a platoon which I led to the left of the battalion. There the machine guns were promptly emplaced and opened on the enemy. Aided by this additional fire support we pressed the attack together with the units on the right. Now all signs of fatigue and exhaustion had left us; our fighting pitch was at fever heat and we wanted to come to grips with the enemy. Rifle fire tore gaps in our ranks, but did not stop us, and we smashed into the woods only to find that the enemy had again broken off and abandoned his positions. The regiment ordered the woods cleared but the thick undergrowth did not make that an easy task. Why not go around the woods and cut the French off? It did not take me long to decide. With two squads and the heavy machine-gun platoon I climbed the slope on the left of the woods. Here there was no underbrush to slow us down and we could not conceive of the enemy moving through the woods as quickly as we were advancing around them. Out of breath, we finally reached the eastern corner of the woods. It was still light enough to shoot and we observed that we had a field of fire that covered the southern exit of the woods for a distance of several hundred yards. Feverishly we got the heavy machine guns into position and the riflemen concealed themselves close to the eastern corner along the edge of the woods. The enemy was expected to emerge from the woods at any moment. To the right and rear we could hear German signals.
Minutes passed with no signs of the enemy and slowly the light faded. Over on the left the blazing buildings in Rembercourt lit the sky. My conscience was bothering me for I had taken the heavy machine-gun platoon without the regimental commander's permission. Since all prospects of a fight had vanished, I released the platoon and returned it to its company. It had scarcely left when one of the riflemen pointed out a column of men, visible in the light of the fires from Rembercourt, passing over the bare crest of the hill about one hundred and sixty yards away. Frenchmen! I could distinguish their kepis and bayonets with my field glasses. There was no doubt that the enemy was withdrawing in close order. I regretted sending the machine-gun platoon away only a few minutes before but it was too late to recall the order.
My sixteen rifles opened with rapid fire at the enemy. Contrary to our expectations, the French did not break and run but rushed at us yelling avantV" Judging from the volume of sound, there must have been one or two companies of them. We fired as fast as we were able but they kept coming. I dragged back some of my men who were about to retire on their own hook. Apparently our fire was forcing the enemy to hit the dirt. It was hard to pick out the enemy soldiers on the level meadow land and in the light of the burning buildings of Rembercourt. His leading elements were some thirty or forty yards in front of us. I had made up my mind not to give way to their superior numbers until they were ready to deliver a bayonet charge. The charge never materialized.
Our fire had dampened the enemy's enthusiasm for an attack. The battle cry of “en avantV" ceased. Only five French machine-gun pack horses, carrying two machine guns continued to advance as far as the edge of the woods where they were captured. It grew quiet around us. Apparently the enemy was retreating toward Rembercourt. A reconnaissance detail which went out and gathered in a dozen prisoners reported that some thirty dead and wounded French littered the field.
Where was the 2nd Battalion? Apparently it had not pushed on through Defuy Woods as per order. To re-establish contact I went back to the northeast corner of the woods with two men who brought the prisoners and pack horses along. I left the remainder of my two squads in position.
On the way, I ran into the regimental commander. Colonel Haas was not at all pleased with what had happened on the edge of the woods. His opinion was that I had not been firing on Frenchmen but on elements of the Grenadier Regiment. Even the prisoners and pack horses with their machine guns failed to convince him.
Observations: The attack on September 7 against the Defuy Woods had to be carried out over terrain that was two miles in width and offered little or no cover. On regimental order the attack was held up because the unit on the right had not advanced. At the same time, the French artillery began a heavy bombardment. The deployed elements of the 2nd Battalion quickly took cover in the potato field and found protection from this fire by digging with their spades.
They had no casualties in spite of the heavy day-long artillery bombardment. On the other hand, the close order of a reserve company led to heavy casualties from enemy artillery fire. This teaches us again that no massing together is permissible within enemy artillery range and re-emphasizes the importance of the spade.
The regimental and battalion command posts were situated close together in a highway cut. Their location was betrayed to the enemy by the large number of messengers who converged there from all directions. The enemy reacted properly and plastered the place with artillery fire. Command posts must be dispersed.
All traffic, either on foot or mounted, must approach by roads and paths hidden from enemy observation. The enemy must not be able to distinguish a command post, hence, do not choose a conspicuous hill for its location. After dark French artillery fire ceased. It was displacing to the rear, probably to avoid capture in event of a German night attack. The French infantry let the Germans approach to within 130 yards before opening up, engaged in fire fight of a few minutes' duration and then, sheltered by the woods and approaching darkness, broke off contact and withdrew. Our losses were heavy; at the end of the day on September 7 we had 5 officers and 240 men on our regimental casualty list.
In the excitement of the fight, elements of the machine-gun company fired over the heads of the crowded infantry line lying four hundred yards ahead of them on a rising slope in an effort to reach the enemy on the edge of the woods six hundred yards away. This created a very dangerous situation for the frontline units. Believing that enemy resistance was over, we abandoned our assault formation in depth and brought the reserves and machine-gun units up to the front line. We paid a heavy price for this tactical error when the enemy opened on us with well-aimed rifle fire at a range of one hundred fifty yards.
In similar situations some of the soldiers will often lose their nerve and break for cover. The commander must take vigorous action, using his personal weapons if necessary.
World History
