The main military problem facing the Israelis on the conclusion of the first truce was posed by the strongest and most effective Arab army, the Arab Legion. This was besieging the city of Jerusalem; from the towns of Lod (Lydda) and Ramie, Arab forces also posed a direct threat to Tel Aviv, the main Jewish population centre. Furthermore, the main railway junction of
The country was at Lod, in addition to the only international airport. Two Arab Legion infantry battalions supported by armour and artillery were concentrated in the Latrun sector; Ramie and Lod were well fortified and held mainly by local Arab forces, irregular units, several hundred tribesmen from Transjordan, and small detachments of the Arab Legion.
A blow at the Arab Legion was the essence of Operation ‘Danny’ , planned as the main Israeli offensive to be mounted on the resumption of hostilities. Its aim was to relieve Jerusalem again and remove the threat to Tel Aviv. The first phase was to occupy the areas of Lod and Ramie; the second phase called for the capture of Latrun and Ramallah with the object of raising the siege on Jerusalem. The operation was to be carried out by Yigal Allon, commander of the Palmach, and the forces allotted were the ‘Harel’ and ‘Yiftach’ Brigades with the ‘Kiryati’ Brigade and the 8th Armoured Brigade in support. Elements of the ‘Alexandroni’ and ‘Etzioni’ Brigades were also attached to the operation. From the north, the 8th Armoured Brigade supported by battalions from the ‘Alexandroni’ and ‘Kiryati’ Brigades was ordered to capture Lod Airport and exploit success into the foothills to the east, in the area of the military camp at Beit Nabala; the ‘Yiftach’ Brigade was to provide the southern flank of the pincer movement.
Under Colonel ‘Mula’ Cohen, who had successfully commanded the Brigade in the battle for Safed and the fighting in Galilee, the ‘Yiftach’ attack commenced from the south at nightfall on 9 July, and cleared several Arab villages in the area. To the north, the 8th Armoured Brigade under Colonel Yitzhak Sadeh, fielded a battalion of tanks — the first used in the IDF, including ten French H-35 light tanks and two British Cromwells brought over by deserters. These and a number of armoured cars advanced with units of the ‘Kiryati’ Brigade and the ‘Alexandroni’ Brigade operating on the flanks, and took the airport.
The two pincer movements were to meet at Ben Shemen, a Jewish children’s village that had been isolated for months. The ‘Yiftach’ Brigade from the south reached there, but the 8th Armoured Brigade from the north encountered severe difficulties because of numerous technical problems, which the inexperienced troops operating the tanks had difficulty in overcoming. In the meantime, while the pincer movement in the north was held up, the 89th Mechanized Commando Battalion, under Lieutenant-Colonel Moshe Dayan, pressed forward towards Lod, where units of the ‘Yiftach’ Brigade were now encountering difficulties. Dayan’s battalion, mounted on half-tracks and jeeps and including an armoured car captured from the Arab Legion, stormed through the town firing in all directions and then retraced its noisy path back through the town. This daring operation unnerved the defenders, enabling ‘Yiftach’ Brigade units to take advantage of the ensuing panic during which the bulk of the population of Lod fled en masse. The town surrendered to the ‘Yiftach’ Brigade, but rose in arms again when an Arab Legion unit counterattacked, but the Israelis beat off the attack and secured the town. The next day. Ramie surrendered and was occupied by units of the ‘Kiryati’ Brigade.
Operation 'Danny' — Western Sector, 9-12 July 1948
Glubb, commander of the Arab Legion, had meanwhile been under considerable pressure to reinforce Lod and Ramie, but the only forces on which he could draw were the two battalions at Latrun, the 4th and 2nd Regiments — to have any effect it would have been essential for him to deploy a full battalion. He was of the opinion that, should the Israeli attack succeed, then it would not be possible for him to prevent the Israeli forces from breaking through at Latrun and advancing to Ramallah. He did not believe that a single battalion could resist such an advance. His decision not to reinforce placed him under considerable pressure, and was to be the subject of bitter reproaches from the rest of the Arab world. After the fall of Lod and Ramie, Arab Legion troops were stoned and insulted in the streets of Ramallah, and Glubb himself was accused of treachery at a meeting of the Jordanian Cabinet in the presence of King Abdullah. However, having regard to the forces available to Glubb at the time and his appreciation of the vital and pivotal importance of Latrun in the Arab position to the west of Jerusalem, there is no doubt that his decision from a military point of view was in fact a correct one.
An Arab Legion company, the 5th Independent Infantry Company, had in fact been in the police station at Lod, but during the fighting Glubb had ordered its withdrawal. It had been the counterattack of this unit coupled with the appearance of a troop of Arab Legion armoured cars on reconnaissance on the outskirts of Lod that had brought about the revolt of the Arab population in the town — believing as it did that the Arab Legion had returned in force.
In the meantime, the ‘Harel’ Brigade under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Joseph Tabenkin had captured a number of villages in the Jerusalem Corridor preparatory for its principal mission of raising the siege of Jerusalem and capturing Ramallah. It became clear, however, from the debates in the Security Council of the United Nations, that yet another cease-fire would soon be imposed. (This pattern was to repeat itself on many occasions in the future military history of Israel, because the automatic majority mobilized in the United Nations over the years by the Arabs and the Communist bloc would inevitably carry the day against Israel’s interests. For, as was to occur on many occasions, when it appeared that the Jewish forces were hard-pressed, the United Nations organization dragged its feet and saw no urgency whatsoever in bringing the hostilities to a conclusion; but, when it appeared that the Israelis were gaining the upper hand, the entire machinery of the community of nations was galvanized into action to prevent the Israelis from exploiting their success.) The new developments in the United Nations indicated to the Israeli Command that but a few days were left in which to complete their mission. Accordingly, the plan to take Ramallah was shelved. The forces were now to concentrate on capturing Latrun.
Glubb, as previously indicated, had very wisely decided to conserve his forces at the outset of Operation ‘Danny’ and not to dissipate them by attempting to reinforce the garrisons in Lod and Ramie. Aware of the strategic importance of Latrun, he concentrated and indeed reinforced his forces in that area and to the north of the Jerusalem Corridor, ordering
Back to the Latrun area elements of the 1st Regiment, which had captured Kule only to lose it later in an Israeli counterattack.
The fourth attack on Latrun took place on the night of 15/16 July. The ‘Yiftach’ Brigade, supported by an armoured battalion from the 8th Armoured Brigade and by elements of the ‘Kiryati’ Brigade, captured the area north of the Latrun enclave, including the villages of Barfiliya, Salbit, El-Burj and Bir-Main, thus opening the way to bypassing Latrun on the road to Ramallah. Appreciating the danger of such a possibility, the Legion forces reacted by counterattacking. The Legion, determined to hold on at all costs to Latrun and only too aware that the Israeli plan was to isolate or encircle it, mounted some of the fiercest counterattacks launched by the Legion during the War. Many stories of bravery in these battles were later recounted. One was about the troop of armoured cars commanded by a young Bedouin who fought in the village of El-Burj: despite receiving numerous wounds, he fought on until his armoured car was a hopeless wreck; in hospital, more than 100 pieces of metal were removed from his body. On the Israeli side, a withdrawing company on the Latrun ridge left three seriously wounded men on the battlefield. A medical orderly, disobeying orders, remained with them. The bodies of all four were later found on the hill.
Meanwhile, the main ‘Harel’ effort was directed against the Latrun ridge which was held by one of the three Legion battalions (the 1st, 2nd and 4th) now concentrated in the general area of Latrun. The ‘Harel’ forces were hard-pressed as a result of an Arab Legion counterattack mounted by units of the 2nd Regiment on El-Burj and Beit Sira, and the Israeli attempt to take Latrun failed.
As the new truce approached, the ‘Yiftach’ and ‘Harel’ Brigades widened their respective areas of control. A distance of but two miles now separated the ‘Yiftach’ outposts west of the Latrun road from the ‘Harel’ outposts poised in the Jerusalem Hills to the east of the Latrun road. Yigal Allon resolved therefore to mount yet a further frontal attack on Latrun. While the ‘Harel’ units occupied the heights above Beit Nuba, from the west, the ‘Yiftach’ Brigade attacked with the support of the 8th Armoured Brigade. As a result of an error in communications, however, this support — which suffered losses from an anti-tank gun on the roof of the Latrun police station — withdrew, and the infantry did not persist in the attack. This was the last Israeli effort to capture Latrun. It continued to block the main highway to Jerusalem for the next nineteen years, until it fell to Israeli forces in the Six Day War.
Despite this setback, however, the ten days of fighting in Operation ‘Danny’ had improved the situation of the Israeli forces immeasurably: Ramie and Lod, with its international airport, were now in Israeli hands; the direct threat to Tel Aviv had been averted; and the Jerusalem Corridor had been broadened towards the south. On the night before the truce became effective, Hartuv had fallen, opening up an additional road to the city. In addition, most of the railway to Jerusalem had been cleared. Nevertheless, the threat against the main road to Jerusalem remained so long as the Arab Legion continued to control Latrun.
In Jerusalem itself, operations were mounted with a view to widening the southern part of the Corridor in the areas of Malha and Ein Kerem, with the purpose of taking complete control of the railway line from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. On the night of 9/10 July, a company of the Gadna (a youth battalion consisting of boys aged sixteen and seventeen), which had fought throughout the siege of Jerusalem, took the area later to be known as Mount Herzl, which dominated Ein Kerem. Malha, to the south, was taken too. For its part, the 1st Brigade of the Arab Legion, led by units of the 3rd Regiment, attacked in the Mandelbaum area, occupying a number of buildings. On the last night before the truce, an additional Israeli attack was mounted on the Old City. An Irgun unit managed to break through the New Gate, but was able to advance only a short distance within before being obliged to withdraw. A simultaneous attempt by an ‘Etzioni’ unit to break into the Zion Gate also failed.
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